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This dissertation investigates the relationship between German Protestant 
missionaries and secular leaders of colonial politics and culture in the German 
colonial empire during the nineteenth century. In particular, it examines how 
missionaries defined their collective identity as an international one against pressures 
that encouraged mission societies to adopt and promote policies that favored the 
German colonial state and German colonial economic actors. Protestant missionaries 
in Germany   created an alternative ideology to govern Germans’ and Germany’s 
relationships with the wider world. The dissertation examines the formation of an 
internationalist missionary methodology and ideology by German missionary 
intellectuals from 1870 and the shift to traditional Protestant nationalism during 
World War I.  It then examines the application by missionaries of this ideology to the 
major issues of Protestant mission work in German East Africa: territorial rivalries 
with German Catholic mission orders, mission school policy, fundraising in the 
German metropole, and international missionary cooperation. In so doing, it revises 
 
conventional interpretations about the relationship between Protestantism and 
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Figure 1. German Mission Stations in German East Africa, 1914 (Source: Roland 
Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa [London: Longmans, Green and Co., 






 German missionaries of the nineteenth century supported an internationalist 
ideology of Christian evangelization. When Gustav Warneck, leader of the German 
Protestant mission movement, described the purpose of mission work, he declared 
that mission “should found an empire, but not a global empire” for Germans. Instead, 
missionaries should strive to create a “heavenly empire” of Christians.1 In this 
dissertation, I argue that late nineteenth-century German Protestant missionaries, 
German mission societies, and the German mission movement in general viewed 
themselves and their community as members of an international community of 
believers. German Protestant missionaries and supporters defined their work as an 
integral component of the universal, evangelical movement of global Protestants that 
made up the ever-expanding Kingdom of God that would, given time, coincide with 
the entirety of humanity. German missionaries believed themselves internationalists, 
but they struggled against nationalist conceptions of their purposes, initially from the 
outside but eventually also from the inside of their movement. I will demonstrate the 
relative strength of German missionaries’ internationalism, how this internationalism 
led the German missionary movement to respond to the colonial state and other 
secular colonial powers, and show how circumstances after the turn of the twentieth 
                                                 
1 Warneck, “Die christliche Mission und die überseeische Politik,“ Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift 28 




century allowed a nationalist mission theory to preempt the older tradition of 
internationalism. 
German Protestant missionaries’ internationalism, in nineteenth-century 
German politics and culture, defined itself contra nationalism. Throughout this 
dissertation the term internationalism will be used to refer to German Protestant 
missionaries’ preference for a community of Protestant Christians dispersed around 
the globe but joined together by a common identity devoted to bringing all of 
humanity into their evangelical community. The Protestant missionaries called this 
community a Christian community but Protestant missionary leaders only 
sporadically considered Catholics and other non-Protestant Christians members of 
this community. In spite of these sectarian tendencies, the German Protestant 
missionary worldview was universalist because it imagined a community open to all 
peoples and able to encompass all peoples who willingly embraced the Gospels and 
Protestant denominational forms. Missionary internationalism challenged nationalist 
articulations of identity because it rejected any “natural” or historical human 
communitarian differences as irrelevant to Protestant Christian bonds of kinship and 
fellowship. 
This definition of missionary ideology raises a number of corollary arguments 
regarding the self-conception, the practical activities, and dominant ideologies of 
Protestant mission culture during the Gründerzeit, the period preceding the official 
establishment of a Prussian-dominated German Empire in 1871, and into the 
Kaiserreich of Bismarck and Wilhelm II. First, missionaries’ preference for 




Christian mission as a tool of the colonizing state. Missionary intellectuals’ ideology 
denied links with the colonial powers, and missionaries regularly challenged colonial 
officials, colonial policies, and other colonial interests in ways that missionaries 
interpreted to favor colonized peoples. Second, when calculating the relative strength 
of various interest groups, Protestant missionaries emerge as one of the most unified 
and influential lobbies in colonial politics. Missionaries’ ambivalence toward 
economic and settlement colonialism means that their influence is an important factor 
in assessing the intents, “successes,” and “failures” of German colonialism. 
The importance of the German Protestant mission movement within Germany 
has been underappreciated up to this point. In 1905, twenty years into Germany’s 
colonial venture, sixteen Protestant missionary societies drew support from German 
donors and ten of those societies operated in the German colonial territories. A 
mission census in 1903 indicated that over 1,000 missionaries performed the work of 
these sixteen societies in the mission field for approximately 500,000 converts. (For 
the Protestants converts were men and women who had undergone several years of 
instruction in Christianity and who had been subsequently baptized). In either case, 
the measured strength of German Protestant missionaries had doubled since 1885. 
Though mission societies never directly presented data on the numbers of their 
financial supporters, together the societies collected over 5 million marks in donations 
in 1903; 2 in 1914, just at the outbreak of the First World War, mission societies 
claimed an income of over 10 million marks in Germany.3 As a comparison, the main 
                                                 
2 [Gustav Warneck], “Die gegenwärtige Lage der deutschen evangelischen Mission,” AMZ 32(1905), 
157.  





colonial lobbying group in Imperial Germany, the German Colonial Society, peaked 
at a membership of just over 43,000 in October 1914.4 In addition to missionaries’ 
preeminence in the metropole, German missionaries also represented the most 
organized and numerous segment of Germany’s white African population.5 It is a safe 
conclusion that the influence of the Protestant mission movement in Germany 
outstripped any other colonial interest group in terms of support base and yet little 
work has been done on the political operations of the movement. 
 The political activities of the German Protestant mission movement make up 
the central concern of this dissertation. The political and religious views of Africans 
in the German Protestant mission territories are an important factor in any history of 
the German Protestant mission movement but this project is designed to analyze the 
dynamics within German Protestant circles that governed the formulations and fate of 
German Protestant missionary internationalism. As a result, this dissertation will only 
be able to make broad reference to the intentions and influence of African 
communities and polities during this period leaving a consideration of Africans’ 
participation in the formation of a German Protestant missionary Christianity for 
future research. Instead, in order to argue forcefully for the internationalism of the 
German Protestant mission movement and its eventual turn to nationalism in the last 
years of the Kaiserreich, I will concentrate on the leadership of the German Protestant 
missionaries. These men formed a circle of friends, colleagues, and acquaintances 
                                                 
4 Richard Victor Pierard, “The German Colonial Society, 1882-1914,” (PhD. diss., State University of 
Iowa, 1964), 106. 
5 According to the Jahresbericht über die Entwickelung der Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee im 
Jahre 1907/08, in 1908 missionaries were behind Handwerker, Ansiedler, Kaufleute, and Beamte in 
the African colonies overall. In East Africa, they outnumbered all occupational groups except 
Ansiedler. See Jahresbericht über die Entwickelung der Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee im 
Jahre 1907/08, Beilage zum Deutschen Kolonialblatt 1909, (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 




that provided the intellectual and political leadership of Germany’s most significant 
movement for overseas activities during the nineteenth century. They held posts as 
directors of mission societies, chairs of theology, country and city pastors, imperial 
officials, and leaders of missionary organizations that worked to support the mission 
societies abroad and in Germany. Their ideas about mission work appeared in formal 
publication and private correspondence. I will present missionary leaders’ views on 
political action, inter-confessional relations, education, fundraising, and international 
collaboration to demonstrate the forcefulness of their international beliefs and the 
impact of political and economic changes in Germany, Europe, and the world upon 
those beliefs. 
 
The Protestant Mission Movement 
 
 German Protestant communities were present at the beginning of the modern 
mission movement. August Herman Francke gathered pietists at Halle in the 
seventeenth century, which stimulated Lutherans in Germany and Denmark to begin 
foreign mission work. The contemporaneous founding of the Society for Promoting 
Christian Knowledge and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign 
Parts in 1698 and 1701 in Britain further encouraged the Danish King Frederick IV to 
establish a mission within the small Danish trading enclave at Tranquebar in South 
India. The so-called Royal Danish Halle Mission sent forth two pietist theology 




arrived in India after a long journey in 1706.6 Less than three decades later the 
Moravians in Herrnhut quickly joined the mission movement with missions to the 
Danish West Indies and the British colonies.7 British Christians responded to William 
Carey’s An Enquiry Into the Obligations of Christians8 by following Carey’s call to 
expand the existing mission movement and set about establishing a collection of new 
mission societies – the Baptist Missionary Society in 1792, the London Missionary 
Society in 1795, the Scottish and Glasgow Missionary Societies in 1796, and the 
Society for Missions to Africa and the East in 1799 (after 1812 called the Church 
Missionary Society).9 The Basel Mission Society’s foundation in the same period10 
and the extensive recruitment of continental missionaries, especially Germans, by the 
British mission societies continued the history of the German Protestant mission 
movement.11 
 The four mission societies examined as part of this dissertation can be 
separated from the larger category of all German Protestant mission societies because 
they were the only four societies with an extensive history in German East Africa. 
                                                 
6 Daniel Jeyaraj, “Mission Reports from South India and Their Impact on the Western Mind: The 
Tranquebar Mission of the Eighteenth Century,” in Converting Colonialism: Visions and Realities in 
Mission History, 1706-1914, ed. Dana Robert (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2008), 22-23. 
7 Andrew Porter, Religion versus Empire? British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas Expansion, 
1700-1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 29. 
8 William Carey, An Enquiry Into the Obligations of Christians, to Use Means for the Conversion of 
the Heathens in Which the Religious State of the Different Nations of the World, the Success of Former 
Undertakings, and the Practicability of Further Undertakings, Are Considered (Leicester: 1792). 
9 Jeffrey Cox, The British Missionary Enterprise since 1700 (New York: Routledge, 2008), 70; and 
Porter, Religion versus Empire?, 40; and Bernd Holtwick, “Licht und Schatten: Begründungen und 
Zielsetzungen des protestantischen missionarischen Aufbruchs im frühen 19. Jahrhundert,” in 
Weltmission und religiöse Organisationen: Protestantische Missionsgesellschaften im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert, ed. Artur Bogner, Bernd Holtwick, and Hartmann Tyrell (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 
2004), 225. 
10 Johannes Christian Hoekendijk, Kirche und Volk in der deutschen Missionswissenschaft, trans. 
Erich-Walter Pollmann (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1967), 23-24. 
11 Of the fifteen missionaries recruited by the Church Missionary Society between 1804 and 1813, only 




The Neukirchen and Schleswig-Holstein Missions began their work very late in the 
German colonial period and so never achieved any significance before the outbreak of 
World War I.12 In addition, distinctions can be made among the four societies; the 
Brüdergemeine’s Missionsdirektion; the Berliner Missionsgesellschaft – before 1907 
called the Gesellschaft zur Beförderung der evangelischen Missionen unter den 
Heiden zu Berlin (the Society for the Promotion of Protestant Missions amongst the 
Heathens), colloquially called Berlin I to distinguish it from the two other Berlin-
based mission societies; the Evangelisch-Lutherische Missionsgesellschaft 
(Evangelical Lutheran Mission Society or Leipzig Mission for its home city); and the 
Bethel Mission (originally the Evangelische Missionsgesellschaft für Deutsch-
Ostafrika, generally referred to by the acronym EMDOA); covered by this 
dissertation. The Brüdergemeine founded in 1732, Berlin Mission in 1824, and 
Leipzig Mission in 1832, all were considered “old missions” because they had been 
established before the creation of the German Empire in 1871 and the conquest of 
Germany’s colonies in the mid-1880s. Meanwhile, the Bethel Mission arose directly 
out of the colonial movement in 1887 and was thus considered by German missionary 
circles as a “new mission.” Beyond these characteristics the German Protestant 
mission societies that took up work in German East Africa differed in other 
significant ways.13 
 Beyond the difference in each society’s origins, there were also basic 
differences in the makeup of the mission societies. The Moravians of the 
                                                 
12 A similar distinction was made in Majida Hamilton, Mission im kolonialen Umfeld: Deutsche 
protestantische Missionsgesellschaften in Deutsch-Ostafrika (Göttingen: Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 
2009), 14n26. 





Brüdergemeine had roots among the early Czech Protestants who had followed Jan 
Hus. In the early eighteenth century they fled Habsburg persecution into the lands of 
Nikolaus von Zinzendorf. Zinzendorf, a Lutheran who had learned pietism from 
Francke in Halle, sought to integrate the Moravians with the local Lutheran 
congregations around his holdings in the Oberlausitz of southwest Saxony. 
Eventually the Brüdergemeine formed its own religious community but one whose 
simple theology of spiritual renewal allowed it to merge with both Calvinist and 
Lutheran established churches across Germany and Europe.14 The Berlin Mission’s 
founders shared the pietistic roots of Zinzendorf, but they initially intended to avoid 
the fraught theological debates over Calvinism and Lutheranism and wanted to exist 
as a nondenominational organization. However, in 1817 the King of Prussia, 
Friedrich Wilhelm III, declared the union of the Lutheran and Calvinist confessions 
under one Prussian rite.15 The Berlin Mission felt compelled to declare itself a 
mission within the Union when it was established in 1824. In effect the Berlin 
Mission adopted a “mild Lutheranism.”16 Members of the theological seminar of the 
Berlin Mission, men training to take up mission work in South Africa, objected to the 
changes. In particular, a number of orthodox Lutheran seminarians, as well as 
supporters of the established church in Saxony asserted their commitment to 
Lutheranism. The Dresden Mission Society (Evangelisch-Lutherische 
Missionsgesellschaft zu Dresden) had been established in 1832 as a support 
                                                 
14 Marcia Wright, German Missions in Tanganyika 1891-1941: Lutherans and Moravians in the 
Southern Highlands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 9-10. 
15 Christopher M. Clark, The Politics of Conversion: Missionary Protestantism and the Jews in Prussia 
1728-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 214-215; and Gerhard Ruhbach, “Die Religionspolitik 
Friedrich Wilhelms III. von Preußen,” in Bleibendes im Wandel der Kirchengeschichte: 
Kirchenhistorische Studien, ed. Bernd Moeller and Gerhard Ruhbach (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck), 1973), 307-330. 




organization for the Basel Mission and its training of missionaries for the Society for 
the Propagation of the Gospel. The Berlin defectors joined the Dresden Mission and 
with the strengthening of Lutheran sentiments amongst Dresden mission supporters 
the society declared its independence from the Basel Mission in protest of the 
expectation that seminarians accept the Anglican articles that the Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel expected its missionaries to follow.17 It was renamed the 
Leipzig Mission upon its relocation to the university city of Leipzig in 1848. The 
Bethel Mission arose in a time when these disputes amongst Protestants had mostly 
settled and had little role in the formation of the mission society. 
 The four mission societies, theologically different, also can be separated 
according to their organization. All of the mission societies had a ruling committee 
that served as the supervisory power for the mission society. The Berlin, Leipzig, and 
Bethel Missions all appointed directors to act as executives – these men made the 
majority of decisions for their societies. Even here there were further variations; 
though there is little scholarship on the Leipzig Mission’s governing style, it is clear 
that the Berlin Mission Society and the Bethel Society both ruled their missionaries 
with a high degree of authoritarianism. The Berlin Mission Society was a collection 
of aristocrats interested in preserving traditional modes of authority within their 
society.18 Friedrich von Bodelschwingh, the aristocratic churchman, philanthropist, 
leader of the Bethel community of religious reformers, and to whom the EMDOA 
                                                 
17 Paul Fleisch, Hundert Jahre lutherischer Mission (Leipzig: Verlag der Evangelisch-lutherischen 
Mission, 1936), 3. 
18 Artur Bogner, “Zur Entwicklung der Berliner Mission als Bürokratisierungsprozess,” in Bogner, 




owed its salvation from institutional and financial ruin in 1890,19 organized the 
mission society so that he could dominate as patriarch even though he did not hold 
the directorship.20 On the other hand, the Moravians operated under the supervision 
of a Missionsdirektion, a committee of leaders representing each of the church’s 
provinces that reported to the governing body of the entirety of the Brüdergemeine. In 
any case, all the mission societies maintained their independence from the organized 
churches of the German Empire.21 
 Bodelschwingh drew his missionary recruits from within his Bethel 
movement. Only the Bethel Society maintained an ongoing commitment to sending 
university-trained ministers to the East African colony.22 The Leipzig Mission in its 
early years also committed to sending out only trained ministers but by the time the 
society was working in East Africa that commitment had slipped somewhat. Of sixty 
missionaries in the field around the world in 1903, twenty-three were theologians.23 
The remainder of the missionaries from the Leipzig Mission and the missionaries of 
the Berlin Mission received their training in seminaries run by the mission societies.24 
Many of these seminarians were drawn from the working classes and nowhere more 
                                                 
19 Thorsten Altena, “Missionare und einheimische Gesellschaft: Zur Kulturbegegnung der Bethel-
Mission in Deutsch-Ostafrika 1890-1916,” in Bethels Mission (1): Zwischen Epileptischenpflege und 
Heidenbekehrung, ed. Matthias Benad (Bielefeld: Luther-Verlag, 2001), 7; Gustav Menzel, Die Bethel-
Mission: Aus 100 Jahren Missionsgeschichte (Neukirchen-Vluyn, Germany: Neukirchener Verlag des 
Erziehungsvereins, 1986), 45. For a short biography of Friedrich von Bodelschwingh see Hans-Walter 
Schmuhl, Friedrich von Bodelschwingh (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 2005). 
20 Thorsten Altena, “‘Brüder’ und ‘Väter im Herrn’: Notizen zum inneren Machtgefüge 
protestantischer deutschsprachiger Missionsgesellschaften 1884-1918,” in Mission und Macht im 
Wandel politischer Orientierungen: europäische Missionsgesellschaften in politischen 
Spannungsfeldern in Afrika und Asien zwischen 1800 und 1945, ed. Ulrich van der Heyden und Holger 
Stoecker (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2005), 68 
21 Hans-Joachim Niesel, “Kolonialverwaltung und Missionen in Deutsch-Ostafrika 1890-1914” (PhD. 
diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 1971), 54. 
22 Niesel, “Kolonialverwaltung und Missionen in Deutsch-Ostafrika 1890-1914,” 31n9. 
23 Fleisch, Hundert Jahre lutherischer Mission, 168-169. 




so than amongst those missionaries trained by the Herrnhuters. The Brüdergemeine 
sent out lay missionaries, especially artisans, and only gradually instituted a form of 
training like that given by the Leipzig and Berlin Missions.25 
 The final important variance among these four mission societies relates to 
their respective interconnections with other organizations and institutions within 
Germany and beyond. Two of the oldest missions operated internationally. The 
Moravian Church had three major provinces by the nineteenth century: Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. These three provinces gathered at decennial 
synods to decide the direction of the church; the organization’s leadership was called 
the Unitätsdirektion (Unified Directorate) and it supervised the Missionsdirektion.26 
The connections of the Leipzig Mission were also denominational and international. 
The Leipzig Mission’s rejection of the Prussian Union included a desire to offer a 
“supra-regional Lutheran alternative” to the existing non-denominational mission 
societies operating in the 1820s. This meant that the Generalversammlung (General 
Assembly) of the Leipzig Mission included representatives from the Lutheran 
Churches of Hannover, Schleswig, Thuringia and elsewhere within Germany; 
Lutherans in the Russian Empire; and from the Swedish and Danish Lutheran State 
Churches until they each established their own mission societies in the 1830s.27 The 
most intimate connections of the Berlin and Bethel Missions were, on the other hand, 
internal to Germany. The Berlin Mission enjoyed close connections with the royal 
                                                 
25 Wolfgang Gabbert, “Phasen und Grundprobleme protestantischer Mission im kolonialen Afrika – die 
Brüdergemeine bei den Nyakyusa in Tansania,” in Bogner, Holtwick, and Tyrell, Weltmission und 
religiöse Organisationen, 520-521; and Altena, “‘Brüder’ und ‘Väter im Herrn’,” 61. 
26 Wright, German Missions in Tanganyika 1891-1941, 12. 
27 Altena, “Ein Häuflein Christen mitten in der Heidenwelt des dunklen Erdteils”: Zum Selbst- und 
Fremdverständnis protestantischer Missionare im kolonialen Afrika 1884-1918 (Münster: Waxmann 




house and the pietist aristocrats of Prussia. King Friedrich Wilhelm III promised a 
yearly donation to the Berlin Mission Society of 500 thalers in 1833,28 a donation 
which the ruling Hohenzollern dynasty continued through their reign.29 Many other 
important political leaders from the Prussian aristocracy also supported the society 
and Max Berner, the last president of the society’s governing Komitee, was also the 
official within the German Colonial Department charged with managing missionary 
affairs.30 In many ways the political connections of the Bethel Mission were even 
more significant and made the society an extraordinary case. In the first place, the 
EMDOA was founded expressly to minister to Germany’s new colony in East Africa 
and its executive committee included the adventurer and colonial pioneer Carl 
Peters.31 The mission’s integration into Bodelschwingh’s Bethel movement brought 
the organization even more closely into conservative circles within Germany. It also 
meant that the Bethel Mission was tightly bound with the program of inner mission 
devoted to “re-Christianizing” Germany and institutionalized Christian welfare.32 The 
Bethel Mission’s unique nature meant that its attitudes toward fundraising and 
education were, as will be shown, distinct from the Protestant missionary mainstream. 
 The various ways in which the Protestant missions in German East Africa can 
be divided indicate the diversity of approaches and experiences of mission work that 
lay behind the label “Protestant mission movement.” Nonetheless, as this dissertation 
                                                 
28 Clark, The Politics of Conversion, 227. 
29 Verhandlungen über die vom Abgeordnetenhaus gestrichenen 500 Taler (January 5, 1870), 
BMW/bmw1/1134; and Kaiser Wilhelm II to Karl Jacobi and Otto Bismarck (July 21, 1888), GStAPK, 
I. HA Rep. 89 Zivilkabinett, Nr. 23572, Bl. 115. 
30 Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, “The Kolonialrat and the Misisonary Societies,” in van der Heyden 
and Stoecker, Mission und Macht im Wandel politischer Orientierungen, 44. 
31 Menzel, Die Bethel-Mission, 14-19; and Horst Gründer, “Deutsche Missionsgesellschaft auf dem 
Wege zur Kolonialmission,” in Imperialismus und Kolonialmission: Kaiserliches Deutschland und 
koloniales Imperium, 2nd ed., ed. Klaus Bade (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1984), 76. 




will demonstrate, the Protestant missionaries of Germany shared certain basic 
principles. These principles formed the basis of an ideology of internationalism that 
would only be superseded by a nationalist ideal of mission work at the close of the 
German colonial era. Protestant missionaries’ loyalty to their international community 
required active maintenance and led missionaries to take interesting stances on key 
issues of missionary concern. This dissertation is composed of six thematic chapters, 
each organized to interpret the development and changes in missionary thought and 
politics between 1860 and 1919. The six body chapters are designed to chronicle the 
major issues of the Protestant mission movement in order to reveal the political and 
ideological views of missionary intellectuals. 
 Chapter one, “Missionary Politics on Paper,” covers the theoretical and 
political writings of German missionary ideologues and leaders on the correct 
relationship between spiritual and political activities. This chapter concentrates on the 
theory produced by missionary leaders in print, in particular by practitioners of 
Missionswissenschaft, the academic study of mission work. For over thirty years 
Gustav Warneck, founder of Missionswissenschaft and intellectual godfather of late 
nineteenth-century German Protestant mission culture, and other leaders argued for 
the strictest possible separation of mission activities from imperial politics. As late as 
1910 many missionary leaders still held to this position, but around 1900 influential 
members of a younger generation began to propose that German Protestant mission 
should assume a more nationalist program. This chapter discusses the resilience of 




deconstruct some of the ways in which historical contingencies challenged 
intellectual ideals. 
 The first instance of these challenges is the subject of my second chapter, 
“Confessions in Conflict.” This chapter focuses on the confessional conflicts of 
German metropolitan and colonial religious life. In particular it discusses a decade-
long political conflict between the Protestant Berlin Mission and the Catholic mission 
order of Benedictines from St. Ottilien in Bavaria. This conflict reveals some of the 
contours of missionaries’ imagined international community and demonstrates the 
tenuousness of the Protestants’ internationalism. It also demonstrates the ways that 
colonial events determined elements of the internationalist-nationalist debate. 
 On the other hand, my third chapter, “Language and Labor,” demonstrates the 
resilience of internationalism and anti-nationalism. Missionaries saw schools as the 
central component of their activities abroad and defended indigenous-language 
instruction against pressure from the state and secular colonialists for German-
language instruction. When missionaries believed their interests were threatened, they 
articulated some of their strongest defenses of their internationalist identity. Some of 
the same missionary leaders willing to use the state to defeat the Catholics stood 
strongly against the state on school issues. Chapters two and three illustrate that the 
transition from an internationalist ideology to a nationalist ideology depended on both 
political concerns and missionaries’ interpretations of their religious interests. 
 Financial concerns were the chief vehicle for the change from internationalism 
to nationalism amongst missionaries. I argue in my fourth chapter, “Mission on the 




the 1890s helped justify a turn to nationalism. Around 1900 some in the missionary 
movement began to argue for the utility of mission work to the national colonial 
project and used this argument as an inducement for financial support. This argument 
received its fullest validation in the Nationalspende of 1913, the financial success of 
which convinced many of the possible efficacy of nationalist rhetoric for missionary 
work. 
 However, at the same time that missionary ideologues and pragmatists were 
beginning to accept the nationalist vision of mission work, a strong strain of 
internationalism persisted. The 1910 Edinburgh World Mission Conference, its 
prehistory, and its aftermath all legitimated the value of the international mission 
movement to German Protestant missionaries’ goals. My fifth chapter, “Mission 
Conferences and the Persistence of Internationalism,” demonstrates that the 
Edinburgh conference and the preceding three international mission conferences fit 
neatly into German Protestant mission societies’ system of professional collaboration. 
Within a larger system of conferences, international mission meetings offered a venue 
for strategic and global concerns. They confirmed for many missionaries that the 
evangelization of all non-Christians was an international project. International 
conferences kept the hopes of internationalism alive into the 1910s. 
 The preceding five chapters traced the ebb and flow of nationalist and 
internationalist ideas amongst German missionaries. The sixth chapter of my 
dissertation, “From Edinburgh to Versailles,” argues that the First World War finally 
settled the question. Though the trend in German missionary intellectual circles had 




in 1913 and early 1914. However, as in so many other areas, the First World War 
transformed mission; after 1919 the German mission movement would be concerned 
with very different issues.33 What had been a back-and-forth between advocates of 
the international and the national course came to an end. German missionary leaders 
interpreted the war and American and British behavior during the war as an assault on 
German Protestantism. Like so many groups interested in Germany’s foreign policy, 
colonial empire, and international position; German mission societies endorsed a 




Benedict Anderson’s definition of the nation as an imagined political 
community, imagined as both limited and sovereign, provides this study with a useful 
starting point for considering the relationship between internationalist and nationalist 
sentiments in the Protestant missionary community of Germany.34 The leaders of 
Germany’s Protestant mission movement imagined themselves members of an 
international community; expansive, universal, and disinterested in notions of 
national sovereignty. The national community that many in Germany longed for 
required the elimination of international loyalties like those held by the missionaries. 
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By describing the contest between missionaries’ imagined international community 
and the limited and sovereign imagined political community of nationalism, this 
dissertation offers a significant modification to historians’ understanding of German 
nationalism. First, internationalism was a much stronger force in the Kaiserreich than 
is usually credited; and, second, alongside the nationalist currents of foreign policy 
that particularly formed after 1890, Protestant missionaries maintained a longer, older 
tradition of internationalism that challenged the nationalism of the German Protestant 
state churches. Significant segments of the German population and colonial policy 
circles questioned the legitimacy of a limited national community. 
German Protestant missionaries’ loyalty to an internationalist ideal, one 
devoted to a universal Christianity directed toward a global, communal commonweal, 
challenges our conventional understanding of Protestantism’s predominantly 
nationalist core from its founding by Martin Luther and its consolidation in 
Bismarck’s rule. This interpretation of German Protestantism has spilled over into the 
few historical studies that have considered German mission work within the larger 
narrative of German history and helps support interpretations of German colonialism 
that see German colonial rule as more authoritarian, more violent, more excessive, 
and less complicated than other European colonial regimes. In point of fact, the 
universalistic and anti-statist tendencies of the German Protestant mission movement 
show that the history of German colonialism is more appropriately considered within 
a larger narrative of European colonialism. 
The simple equation of Protestantism with nationalism and mission with 




Hans-Ulrich Wehler. Wehler’s work ignored German foreign mission, an oversight 
that omitted a group that did not fit into his description of German Protestantism or 
his summary of Germany’s colonial “adventure.”35 According to Wehler, the 
Lutheran church and the Prussian state joined together in mutual support, and 
Prussia’s dominance of the German Empire meant this union effectively extended 
beyond the Hohenzollern monarchy into the larger imperium. The Prusso-German 
state placed its coercive powers at the disposal of the church, and the church returned 
the favor by ensuring the legitimacy of the state.36 Wehler argued that the Protestant 
church became a force for the nationalization of German culture, feeding a 
nationalism aimed at both external and internal opponents. The internal opponents all 
shared an ambiguous relationship to the Protestant church and had suspicious links 
with communities which transcended national borders: Catholics, socialists, and 
Jews.37 Though Wehler’s assessment of the national political importance of 
Protestantism during the Kulturkampf is accurate, the missionary movement’s 
ideology, international and uncommitted to the program of nationalism, raises 
important questions about the validity of Wehler’s argument, particularly after 1878.  
The general neglect of missionaries also problematizes a strict adherence to 
Wehler’s well-known “social imperialism” thesis. With this thesis Wehler argued that 
the decision by Bismarck and the ongoing pursuit of colonial interests by successive 
German leaders, especially Kaiser Wilhelm II, represented an intentional effort to 
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deflect attention away from domestic reform onto a great nationalist project.38 
Missionaries and religious interests writ large were excluded from the social 
imperialist interpretation of Germany’s colonial program. Wehler elevated domestic 
politics in his interpretation and, as a consequence, eliminated colonial activities as a 
possible influence upon German politics and society. Many of Wehler’s like-minded 
successors have repeated Wehler’s oversight;39 and those who have questioned the 
social imperialism thesis have missed the import of missionaries.40 
 Thomas Nipperdey and David Blackbourn both offered modifications to 
Wehler’s linkage of the Protestant church with the national state. Nipperdey argued 
that the majority of the institutional church opposed the particularism of nationalism. 
However, Nipperdey conceded that after the Wars of German Unification the 
Lutheran Church gradually nationalized, and both liberal and conservative Protestants 
adopted a religious nationalism in which the Reformation and the moral power of the 
nation formed the foundations of German culture and society.41 Blackbourn also 
acknowledged the growing strength of nationalism in Germany between 1870 and 
1914, but argued that national identity was perfectly compatible with other regional, 
religious, or class identities. However, chauvinism did exist in the Kaiserreich; 
Blackbourn pointed out that exclusionary nationalism especially targeted Jews, 
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socialists, and Catholics – the “gold, red, and black internationals.”42 While 
Blackbourn largely supported Wehler’s interpretation of German colonial history,43 
Nipperdey included a brief consideration of foreign missions in his analysis. 
Unfortunately, his interpretation is limited. Though he acknowledged the occasional 
points of conflict between missionaries and colonial governments, Nipperdey argued 
that because mission profited from the spread of colonial empires these differences 
were not significant. Because the “international links of German Protestants were 
never very strong,” national colonial policy and mission policy naturally flowed 
together.44  
 The closest any work on Germany’s religious history has strayed to our 
concerns for the German missionary movement, nationalism, and politics is Helmut 
Walser Smith’s study of religious conflict during the Kaiserreich.45 Smith described 
the activities of the aggressively anti-Catholic Protestant League (Evangelischer 
Bund) and parallel confessionally-charged activities of the Catholic Center Party. The 
Protestant League included on its founding membership rolls important members of 
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the Protestant mission movement and was, on occasion, accused by Catholic 
politicians of interfering with Protestant-Catholic mission relations.46 According to 
Smith, these two organizations were indicators of a confessional rift within the 
German Empire that simmered beneath the common national culture within 
Germany.47 However, Smith’s study focused on the interaction of confessional 
loyalties rooted in national contexts and ignored internationalist agendas and 
priorities like those of the missionaries.48 
Germany’s missionary movement has received little more coverage in surveys 
of Germany’s colonial history than it has from the major interpretative histories of the 
Kaiserreich. The two scholarly surveys of note, Horst Gründer’s Geschichte der 
deutschen Kolonien and Woodruff D. Smith’s The German Colonial Empire both left 
analysis of German mission societies and their advocates’ activities in the 
metropolitan space out of their narratives.49 Gründer’s work did include missionary 
activities, but it was not a history of the colonial movement or metropolitan colonial 
policy. Rather, it was a history of the various German colonies and made its purpose 
the presentation of the German and indigenous histories of German colonialism in the 
colonized space.50 On the other hand, Smith’s work concentrated on the connection 
between Germany’s colonial empire and domestic German politics.51 However, it 
relegated the consideration of missionary participation in colonial political debates to 
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a short section; governmental, economic, political, and secular associational groups 
all received more individual coverage in Smith’s work than both Catholic and 
Protestant missionaries combined.52 Both surveys confirm British imperial historian 
Jeffrey Cox’s observations on the marginality of missions in colonial histories.53 
Germany’s nineteenth-century history has been largely devoid of any reference to 
missionaries. 
 In the last decade-and-a-half, historians have returned to the German colonial 
histories in search of answers to larger questions of German history. In particular, a 
research agenda hoping to uncover the origins of National Socialism and the 
Holocaust has looked to the German occupation of German Southwest Africa 
(modern-day Namibia) and the Herero-Nama Genocide to explain the violence of the 
Third Reich. Historians Isabel V. Hull, Jürgen Zimmerer, and Joachim Zeller, 
resurrecting an older argument made by Helmut Bley, have argued that Germany’s 
war against the Herero in 1904 to 1907 was a unique prologue to Auschwitz, linking 
imperialism and genocide as Hannah Arendt had in 1951.54 Zimmerer has since 
conceded that Nazism arose from a multitude of causes besides colonialism; however, 
he has maintained that colonialism was an important source of ideas for Nazis. 
Colonialism and specifically the Namibian genocides served as the “ultimate [and 
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necessary] taboo break” preceding the conception and enactment of the Final 
Solution.55 
 Zimmerer, Zeller, Hull, and their predecessors’ arguments have not passed 
without critique. Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski challenged this new 
“special path” of German history. They argued that, in fact, Germany’s colonial past 
and the history of its colonial violence do not stand separate from European and 
American colonial behavior. Their thesis about Germany’s colonial past, like Geoff 
Eley and David Blackbourn’s thesis against the original Sonderweg,56  argued that 
Germany’s history is better understood as a part of the Western history of 
imperialism.57 The very weakness of the colonial state contradicted any claims of its 
totalitarianism.58 Ultimately, the arguments of Gerwarth, Malinowski, and others 
agree with the findings of this study. As this dissertation will argue, German 
missionary history is important on its own merits and as a part of a larger history of 
European colonialism. 
 Missionaries are an important element of the story of the Herero-Nama War 
and, unsurprisingly, they figure prominently in the histories written of the Herero, 
Nama, and Namibia. A significant historiography has developed around the history of 
the peoples of Namibia, especially in German. Some researchers have barely 
considered the missionaries working amongst the indigenous peoples of the region in 
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their studies,59 but for others the relationships between missionaries and Africans 
form the core of the analysis. Missionaries acted as key “agents of social change” 
helping facilitate the spread of global trade and creating hybrid African societies.60 In 
the aftermath of the Herero-Nama War, missionaries helped concentrate the surviving 
Herero and supported the creation of a modern Herero “nation.”61 Overall, this 
historiography contributes important conclusions to the history of Namibia, but it 
sheds little light on the priorities and goals of the missionaries and says nothing about 
the mission movement in Germany. 
 In some of the same ways that the Herero-Nama War dominates the history of 
colonial Namibia, the history of German East Africa has had a strong focus placed 
upon the Maji-Maji War. The Maji-Maji War, 1905-1907, “[stood] – in contrast to all 
other rebellions – as the first organized – quasi national – rising of African societies 
against white rule in Africa.”62 Its historical significance has garnered a very 
intensive historiography.63 The German military response to Maji-Maji is amongst 
the most brutal responses to a colonial rebellion during the period with a combination 
of deadly tactics and the destruction of food crops to inflict famine upon the 
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resisters.64 Estimates place the number of Africans killed in the rebellion at 
100,000.65 Unsurprisingly, histories of the German colonial period in Tanzania 
include the Maji-Maji War in their narratives as well.66 And yet, these discussions of 
the Maji-Maji War rarely include any reference to missionaries in East Africa. The 
best explanation is that while missionaries in Southwest Africa were accused by their 
political opponents of having a hand in the Herero and Nama uprising,67 missionaries 
in East Africa escaped such characterizations. As a result, histories of the Herero-
Nama War have treated missionaries as historical subjects of inquiry whereas 
histories of the Maji-Maji War largely have not.68 
 Wider histories of German East Africa have not overlooked missionaries to 
the same degree as those that have focused on the history of Germany. However, 
there has been only limited treatment on the concerns of this dissertation. Prior works 
have done little to investigate the metropolitan aspects of the missionary movement 
and when they have, they have neglected to consider the importance of political 
ideology. None has given serious consideration to the conflicts over national 
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particularity and international universality that took place in colonial and missionary 
circles. A brief survey of this literature will reveal the lacunae. 
 The earliest histories of German missions in German East Africa were 
produced by the missions and mission supporters themselves. These works provide 
valuable historical information but are too laudatory of missionary accomplishments 
and not sufficiently analytical for our purposes.69 Scholars began to consider the 
history of missions within the context of colonial history after World War II. Kenneth 
Scott Latourette and Stephen Neill, who wrote in the 1960s, retained much of the 
celebratory tone of their forebears, and both men’s scholarship was heavily Anglo-
centric.70 In the 1970s and 1980s the German mission movement attracted a burst of 
scholarship. This work generally focused on the role that missionaries played in the 
expansion of colonial power with some interest in the development of African 
Christianity and African polities thrown in. 
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 Marcia Wright’s study of the Berlin and Moravian missions in the southern 
highlands of Tanzania between 1891 and 1941 made clear the importance of 
missionary ideology and methodology for understanding the impact of evangelizing 
Christianity upon Africans. Wright argued that German missionaries were never able 
to reconcile their theory with their practice in the colony.71 However, the work does 
nothing to engage with questions of how colonial conquest threatened the mission 
movement. As a result, the work did not engage with arguments over issues of 
national belonging and internationalism that took place in the metropole. 
 An unpublished dissertation by Hans-Joachim Niesel did more to address the 
influence of political contests and philosophy upon German missionary ideology. In 
particular, Niesel focused upon missionaries’ engagement and participation in the 
administration of the German East African colony. Niesel disagreed with Wright’s 
suggestion of nationalist influence upon German missionaries’ approach to colonial 
administration. But for a few short years before the First World War, Niesel argued, 
mission maintained its ideology of internationality.72 Niesel concluded that this meant 
little since the two entities, the colonial government and the missions in German East 
Africa, collaborated in the colony’s work of “cultural uplift.” Secular and religious 
efforts both contributed to the creation of a privileged class in the colony, a class with 
access to resources, education, and power in the colonial state.73 
 Niesel, like Wright, drew important attention to the complex relationship 
between the German mission societies and the colonial project. But both works have 
their weaknesses. Neither work brings the entirety of the Protestant mission 
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movement together when considering either the metropolitan or the colonial 
processes of missionary politics. Niesel excluded the Moravians from his analysis, 
Wright omitted the Bethel Mission, and both left out the Leipzig Mission Society. 
These omissions limit the extent to which Niesel or Wright’s conclusions can be 
verified for German Protestant mission culture. Furthermore, neither scholar’s work 
made a concerted effort to understand the national organizations and conferences of 
Protestant missionaries that constituted the core of Protestant ideological and political 
activity. This last absence will prove to be true for later works on the German mission 
in East Africa as well. 
 Mission scholarship continued along this vein, focusing on three general areas 
of research derived from similar priorities as that shown by Wright and Niesel’s 
work. On the one hand, a number of scholars developed an interest in the study of 
missionary school policy – a subject which both Niesel and Wright touched upon.74 
Others built on the older questions of mid-twentieth century missiology, questions of 
theology, and sought to understand the interaction of theory and practice in German 
mission history.75 This historiography shed important light on aspects of Germany’s 
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colonial and missionary history, however none of it dealt directly with questions of 
missionary internationalism or with the political motivations or activities of 
missionary leaders in Germany. 
 However, one unique research agenda did develop around the study of 
missionary politics and activities in the metropole during the period of the Second 
German Empire. Werner Ustorf and others shed important light on the relationship 
between local domestic political actors in the merchant towns and cities of northern 
Germany and the North German Mission Society. In Ustorf’s study the motivations 
for foreign mission amongst the upper-class Bürger of those towns and cities had a 
good deal of their origin in fighting the democratization of municipal politics.76 
Similar local and regional political concerns informed the development of support for 
the Catholic mission movement in Germany.77 
 The most well-known missionary figure in the history of German imperialism 
is Friedrich Fabri. Fabri is frequently credited with launching the German colonial 
movement with his pamphlet, Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien? (Does Germany 
Need Colonies?);78 and his influence as an associate of Bismarck’s in this early 
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period is hard to deny.79 But Fabri’s importance is to the colonial movement more 
than to the German Protestant mission movement. In fact, by the time Germany’s 
Protestant mission societies were involved with the German colonial empire Fabri 
had been forced out of his position at the head of the Rhenish Mission because of the 
close link he sought between mission and colonial expansion.80 The leadership of the 
Rhenish Mission Society and the German Protestant mission movement, namely 
Gustav Warneck and Franz Michael Zahn, forced Fabri from his post at the Rhenish 
Mission in 1884 and from leadership in the various national mission conferences.81 
As a consequence of Fabri’s marginality by the mid-1880s, this study does not 
concern itself with his activities. An accurate assessment of the involvement of 
Germany’s Protestant missionaries in the German colonial project requires closer 
attention to actors within the movement rather than the swiftly excluded Fabri. 
 The most significant work of scholarship on missionaries during this early 
phase of research was Horst Gründer’s study of Christian mission and German 
imperialism.82 In it Gründer argued that the intertwining of mission and imperialism 
was not an unintended byproduct of mutually autonomous activities. In fact, the union 
of these two activities was a concrete outcome of political, economic, and social 
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conditions in the metropole.83 After 1871 national consciousness within the new 
German Empire colored missionaries’ attitudes and this, in turn, led the German 
mission movement into a close partnership with the colonial state. Christian “spiritual 
expansion and conquest” worked alongside the migration of European settlers, the 
spread of European languages and technology, and institutions and capitalist modes 
of production to affect that Europeanization.84 In short, to Gründer, the work of 
missionaries was part and parcel of a total program of European political, economic, 
social, and spiritual conquest of the world.85 
 Gründer’s argument that German missionaries’ work in the colonies entangled 
itself with the colonial project of economic and political conquest is true. However, 
this dissertation agrees more closely with Johanna Eggert’s assertion that Germans 
traveled to Africa without any particular national feeling.86 First of all, missionaries, 
in their ideology and activities, remained ambivalent towards Gründer’s program of 
“Europeanization.” Most German Protestant missionaries viewed capitalism as a 
dangerous force that threatened to immiserate and proletarianize the African people. 
And missionaries showed a certain degree of apathy as to who their political rulers 
should be (they were far more concerned that they be allowed to do their work 
undisturbed and that the political powers could maintain the peace). Furthermore, 
missionaries and settlers viewed each other with such suspicion that cooperation was 
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impossible. In short, missionaries were hardly advocates of European colonialism. 
Individual missionaries and their home mission societies all viewed themselves as 
evangelists first, advocates for indigenous peoples second, and colonialists third, if at 
all. The nationalization of the mission project, as this dissertation will show, was an 
outcome of developments within the missionary movement intermittently influenced 
by outside forces. It was only with the arrival of a new generation of leaders that the 
German mission movement took on a national character; Gründer’s periodization is 
simply too early and not borne out by the evidence of missionaries’ metropolitan 
activities. 
Africanists working on this problem in southern Africa have trod rather 
extensively over this ground. Like historians of German colonialism, historians of 
British colonialism are similarly divided over the relationship between missionaries 
and colonial conquest. Some argue quite forcefully that missionaries actively solicited 
British intervention. Intervention was usually justified by these missionaries as 
necessary to overcome African leaders’ resistance to mission-induced social and 
political change.87 Others have presented missionaries and “humanitarians” as 
working at times in contrast with other colonial interests to promote the spread of 
British “civilization” to colonized African populations. In this case, missionaries were 
also willing to criticize other colonialists when they thought the British had 
transgressed and become “uncivilized.”88 Still others have argued that missionaries 
and Christianity were used by savvy African political actors to buttress African 
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modes of authority and power under British colonial regimes. In this interpretation 
the colonial system is moved into a space in which negotiation and collaboration 
often stimulated the expansion of Christianity in African societies.89 In the end, the 
role missionaries played in creating the colonial state seems to have been more 
complicated than a simple binary of complete colonial conquerors or independent 
critics.90 
 Since Gründer’s work there have been a number of studies of German 
Protestant missionary activities. In general these works have not examined the 
political activities of mission leaders. Historian Thorsten Altena did exhaustive work 
researching the biographies and backgrounds of German missionaries. His goal was 
to reconstruct missionaries’ understandings of Africa and Africans and to understand 
the ways in which missionaries’ backgrounds affected their experience in Africa. 
Missionaries in the field found themselves confronted with an Africa and Africans 
that refused to conform to the missionaries’ provincial worldview. Instead, 
missionaries developed a collection of “African images” which they used to develop 
their own self-conceptions and impressions of the Africans.91 These “African images” 
rested on constructed African pasts that supported the missionaries’ paternalism. 
Gunther Pakendorf has also argued that a mixture of pietism and Romanticism, 
colored the basically conservative attitudes of German Protestant missionaries.92 
Altena’s work on missionaries’ “self-conception and conceptions of the ‘other’” gives 
invaluable aid to historians’ understanding of missionary identities and motivations, 
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but its focus on the colonial space sheds little light upon the political motivations of 
mission society leaders and intellectuals beyond proving their general anti-
modernity.93 
 One area of particular research interest amongst scholars working on German 
missionaries has been the role of missionaries’ in education. In particular, German 
scholars have focused on the concern for “training the Africans to work” (Erziehung 
der Neger zur Arbeit). Altena notes it as a central concern of missionaries94 but it is 
Sebastian Conrad who gave the matter the closest examination in his work on 
German conceptions of labor during the imperial period.95 Conrad and Altena’s 
interpretations ignore the priorities of German missionaries and overlook the 
ambivalence of most missionaries regarding the economic development of Germany’s 
African colonies.96 What is important about Conrad’s contribution is that his work 
brought missionaries into the discussion of Germany’s history during the period of 
nineteenth-century globalization before the First World War. This interest in the 
global history of Germany is an important historiographical development, one 
designed to move the colony and the metropole into one analytical field.97 
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 Scholarship on Germany’s global history, in particular efforts to integrate 
Germany’s empire with Germany’s more traditional historiographies, has led to 
important methodological approaches to transnational history. In the German case 
early precursors to this approach focused on the cultural significance of Germany’s 
empire98 and more recent interventions include David Ciarlo’s work which brings 
together the history of Germany’s empire with the history of advertising and print 
technology.99 In contrast to Zimmerer and Hull’s quest for a causal link between 
colonialism and the Holocaust, some historians have sought a more fruitful analytical 
connection between imperialism and Germany’s imperial rule in the Eastern 
European lands of Poland, the Ukraine, the Baltic States, and European Russia during 
the Kaiserreich, World War I, and the Third Reich. This work includes studies by 
Woodruff D. Smith, Wendy Lower and Shelley Baranowski100 on the Nazi period and 
in the path-breaking compilation by Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel on 
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the Bismarckian and Wilhelmine periods.101 Similarly, George Steinmetz’s research 
into the role of ethnographic knowledge and colonial administration connected 
colonial concerns with the political culture of the German Empire.102 Beyond cultural 
studies, Conrad’s work is part of an important effort to integrate Germany’s 
economic, political, and intellectual history into larger currents of the inchoate 
nineteenth century. Both he and Andrew Zimmerman share an interest in the effects 
of economic change and shifting systems of labor upon the cultural and intellectual 
history of Germany, Africa, and, in Zimmerman’s case, the United States. Both show 
that the German colonial experience was an essential element in the forms that 
globalization took before the First World War.103 
 One of Conrad’s most important theses is his argument that increasing 
nationalism is a component of the process of globalization. As the boundaries of 
distance erode before the forces of economic integration, constituencies become ever 
more concerned about who should be included in and who should be excluded from a 
community.104 It is no coincidence that at the same time global economic integration 
reached levels just before 1914 that would not be matched again until the 1980s105 the 
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international community was standardizing national identities with the passport.106 In 
the case of Germany’s Protestant missionaries this contest between the two poles of 
globalization – nationalism and internationalism – lay at the core of missionary 
politics. Missionaries were not the only corporate group challenged in their 
internationalism by the pull of national communitarian forces. 
Germany’s Protestant missionaries were not alone in their place in the betwixt 
and between of loyalties. Historians have addressed this issue of internationalists in 
the late nineteenth century swimming against a nationalist current in a number of 
other places. Scholars who have taken up the study of internationalism argue that the 
literature on nationalism is insufficiently aware of the nation-state’s international 
context.107 In fact, John Boli and George M. Thomas have argued that the tensions 
between the nation-state and the various forces of transnational groups strengthened 
both the state and transnational structures, supporting the view that internationalism 
and nationalism are mutually constitutive.108 At the same time, scholars of the 
movement of lawyers to institute systems of international jurisprudence have shown 
the struggle of internationalist liberals against their own moderate nationalist ideas.109 
In this context, Akira Iriye argued, groups of people have striven to create alternative 
communities bound together by cultural interests. To the extent that a national 
community can be “imagined,” as Benedict Anderson argued, Iriye posited that the 
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international community must also be “imagined.” However, this study and other 
historical sources contradict Iriye’s second point that internationalism arose as a 
response to the rising strength of militarism and nationalism after 1900.110 The 
history of socialism, Catholicism, and, particularly for this study, Protestant mission, 
all point to origins that predate 1900. Furthermore, in the cases of socialism and 
Protestant missionaries, it seems that it was nationalism and not internationalism 
which grew stronger after 1900. Nonetheless, the consensus among scholars is that 
the question of international identity was a significant one for many individuals and 
groups living during the late nineteenth century. 
In particular, adherents of international socialism have provided a fruitful 
study for historians interested in internationalism, particularly after socialists across 
Europe abandoned international solidarity in August 1914. Historians of the Second 
International and international socialism before the First World War agree that 
internationalism and nationalism were intertwined concepts even though historians of 
nationalism have treated them otherwise, though the matter of national diversity 
presented an important challenge to socialist advocates. Kevin J. Callahan argued that 
the Second International created a mass political culture that performed a united 
representation of socialist solidarity while promoting ideological, national, and 
cultural diversity with a form of “inter-nationalism.” Leaders imagined the proletariat 
as a community representing all nations.111 Michael Forman agreed with Callahan’s 
interpretation that the Second International wrestled with the “national question,” 
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particularly over the contest between “multinationalism” and a growing Zeitgeist that 
emphasized ethnicity as the fundamental unit of politics.112 And Susan Milner posited 
that while socialist leaders saw nationalism as incompatible with nationalism, their 
methods often arose from national strategies and priorities.113 In every case, socialists 
who supported an international agenda for their movement were forced to struggle 
with a growing consensus, even in their own ranks, that polities should rise from 
ethnicities.114 
 The other major internationalist community during this period was the 
Catholic Church, a church of different cultures and nationalities “said [or imagined] 
to share a common religious identity in a global community.”115 Unfortunately, 
scholars have done little work on the intertwining of international Catholic identity 
with national identities. The nineteenth century witnessed a movement in the Catholic 
Church, led from Rome, to create a more uniform, more centralized, and more 
“Roman” Church.116 This movement, called Ultramontanism, has received the 
majority of its historical treatment in histories of church-state conflict with little 
consideration of the movement’s global communitarian agenda. In general, the 
scholarship that has touched on this material has focused on modernity of the 
movement. This was a movement built upon the popular Catholic press and a new 
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response to the forces of secularization.117 Nicholas Atkin and Frank Tallet argued 
that this Ultramontanism was an effort driven by lower clergy and members of the 
central church hierarchy to escape the power of local bishops and the state, a 
movement geared toward creating a wider community even while others in the 
German Catholic community fought to create a national church.118 Historian Karl 
Buchheim has agreed, arguing that the Ultramontanist movement was a form of 
democracy grounded in a “supranational, universal” thought.119 While there is still 
room for more research on Catholic internationalism, it is clear from what has been 
done that within the Catholic Church nationalist and internationalist agendas vied for 
influence. 
 The final group that is useful to consider as representative of the tensions 
between universal, international contacts and local, national loyalties are those 
Africans and African-Americans who led the Pan-African movement, just in its 
infancy in the late nineteenth century. Though Pan-Africanists made universalist 
claims of community for a limited constituency, their movement also demonstrates 
the struggle between global and local identities. Protestant missionaries imagined 
their community as potentially congruent with the entirety of humanity while Pan-
Africanists imagined the boundaries of their international community as racial and 
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defined by African ancestry.120 However, as Tunde Adeleke has shown, there were 
many common characteristics between the Pan-African movement and the Protestant 
mission movement. In particular, both groups sought to ignore their Euro-American 
cultural connections or at least to transcend them for the sake of their international 
mission. However, such an attempt was impossible. Both movements believed 
themselves harbingers of a positive future, both bore civilization and the “civilizing 
mission” to the uninitiated.121 
 These three corporate groups – socialists, Catholics, and Pan-Africanists – 
offer some important insights into the frameworks that international groups utilized to 
construct their imagined communities. Missionaries, socialists, and Catholics were all 
imagined communities that proclaimed themselves representatives of humanity, 
international fraternity, human rights, and universal peace.  Nonetheless, they 
maintained a critical awareness of the differences ensconced by cultural and national 
boundaries.122 Pan-Africanists made similar claims with regards to their goals in the 
interests of black people around the world. A further similarity between these 
movements is the role of international conferences as key forums for nurturing and 
promoting international unity. Missionaries and socialists alike viewed conferences as 
venues for discussing strategy, tactics, and the principles of their movements.123 
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Catholic councils like the First Vatican Council in 1868 and the Catholic Social 
Congress in Liege in 1886 drew on an even older tradition for much the same 
purpose.124 The Pan-Africanist movement held its first conference in London in 1900 
and would only expand its scope after the First World War.125 Germany’s Protestant 
missionaries operated as part of an international movement of Christian 
evangelization and felt their commitments to that movement to be far stronger than 
any national loyalty. Until the last years before the First World War, like the 





 Germany’s Protestant missionary movement represents an important 
intersection in the history of nationalism, religion, and politics in the German Empire, 
Europe, and the world. German missionaries believed that their first loyalty lay to 
their understanding of biblical instruction. What is more, the bonds missionaries felt 
to the international community were in many ways more real than any connections 
the missionary leaders felt to a German nation. This dissertation takes the 
missionaries’ words seriously and sets out to demonstrate that for forty years their 
worldview included a conviction that Christian community transcended cultural 
difference. This vision of community failed to recognize indigenous peoples as the 
full participants promised by the missionaries’ ideology, but that does not make it any 
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less important. Protestant missionaries in Germany reached millions in Germany and 










Chapter One: Missionary Politics on Paper 
 
 The inaugural 1874 issue of the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift set out the 
journal’s purpose. It declared that the era of Protestant mission was in full glory. The 
journal’s founding editor and chief contributor for the next three decades, Gustav 
Warneck, wrote, “One can treat mission with contempt, one can be its enemy, but one 
can no longer ignore it, it has become a power.”1 He continued, elaborating upon the 
prodigious expansion of mission to “wherever the sailor, merchant or explorer” had 
set foot around the globe. In spite of this advance, there remained, in Warneck’s 
opinion, many who opposed mission and impeded its evangelical purpose. The 
editorship of the Missions-Zeitschrift intended that the journal awake sympathy for 
mission in educated circles while improving the character of mission itself. 
Furthermore, the journal would bring to missionaries’ attention those “culturally and 
religiously historical, geographic, ethnological, and similar questions” that bore upon 
the “evangelization of the peoples.” While devoted in principle to the universalism of 
Christian mission, Warneck cautioned, “We are not absolute opponents of every 
particularism in mission.” Warneck sought to respect the local activities of mission 
societies. He acknowledged the power of local support circles for the unique qualities 
of each mission society, but, nonetheless, Warneck defined the purpose of the 
Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift and Missionswissenschaft as the furtherance of the 
                                                 




Christian Gospel, over and above other concerns.2 A decade later, when overseas 
empire became a reality for Germany, Warneck argued that the importance of 
missionary work had grown, because “German colonial policy implie[d] a greater 
responsibility [for] our mission activities, as well as [made] mission a partner in the 
civilizing activity of colonial policy.”3 The following decades would see the German 
missionary leadership gradually adapting to the new political situation. Greater 
responsibility to Christians of all races and political entanglement led early 
missionary intellectuals to reinforce their support for Warneck’s founding principles. 
 Missionaries and missionary leaders like Gustav Warneck had a particular 
definition of politics in these discussions. In general missionaries insisted that their 
work was emphatically not political. As has been pointed out by historians, 
missionaries’ mere presence in non-Western societies was a political fact.4 Their 
activities in the metropole, namely mission leaders’ participation in contests for 
political, symbolic, intellectual, and spiritual power all prove that missionaries were 
as political as anyone else. However, missionaries stridently argued, especially in the 
Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift, that they were divorced from political concerns. In 
the missionary vernacular of Germany “politics” meant secular affairs. In particular 
this meant the activities of the state (and almost always the state churches) in the 
colonies. Though missionaries would willingly admit their role in a larger European, 
Western, or Christian colonial project, missionaries resisted participating in the 
                                                 
2 Warneck, “Dic cur hic?” 1-4. 
3 Editor’s Note to E[rnst] Reichel, “Was haben wir zu thun, damit die deutsche Kolonialpolitik nicht 
zur Schädigung, sondern zur Förderung der Mission ausschlage?” AMZ 13(1886): 39n2. 




“political” activities of any particular German or other colonial project.5 This chapter 
and the rest of the dissertation will use the missionaries’ definition of politics, 
keeping in mind the peculiarly constrained nature of this definition. 
 At the heart of German missionaries’ aversion to politics as they defined them 
was their certainty that their work as evangelists rose from a divine source. As 
servants of God’s purpose and bearers of the Gospels, missionaries determined that 
politics posed an existential threat to their activities. The command of Jesus that his 
followers bring Christianity to all peoples was seen as both older and superior to 
whatever motivations fed colonial expansion. Of manifest importance was the threat 
posed to the purity of missionaries’ spiritual work by the threat of politics. Politics in 
all its forms – inter-power rivalry, the false idol of the national state, and the 
meanness of public policy – was, at least intellectually, seen as a menace that would 
undermine missionaries’ duty to evangelize all peoples. Missionary culture in 
Germany also included a hefty strain of anti-modernism and skepticism toward the 
modern state. This meant that missionaries questioned any project that supported the 
interests of state or economic actors in the colonial sphere. The modern state and 
modern capitalism both threatened Christian values in Germany and abroad.6 As a 
response to this double threat, missionary intellectuals during the late nineteenth 
century argued forcefully in favor of mission’s autonomous operation and maintained 
the strength of internationalist principles against any nationalist purpose. The rise of a 
                                                 
5 This is notably different from contemporary British mission ideology which, at least in East Africa, 
argued that commerce and the work of “unofficial empire” were part and parcel of the project of 
evangelizing the indigenous peoples. See Dana L. Robert, introduction to Converting Colonialism, 11-
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6 Altena, “Ein Häuflein Christen mitten in der Heidenwelt des dunklen Erdteils”, 917-918. Pakendorf, 
“Berlin in Afrika, oder der historische Ort der deutschen Mission,” 473-475. Werner Ustorf discusses 
how the old trading houses of the Hanseatic Cities of northern Germany joined with mission against 




nationalistic missionary ideology after 1900 came about as a response to changing 
circumstances that helped build a challenge to the anti-state and anti-national views of 
earlier generations of missionary leaders. This younger generation was educated and 
acclimated to a world that seemed shaped and governed by a new political logic of 
nations, empires, and global processes. These men understood history as driven by 
national forces and envisioned a future in which German missionaries rode as 
sidekick to a galloping German imperialism. 
 This chapter will examine a sampling of representative articles published by 
German Protestant missiologists7 for consumption by the missionary community and 
interested observers from the colonial movement, academic faculties, the German 
colonial government, and the general public. The analysis will demonstrate the 
specifics of German mission theory when it came to the relationship between colonial 
and imperial ambition and the spiritual goals of global mission. The discussion will 
be organized around the arguments raised by their authors as to the correct balance 
between politics and religion. This leads to a certain chronological organization as the 
differences between the ideas of the older generation of missionary leaders in the 
1870s, the corollary arguments raised by those same men in the 1890s and first 
decade of the twentieth century, and the later generation of Missionswissenschaftler 
reflected a changing emphasis in arguments over nationalism and internationalism. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Catholic Missionswissenschaft was much slower to organize as a professional discipline in Germany. 
The academic advent of Catholic mission studies in Germany is dated to the launch by Joseph 
Schmidlin of the Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft in 1913. See Horst Rzepkowski, “Gustav 





The Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift 
 
From 1874 to 1919 the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift stood at the center of 
the intellectual sphere for mission ideology in Germany. The Allgemeine Missions-
Zeitschrift, founded in 1874, served Warneck and Germany’s missionary leadership 
as a forum for working out key issues of German national missionary life, 
international missionary culture, and German missionaries’ approaches to German 
colonial policy. Warneck’s Missions-Zeitschrift served two generations of missionary 
theorists and practitioners as the venue in which Germany’s Protestant mission 
movement debated and declared its positions on the key religious, political, and 
scientific issues of missionary life. For forty-five years, the Allgemeine Missions-
Zeitschrift served the intellectually- and academically-centered leaders of Germany’s 
mission movement until it, like Germany’s overseas missionary life, diminished by 
the First World War, lost its national influence and significance. 
 Though scientific and theological issues had been debated in the ecclesiastical 
and popular periodicals of the German mission movement before the publication of 
the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift, Warneck’s journal was a conceptual break.8 It 
sought to elevate the quality and significance of missionary experience and 
experiences within German learned society beyond the closed sphere of traditional 
missionary supporters. The journal sought to legitimate the mission movement with 
scholarly credentials. Because the journal stood as the quasi-official voice of German 
missionary thought, in its pages historians can begin to discern the politics and 
                                                 





ideology of Germany’s missionary movement. By the end of the 1880s the journal 
was publishing 2,600 monthly copies with a peak of 3,000 subscribers in 1912.9 Its 
scope spread beyond the mission sphere in Germany with the Colonial Director and 
his aides as regular readers.10 The Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift cast a wide net, 
offering its readers material on languages of the Himalayan plateau11 as well as 
discussions of the history of Christian conversion in the medieval German lands.12 
This broad reach led the journal to become something of a hybrid publication mixing 
elements of a news-magazine, scholarly journal, and digest of mission society reports. 
What separated the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift from other missionary periodicals 
was its scholarly direction and broad sampling from all Protestant mission societies.13 
In its composition the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift set out to achieve three 
goals. First, it presented articles about the activities of German mission societies 
around the world, in German as well as other European colonies. By doing so the 
Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift helped communicate to its readers the global 
character of German mission, the inextricable intertwining of German mission 
                                                 
9 Joachim Kirchner, Das deutsche Zeitschriftenwesen: Seine Geschichte und seine Probleme, vol. 2 
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1962), 278. The 1912 number appears in Sperlings Zeitschriften-
Addressbuch, 1912, s.v. “Missions-Zeitschrift, Allgemeine.“ 
10 Some indication of how receptive the intellectual elite of the Kaiserreich was can be inferred from 
the influence of “cultural diplomacy” demonstrated by Rüdiger von Bruch when German thinkers 
sought a way out of Germany’s “encirclement” by converting the military and diplomatic contest 
between the great powers into a cultural contest or by promoting international cooperation. Those 
drawn to von Bruch’s model of “cultural mission“ might have recognized German missionaries 
religious internationalism as another way out of Germany’s diplomatic troubles. See Rüdiger von 
Bruch, Weltpolitik als Kulturmission. 
11 August Hermann Francke, “Die sprachlichen Verhältnisse der Himalayamission der 
Brüdergemeine,” AMZ 25(1898): 439-446. 
12 [Johann Friedrich] Iken, “Die Missionsthätigkeit des Hamburg-Bremischen Erzbistums im 
Mittelalter,” AMZ 19(1892): 145-159, 221-234, 278-289, and 511-529. 
13 On the metaphorical bookshelf of all 19th-century German missionary published materials, the 
monthly or quarterly society reports put out by every mission society take up the great majority of 
space. These mission society reports usually printed edited and redacted excerpts from the regular 
reports of their missionaries in the field. The AMZ frequently included examples of these reports in its 
pages. This was similar to the case of British mission periodicals, Cox, The British Missionary 




activities with all the colonizing and colonized peoples of the earth. Second, from this 
demonstration of German mission’s global dimensions the editors and contributors to 
the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift connected its readers, supporters of German 
missionary work, to the broader international missionary movement. This goal was 
further supplemented by the frequent articles presented by foreign contributors and 
about non-German Protestant mission societies. Finally, the Allgemeine Missions-
Zeitschrift’s focus on presenting the best scientific and scholarly work for its readers 
helped mark out the journal as a modern, respectable publication. German 
missionaries came to see themselves as the most “scientific“ missionaries, a quality 
that represented to them one of Germany’s greatest contributions to the international 
mission movement.14 
The editorial scope of the publication grew out of the Allgemeine Missions-
Zeitschrift’s place in its founding editor’s idealized reorganization of Germany’s 
missionary culture. Gustav Warneck wished to elevate the cultural and political place 
of Germany’s missionary movement within German cultural life. In his view, 
Germany was a powerful nation that ought to be focused on the promotion of 
Christianity worldwide. In order to achieve this elevation of the German missionary 
movement, Warneck sought to federate the established mission societies of the 
German Empire into one national organization; connect that organization with the 
international missionary movement based in the British Isles, Scandinavia, and the 
United States; and mobilize the tens of millions of German Protestants to make 
                                                 
14 William Richey Hogg, “The Rise of Protestant Missionary Concern, 1517-1914,” in The Theology of 
the Christian Mission, ed. Gerald H. Anderson (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1961), 109. 
On the quality of missionary knowledge see, for example, Harald Sippel, “Mission und Kodifikation: 
Der missionarische Beitrag zur Erforschung des afrikanischen Gewohnheitsrechts in der Kolonie 




Germany a leading missionary nation.15 In the first several decades of its publication 
the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift went a long way to present missionary activities 
as independent from the German state and the German missionary movement as part 
of an international mission movement. 
 Warneck and his colleagues sought to keep mission separate from nationalist 
politics for three reasons. Missionaries’ understanding of the Gospels and Epistles 
made any division of humanity other than Christian and non-Christian impossible. 
For this reason missionary thinkers from the 1870s onward maintained a view that no 
other possible human goal outweighed that of mission and thus they rejected 
nationalist politics as beneath the concerns of missions. The older generation of 
missionary leaders also rejected politics as corrosive to missionary endeavor. The 
earthly demands of colonial administration and national loyalty, they argued, led 
mission away from its higher purpose and would, as a consequence, unnecessarily 
prolong the process of global evangelization. Finally, should missionaries manage to 
maintain a completely autonomous missionary enterprise, international power politics 
would remain a threat to spiritual success. Politically-driven expansion could lead to 
political conflict which would unduly disrupt global spiritual progress. From the 
1870s until the early twentieth century, Warneck, along with others who felt that 
international and national politics threatened German and global missionary life, 
dominated the field of Missionswissenschaft. 
 The role of nationalism and its tropes expanded in the German cultural, 
intellectual, and political sphere from the foundation of the Kaiserreich to the end of 
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Wilhelm II’s reign. State actors, political organizations, voluntary associations, and 
reformers all attempted to make use of the divergence between the interests of the 
authoritarian state and their particular definitions of the national interest. As a result 
nationalism became a contested area of the culture.16 German missionaries, like other 
corporate groups in Germany after unification, were drawn into the process of 
defining the German nation. Many scholars have identified the establishment of a 
colonial empire as one of Bismarck’s many successful applications of a national issue 
to secure domestic political advantage.17 In fact, many scholars argue that the 
“nation” became a more significant factor in German society than it ever had before 
unification.18 These processes were only intensified after the dismissal of Bismarck 
and the political course set by Kaiser Wilhelm II and his ministers after 1890. The 
period was one of “hybrid identities coexisting with the development of passionate 
nationalist, racist, confessional, and political loyalties.”19 
The year 1890 can be seen as a watershed in the history of the Kaiserreich 
because the waves impelled by the ongoing changes in Germany’s economic and 
social conditions grew in intensity and speed.20 The buffeting of German society by 
emerging political institutions and associations, industrialization and urbanization, 
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and the ongoing issues of national unification changed the shape of German society in 
ever-expanding ways.21 In the case of German missionaries, intimately involved in 
Germany’s colonial project and eager to benefit from political opportunities while 
somehow protecting themselves from the risks, the problem of nationalism and 
national identity remained of key concern. With so many Germans calling for a 
second founding of the Reich, Germany’s missionary leaders were continually 
participating (willingly and unwillingly) in the debate over German nationalism. To 
many cultural critics Germany remained divided along regional, confessional, and 
political lines. Germany, therefore, required a second founding to eliminate the 
remaining divisions. Missionaries’ loyalties to an internationalist worldview only 
complicated issues. As one historian of Germany’s nineteenth-century transnational 
history has emphasized, the study of the various links and influences that crossed 
state boundaries, religious and political in this case, opens up new perspectives on the 
networks that linked Germans with each other and with the rest of the world.22 
 
The Primacy of Christian Evangelization 
 
From the very beginning German missionaries argued in the Allgemeine 
Missions-Zeitschrift that mission could never be fully blended with politics. Christian 
loyalty, they declared, must always outweigh any other obligation. The injunction to 
Christians to spread the Gospel to the entire earth, the great commission given by 
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Jesus in the twenty-eighth chapter of the Book of Matthew, carried such great weight 
as the biblical command of Jesus that no other project could or ought to take 
precedence. This verse served as the chief justification for missionaries’ most basic 
practice of their faith, the support and promotion of missionary work among Christian 
and non-Christian peoples.23 Missionary authorities would not tolerate any other 
entity, concept, or group siphoning away one iota of support. This was the most 
forcefully argued of all the positions by Missionswissenschaftler in the Allgemeine 
Missions-Zeitschrift and even the later contributors who sought a greater 
accommodation between German nationalism and German mission Christianity made 
their case without denying the ultimate higher authority of the mission commission. 
 An early defense of the primacy of mission’s religious purpose came from a 
leader of the oldest German missionary church, Ernst Reichel of the Herrnhuter 
Brüdergemeine. In 1886 Missionsdirektor Reichel argued that in order for colonial 
policy to support mission, missionary leaders must protect “its godly,…international, 
and…[politically] independent character.” Europeans brought to the colonized sphere 
positive and negative influences, a dichotomy that Reichel referred to as the choice 
between “Jesus” and “the devil.” The question was, whether the colonizer brought the 
benefits of moral, Christian life or the curses of alcoholic spirits and depravity.24 The 
missionary must act as the intermediary, winning over the colonized peoples to the 
new order while encouraging benevolence amongst the colonizing Europeans. 
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Reichel proposed that missionaries participate in the larger civilizing mission without 
committing to any German colonial program. 
 In addition to warning against chauvinism in German mission, Reichel also 
cautioned against any threat of worldly interests overtaking the godly purpose of 
mission work. He wrote, “Colonies serve the spread of power, the expansion and 
prosperity of the earthly Fatherland. Mission serves the spread of a kingdom that is 
not of this world, and which advances the power and honor [of Jesus Christ].” 
Missionaries could not allow themselves to be distracted when the interests of Kaiser 
and God conflicted. To Reichel the ultimate goal of Christian mission must be the 
“saving of heathen souls through the Gospel” and “forming heathen peoples into 
Christian peoples.”25 While German missionaries would later utilize the language of 
the Kulturkampf in their own struggles against Catholic missionaries, Reichel’s article 
appeared when many in the educated middle class of Germany had grown disturbed 
by the interventions by the Prussian state in religious matters. Liberal assailants of the 
Catholics had begun to argue against the separation of church and state with regards 
to the confessional question and their conservative Protestant allies grew increasingly 
leery of government intrusions.26 However, as the Kulturkampf both exceeded many 
middle-class Protestants’ wishes and failed to integrate the Catholic population into 
the Kaiserreich, missionaries must have begun to see the risks such a legal theory 
could have upon their own work.27 
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 As a result, Reichel offered a clear articulation of a separation of state-based 
imperialism and missionary evangelization. Mission must remain politically 
independent. “Colonization and mission must remain cleanly separate[d] from one 
another” even though their interests mixed and intertwined in the colonies.28 By 
maintaining complete independence and freedom of action, missionaries would be 
able to make whatever choices necessary on issues as diverse as language, native 
rights, and land ownership to ensure success in their holy purpose. 
 In 1891 the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift reprinted the text of a lecture 
given by Warneck at the Saxon Provincial Mission Conference in Halle. The Saxon 
Mission Conference had rapidly become a national organization that drew mission 
leaders as well as secular colonialists from across Germany.29 The reprinting of 
Warneck’s thoughts by the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift ensured that an even 
wider audience of interested scholars and supporters could hear Warneck’s lecture on 
“The Project of Heathen Mission and its Present Challenges.” Warneck offered a 
spirited defense of mission as an “apostolic” project. He argued that mission was and 
should continue to emulate Jesus’s instructions to his apostles. “Jesus Christ,” 
Warneck told his listeners, “as the founder of mission is without doubt also the 
highest mission authority, his judgment [is] thus authoritative on the mission project.” 
And because Jesus was a preacher and not a technician, therefore mission must 
remain a fluid operation ungoverned by technocratic priorities. According to 
Warneck, those in the government and colonial movement who wished to see German 
missionaries serve the colonial empire more directly misunderstood missionary goals. 
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He argued that missionaries should continue the work of Jesus and reveal God’s love 
through teaching and sacrifice to all peoples not only in service of the German 
Empire.30 Warneck’s defense came at precisely the moment German statesmen 
around Kaiser Wilhelm II began arguing for greater political and economic 
exploitation of the German colonial empire.31 New priorities in German colonial 
circles pressured German missionaries to direct their educational activities toward 
economic development.32 
 Protestant missionaries had grounds for arguing that their independence had 
borne fruit. In an 1892 summary of German missionary activities in the colonies, the 
Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift presented data confirming missionary success. 
According to the report, in 1883 there had been 193,975 “Heathen-Christians”33 and 
in 1890 that number had risen to 246,903 converts.34 These numbers, reflecting as 
they did a period of missionary independence, gave support to Reichel, Warneck, and 
their fellow advocates of missionary autonomy. 
 After all, the colonial state was just another aspect of dangerous trends in 
contemporary society and culture. Warneck wrote that “civilization brings many 
useful things: trains, the telegraph, gas lighting and the comforts of abundance; but it 
does not bring Christian faith.” The late nineteenth-century colonial state, according 
to Warneck, did little to create Christians with its supposed civilizing mission. He 
counseled, “Just like happiness, contentment and virtue…belief in the Gospels is not 
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dependent upon a particular degree of civilization.” Missionary enterprise and 
Christian evangelization was not dependent upon the advancement of “modernity.”35 
And, thus, Warneck argued, Christian mission did not need to submit to the pressures 
of colonial and economic powers because mission’s goals were not dependent upon 
the benevolence of those powers.36 Attachment to the colonial state would destroy 
this independence and violate the missionaries’ principles. 
 Perhaps not Warneck’s equal as an academic but certainly his equal in 
authority in the German mission movement, Franz Michael Zahn of the Norddeutsche 
Missionsgesellschaft (North German Mission Society) produced the most reasoned 
defense of mission’s superiority over nationalism. The North German Mission 
Society had been founded in 1836 and, after false starts in New Zealand and India, 
focused its work amongst the Ewe peoples in territories that would become part of 
Ghana and Togo. Zahn had been the mission society’s leader since 1862 and 
developed his ideology of mission before the establishment of the Kaiserreich. His 
argument attacked the fundamental basis of nationalist arguments for missionary 
particularism and left little room for compromise. He noted that since the 
establishment of German colonies German nationalists had suddenly become 
“mission friends” who wished to see German money and lives spent only in German 
colonies.37 In his opinion, these new friends depended on an ideology, nationalism, 
which was an intellectual construct, built on shifting sands. 
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 Opening with a discussion of the biblical origins of human difference and 
thereby demonstrating Christians’ “moral imperative to respect” human diversity, 
Zahn proceeded to tear apart any concept of racial purity anywhere in the world. 
Attaching essential characteristics to any group of people, like the Germans or the 
English, would be an error. As he put it, “National character is always becoming, and 
its development takes place and is influenced not only from the inside out but also 
from the outside.” Furthermore, because of changing borders, the movements of 
peoples, and exchanges of ideas across boundaries there was barely any people of a 
“world historical significance” that was not a “mixed Volk.” God clearly intended that 
immigrants and emigrants lose their character and concentrate on living according to 
Christian morality in a great human conglomerate. After all, Zahn argued, “One gets a 
correct image only when one places national virtues beside national failings” and it is 
in the fighting of weaknesses that a nation’s character develops.38 
 In fact, racial difference was largely illusory according to Zahn. The 
malleability of humanity would be impossible if all people were not of one race. Zahn 
supported the argument of Reinhold Grundemann, one of the oldest mission scholars 
and one of Warneck’s founding collaborators on the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift, 
who argued that before there were “peoples” on Earth, humanity had been united as 
one people. Therefore, the goal of history was to collect a “reunited humanity into 
which all difference [would] be absorbed.” It was only an “immoral patriotism” 
which did not recognize this truth. So, where did mission fit into this project? For 
Zahn, the more advanced a culture the greater its role in the community of man, “The 
nearer humanity comes to its goal, the more it leads a communal life” without cultural 
                                                 




or national distinction. Therefore, the more advanced a culture, the greater its 
responsibility to work toward the eventual reunion of the world’s peoples. Only a 
“sickly overemphasis of national feeling” could cause one to move away from this 
communitarian purpose and ignore the good in another people.39 After all, there were 
no borders for religion, and a divine purpose would lead humanity to unity in 
Christian salvation. 
 According to Zahn, dividing humans into separate nations reflected a false 
understanding of human history. Zahn explained to readers that the religious divisions 
among Christians arose from cultural causes unconnected with national difference. 
“There is no special ‘German’ concept of Christianity,” Zahn wrote, “[and] nothing 
seems more wrong to me than taking on that [there] is in the German character an 
immunity to error…” The religious divisions of the Reformation and its aftermath had 
split humanity, contrary to God’s intent. The international mission movement and its 
path forward toward universal human dignity and salvation provided the means to 
reverse the errors of the Reformation and re-foster human unity. Zahn warned that an 
“emphasis on nationality in mission would be a deplorable regression.” Furthermore, 
the very origin of German mission was not national in character and not strengthened 
by national impulses.40 The real future of Germany’s missionaries, Zahn maintained, 
required an embrace of the international brotherhood of Protestant Christians, which 
would help tear down the false barriers of human difference. Zahn reminded his 
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readers that “the highest service to God (Gotteswerk) of mission [was] not…service 
of national egoism,” but rather to being “dutiful to Christ.”41 
Long after the establishment of the German Empire in 1871 German 
missionary leaders remained committed to their ethos of missionary independence. 
Though the structural realities of Germany transformed to reflect the new logics of 
industrialization, urbanization, and secularization, German missionary leaders like 
Zahn and Warneck maintained the independence of German Protestant missionary 
activities. The 1890s saw a new intensification of the nationalist forces, however. In 
the political sphere the parties of the Left, Right, and Center all competed to prove 
their national credentials. One of the marquee issues was colonialism and the German 
colonies had developed a “national aura,” which infused every colonial activity with 
greater political weight.42 Missionary leaders of the older generation were forced to 
adapt to this change and the new generation of leaders would introduce a national 
perspective to missionary activities with little hesitation. Nonetheless, the older 
generation’s position would remain influential to the very last days of Germany’s 
colonial empire. 
 The strength of arguments that mission stood outside politics because of the 
intellectual, theological, and spiritual superiority of missionary work over and above 
colonial political motivations held strong for nearly thirty-five years. Those to whom 
Christian truth had been revealed must also seek to spread the Gospels. And so, 
Warneck concluded, this fact made mission international. While missionaries must 
belong to a nation, no matter which nation it was all missionaries bore the same 
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burden. To the early missionary leaders, mission work was through and through a 
moral project. Warneck insisted that “the salvation of souls remain[ed] the soul of 
mission work.”43 The pursuit of souls for Christian salvation was extra-political and 
extra-national. For the missionary leaders of the nineteenth century, mission could not 
be constrained by worldly matters. Warneck wrote in 1901, “Mission should not 
make the peoples into Germans, Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Russians; [it] should 
make them into Christians” in preparation for a future heavenly kingdom.44 
 
Politics, the Great Corrupter 
  
To the older generation of missionary leaders the politics of colonial 
administration and interest groups threatened to rot everything it touched, especially 
mission. Nonetheless, in some cases the prosaic concerns of colonial officials and 
politicians became authentic and troubling threats to mission activities that demanded 
missionaries involve themselves in political debates. Missionary leaders in the 1870s, 
-80s, and -90s all agreed that involving missionaries as active participants in the 
administration of German or other imperial powers’ colonial territories threatened the 
moral corruption of mission work. The threat was two-fold. First, any diversion of 
missionary energy to support colonial goals was a violation of Christian principles. 
Second, if missionaries involved themselves in any action by colonial powers then 
colonized peoples became all the more likely to equate missionaries with the colonial 
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regime. Missionaries’ supposed good deeds would be tainted by their affiliation with 
the irreligious and immoral colonial state. 
Warneck in particular worried about the possible corruption of German 
mission by German colonial interests. An early example of this appeared in a short 
article by Warneck in the 1887 issue of the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift. In 
“French Nationalism and Mission” Warneck reported on the hardship faced by the 
Paris Mission Society, a French Protestant group. According to Warneck it was 
“colonial-political dogma” in France that mission served as an ally to colonial 
conquest. According to the prevailing view of German Protestant missionary leaders, 
France’s overwhelming Catholic majority and French Catholic mission societies’ 
eager alliance with the state, the Paris Mission Society in Madagascar was caught in a 
dangerous vise. In France, according to Warneck’s article, not only were colonial 
policy and mission bound together, but French nationalism and Catholic mission were 
united in suppressing Protestant mission.45 Warneck took this opportunity to instruct 
his readers about the threat of nationalism to missionary works. 
 Warneck’s wider view of the correct relationship between the state, national 
loyalty, and mission came at the end of his short article. “Our French co-religionists 
fought a good fight…protesting against…the misuse of religion and mission for 
political and colonial political purposes.” It was frequently an unpopular fight, 
Warneck continued, but it had to be fought. “It [would have] discredit[ed] mission at 
home and abroad if [mission] only serve[d] to provide a good conscience” for 
colonial powers. One expected that religion remain free from politics and it would be 
                                                 




regrettable if German colonial policy followed France’s lead by interfering with the 
freedom of religion, Warneck continued.46 
 Four years later at the 1891 Saxon Mission Conference Warneck opened his 
lecture on the current challenges of foreign mission by explaining that mission work’s 
long isolation from German politics had ended. Nonetheless, his opposition to a 
politicization of missionary endeavor remained strong. In his lecture, reprinted by the 
Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift, the missionary leader informed his audience that the 
growing influence of mission, its growth from “child to man” meant that now the 
secular world sought to “influence the mission enterprise, [and]give [mission] a 
direction that would fundamentally alter” the mission project. This was the newest 
challenge facing modern mission.47 These suggestions were often cast as “reform” 
but by the end of his lecture it was clear that, for Warneck, “reform” was little more 
than window dressing hiding a dangerous corruption of Protestant missionary work. 
 Germany’s rapid transformation into a colonial power between 1884 and 1887 
brought the long-ignored mission movement into Germany’s colonial and political 
calculations, Warneck warned his audience. What had become necessary, in the 
Missionswissenschaftler’s opinion, was a definition of boundaries. “Technical worker 
education, plantation construction, agricultural testing stations, commodity marketing 
– these are all matters of colonial interests, not of mission….No [man] can serve two 
masters, [and] neither can mission.” Economic development for the national interest 
would only lead missionary work away from service to God, as Warneck put it, 
missionaries should “build the kingdom which is not of this world, [a world] in which 
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[mission] would be a queen [to Jesus].” 48 Increasingly German policymakers were 
seeking to make the colonies profitable, the recent suppression of the so-called Arab 
Revolt in German East Africa and the scandalous behavior of German colonial hero 
Karl Peters in the same colony had turned public attention upon events in the German 
territories. Some began wondering what place German missionaries should have in 
this national project as calls rose for a more responsible administration of the colonial 
empire.49 
 Accommodation with the colonial state was more common in an earlier 
period. Reichel of the Brüdergemeine had already asserted that missionaries could 
only maintain loyalty to the Fatherland and perform their “holy avocation” by 
maintaining the internationalism, spiritual focus, and independence of the Protestant 
mission movement. Experience had shown that wherever mission and the Gospel had 
been allowed a healthy course by the colonial powers, peoples had been more gently 
acclimated to the new colonial order. Through the church and schools, missionaries 
were able to create “industrious, intelligent, loyal and reliable subjects” for the 
colonial power. 50 Reichel perceived room for cooperation between the missionary 
and colonial projects but he still argued against systematic collaboration. His 
concession for some small place of cooperation, directed at German colonial 
politicians, emphasized the positive effects of missionaries’ independence. 
Nonetheless, this hopeful compromise remained secondary for Reichel to mission’s 
need for independence, godliness, and internationalism. 
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Warneck went on to criticize anyone who would elevate the “civilizing 
mission” above the evangelical mission. He argued that it was natural that 
missionaries as Christians amongst the “uncivilized peoples” provide medical help; 
build hospitals; care for the hungry, orphaned, and widowed; and support the 
oppressed against their oppressors, but missionaries must remain focused on their 
main work – the salvation of the sinner and the planting of the Gospels in the hearts 
of heathens. As a consequence, Warneck came out against efforts by colonial 
administrators, traders, and concessionary corporations to instrumentalize mission 
stations and schools as training grounds for African labor. He cautioned that Jesus did 
not send out his apostles with the instruction to “teach them to work” but with the 
instruction to “make them my followers.” 51 Any secular colonialist who hoped for a 
more pliable workforce should accept that it would only come as a secondary effect 
of Christian mission.52 
According to Warneck, secular colonial interests had cynically appropriated 
humanitarian rhetoric. He contended that the “interest in the uncivilized peoples [was] 
not characterized by the concern, how can these poor peoples be helped, instead [it 
was characterized] by the question: how do we extract the greatest use from [these 
peoples]?” Warneck’s position was that economic interests wished to create more 
effective workers and more capable consumers for their own profit while missionaries 
sought to educate the colonized peoples for selfless reasons.53 The threat that German 
missionaries might be led astray from their divinely appointed task reinforced 
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Warneck’s view and that of his compatriots’ that politics was corrosive to the key 
task of German mission work – the creation of Christians. Education, when left to 
secular colonialists, did not serve the interests of the student but of the teacher; 
therefore, missionaries had to keep themselves separate to avoid the corruption of 
their work. 
 
The International Question 
 
Even a spiritually pure and universalist mission movement could not avoid the 
threat of earthly interests to its work. Though a minority of missionaries saw colonial 
expansion as a necessary support to missionary activity, the majority of the older 
generation remained ambivalent towards the global turn to empire and increased 
competition between the world powers that occurred in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. In every case the fear was that overtly chauvinistic policies and 
bald antagonism would lead to a dangerous disruption of missionary activity. 
Furthermore, the tendencies of global capitalism and the intensification of global 
imperialism led missionary intellectuals to remain hostile to the colonial state. In the 
face of these threats missionary leaders articulated a determined internationalist 
ideology. 
In the earlier, calmer period of imperial expansion before 1890, Reichel 
argued that based upon the experiences of his own society in the possessions of 
Britain, Holland, and Denmark, mission and the state could comfortably coexist. In 




not treat them appreciably differently from missionaries who shared the colonial 
powers’ nationality, and used their power to support the work of German 
missionaries. 54 Reichel argued that the example set by other Protestant colonial 
powers – Great Britain, Denmark, and the Netherlands – required that Germany act 
with the same equanimity. In addition, German mission, in order to protect the 
international character of its work, must oppose any overzealous German patriotism 
within its ranks that might jeopardize international comity.55 
 German interests in East Asia intensified as a result of Weltpolitik, an 
aggressive foreign policy designed to garner for Germany greater world power. 
Wilhelm II and his like-minded advisors felt that Germany had a right to world power 
status and deserved her “place in the sun.” The industrial, scientific, and economic 
success of the Reich proved for these men that Germany was a nation on the rise. For 
them the colonial venue offered a powerful opportunity for Germany to assume the 
role that its elite believed it deserved. Economic colonialism, and its subsidiary 
ideology Weltpolitik, saw overseas territories as inherently valuable because of their 
economic potential. The expanded colonial empire Wilhelm, Alfred Tirpitz, Bernhard 
Bülow and other Weltpolitiker inside and outside the government wanted would offer 
expanded access to world markets and serve as tangible proof of Germany’s strength 
and diplomatic prestige. 56 Policymakers increasingly directed German foreign 
policies towards worldwide aggrandizement and diffuse efforts to add to Germany’s 
colonial possessions. In many ways these impulses were part of larger global 
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processes but they remained firmly grounded in the politics and rhetoric of the 
Kaiserreich under Wilhelm II.57 
 The acquisition by the German Imperial Navy of the territories around 
Jiaozhow Bay (Kiaochow) in 1898 as a concession from Qing China under a 99-year 
lease and the participation of Germany in the Eight-Nation Alliance against the 
Boxers both marked a new phase of German imperial activity. In fact, the Boxer 
Uprising left Warneck with a bitter taste. Many anti-colonial and anti-religious critics 
blamed the activities of German, and especially Protestant missionaries, for inciting 
the Chinese to violence. This must have proven for the aging missionary leader that 
politics was a dangerous field for missionaries. According to Warneck, the disorder in 
China grew out of the combination of Europe’s relations with the Chinese 
government, the Chinese people’s resistance to the reform agenda coming from the 
Chinese government, the expansion of territorial occupations by the European 
powers, and general forms of social and economic distress in China.58 Warneck 
judged that the events in China marked a new epoch. The suppression of the revolt by 
the imperial powers would provoke a “sifting” in China, like what had already 
occurred in Africa, and which he did not guarantee would bode well for Christian 
interests in the Far East.59  The reproach that Warneck directed towards the political 
powers in China reflected the Missionswissenschaftler’s ongoing suspicion of 
colonial power.  
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As late as 1901, even as his ideas began to adapt to the growing importance of 
imperial powers in global missionary activities, Warneck warned his fellow 
missionaries of the threat to mission from imperial rivalries. At the 1901 meeting of 
the Saxon Mission Conference in Halle, Warneck took the events of the Boxer 
Rebellion as yet another chance to comment. Warneck’s analysis arose as a response 
to the suggestion that Christian, and especially German, missionaries had been the 
chief provocateurs of Chinese resistance. The Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift 
reprinted Warneck’s lecture for broader consumption and, in a footnote, requested 
readers distribute the text to even broader audiences.60 Warneck recounted how in the 
earlier period of colonial conquest missionaries were enjoined to “replace religious 
missionary work with ‘worker education’” and told that they must place themselves 
in service to the interests of the Fatherland. Missionary experts who defended the 
religious and universal character of mission “were denounced as ‘unpatriotic’.”61 The 
earlier tribulations of the missionary leadership foregrounded the ongoing pressure on 
missionaries from colonialists. To him, the Boxer Rebellion and the succeeding 
public reaction were proof that mission must not become an annex to colonialism. 
The events in China gave Warneck an opportunity to comment on the growing 
conflict between the European powers. This conflict concerned Warneck because as 
the European powers participated in “jealous national competition” for overseas 
influence they jeopardized the universal missionary project. International competition 
imperiled the principles of religious freedom and drew missionaries into the conflict 
in a manner which challenged the entire structure of international Christian 
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evangelization. As Warneck summarized it, the more mercenary a national colonial 
policy was and the “less understanding it [had] for the religious goals and spiritual 
equipment [Betriebsmittel] of mission, the more intolerant [that colonial policy] 
[would] be of foreign missionaries.” Furthermore, the more that missionaries of a 
given nationality attempted to serve their nation, the less they drove the missionary 
project forward.62 
With his position clarified, Warneck then defined “overseas politics” as global 
power politics or relations, what could be collectively called “imperialism” in modern 
historical-political parlance. Warneck judged the competition for global territory as 
motivated by national greed that rendered any “civilizing advancement of humanity” 
subsidiary to “national egoism” and imperial expansion.63 Warneck and others did not 
wish to have European missionaries associated with European soldiers. Finally, 
according to Warneck, mission and colonialism differed on one final point – it was 
the goal of empire to make of the colonized peoples loyal subjects or citizens of the 
ruling empire. Missionaries, as his listeners and readers knew, sought to create 
citizens of the Kingdom of God. The growing antagonism of international 
imperialism continued to threaten missionaries’ own internationalism.64  
Because mission stood above nationalist competition and worked for all 
humanity, Warneck posited that this should be sufficient to compel the colonial state 
to support the missionary project without any remuneration from mission societies. 
Similarly, missionary work was well-served by the order that colonial power brought 
to the mission field, and so “a friendly position to overseas politics [was] in the 
                                                 
62 Warneck, "Die christliche Mission und die überseeische Politik,“ 162-163. 
63 Warneck, "Die christliche Mission und die überseeische Politik,“ 166-167. 




interest of mission.” For this reason, both mission and imperialist forces should seek 
to care for a mutually friendly relationship in which the difference between the 
missionary and the administrator remained clear.65 Warneck thus, in one place, 
brought together every aspect of his and his colleagues’ opposition to mission 
becoming a client of national policy. While missionaries were not alone in opposing 
the tide of imperial competition around the world, and for thirty years they claimed 
they kept their work unsullied by politics. However, when pressured the missionaries 
remained willing to justify their work as morally, culturally, and economically 
valuable for colonized peoples and colonizers alike. 
 That same 1901 lecture also saw the beginnings of a shift in Warneck’s ideas 
about world politics. By 1900 it was impossible for any observer of global politics not 
to believe that he or she was witness to important forces of change sweeping the 
world. European powers had finished the partition of Africa, the Spanish-American 
War had made it clear that the United States was an international power, and conflicts 
in China and Central Asia amongst the imperial powers (now including Japan) made 
it impossible for any politically active individual to ignore the dynamics of global 
foreign relations. In the case of Warneck and a few others this meant that other 
ideologies with international vision competed with universalist missionary 
Christianity. The old guard of missionary leaders discovered the threat of other global 
religions, especially Islam; the secular internationalism of socialism; and the 
integrative effects of global capitalism. These men did not turn away from their old 
principles but did seek to build a German mission movement that could deal with the 
challenges offered by competing internationalisms and nationalisms. 
                                                 




In that same remarkable lecture from 1901 on the Boxer Rebellion, Warneck 
discussed how the missionary and colonial projects might cooperate to advance both 
projects’ goals and priorities: the occupation of mission territories, the protection of 
missionaries and “Heathen-Christians,” and the welfare of native communities. 
Though he made it clear that the missionary and the imperial projects had significant 
areas of conflict or disagreement, Warneck argued that a friendly relationship was 
essential to the success of both projects. As Warneck saw it, it was in the interests of 
all humanity that European Christianity progress and bring the advantages of 
Christian values to the globe – promoting a sober, prosperous, and peaceful culture 
amongst all peoples.66 The German intervention in China had arrested the attention of 
the German public, with a heated Reichstag debate about the conduct of the German 
soldiers as part of the allied invasion force raising questions of the moral 
repercussions of the intervention. With this backdrop, Warneck undoubtedly hoped to 
distance the German missionary movement from the sort of imperialism which 
readers of Germany’s newspapers learned of via soldiers’ letters: tales of abuses of 
the civilian population and mass executions that tarnished the benevolent 
representations of the imperial project.67 Perhaps he even hoped to channel some of 
the forces of globalization for missionaries’ purposes. 
The result of God’s design was that unbeknownst and unsought by the global 
powers, their competition brought about the spread of Christianity. That is, Warneck 
said, “the missionary contribution of global politics.” God had created the impetus, 
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and the European powers had carried out his will by conquering non-Christian 
territories for their own interest. This served God’s purpose because European 
conquest had opened up non-Christian lands that had been formerly closed to 
missionary enterprise.68 On the other hand, the injunction that Christians seek out 
new realms in which the peoples were ignorant of the Gospels had also supported the 
spread of colonial power. In the South Sea, wide sections of Africa, and other lands, 
Christian missionaries had opened territories to “civilizing influences” before the 
arrival of European political power.  In a shift from his views in 1891,69 Warneck 
concluded that as both missionaries and colonial powers sought to bring civilization 
to non-Western peoples, albeit emphasizing different aspects of “civilization,” the 
expansion of mission territories could be seen as a goal of both projects. However, he 
limited this cooperation by noting that “political intrigue is in all cases a missionary 
sin…patriotism may not justify” such activity. The more mission avoided involving 
itself in calls for colonial expansion by a given power, the “surer it protect[ed] its 
religious and its international character.”70 Warneck continued to emphasize the 
danger of excessive national loyalty to missionaries’ spiritual work. 
Finally, Warneck closed his discussion with the unambiguous declaration that 
“in its whole project mission [was] the natural representative of the interests of the 
native.” It was the greatest joy of missionaries when they could work “hand-in-hand” 
with the colonial government to serve the humanitarian needs and interests of 
colonized peoples. Cooperation was ideal, but because missionaries were bound to a 
higher obligation as advocates of indigenous peoples when “colonial-political 
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egoism” or ignorance of native peoples’ lives endangered the well-being of colonized 
and missionized peoples. The ultimate goal, Warneck contended, of mission activity 
should be an “economically self-sufficient existence” for colonized peoples. 
Missionaries should care for the national identity of the colonized peoples against the 
frequent tendency of colonial governments to proletarianize indigenous populations, 
destroying their cultural differences and transforming colonized peoples into 
creolized laborers.71 The threats of modern capitalism and the damage it had wrought 
in Germany’s small towns and villages, cities and neighborhoods could not be 
allowed to spread to Africa and Asia. 
The Missionswissenschaftler Warneck revealed his political side in his 
discussion of the relationship between global imperialism and missionary activities. 
His argument that the colonial and missionary projects were distinctly different was 
compelling – the motivations of missionaries and of colonial officials usually derived 
from secular and religious sources respectively. However, in Warneck’s discussion of 
the promising areas for collaboration between missionary and colonial groups, the 
reader can begin to see how easily a missionary could fall into support for nationalist 
colonial activity. Warneck closed his lecture, “Global mission and global politics 
intertwine with one another” and if they could bring their disparate strengths to bear 
they could “save the non-Christian world.”72 
Warneck’s 1901 speech came during a pivotal period in the history of German 
imperialism. In the immediate context, Warneck sought to respond to the massive 
outpouring of anti-missionary sentiment that came about in the Western press as the 
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colonial powers sought to explain the sources of the Boxer resistance movement. The 
same event saw Kaiser Wilhelm II take the opportunity to offer one of his manic 
articulations of German expansionism, his famed Hunnenrede (Huns Speech) calling 
for German troops to recall their ancient ancestors in striking down the Chinese. At 
the same time Warneck’s speech came as imperialism entered a second phase. There 
were few new territories available for greater colonial expansion by any power and 
German ultra-imperialists began to press for greater imperial territories. Such a 
strategy would risk greater conflict with the other imperial powers and Warneck’s 
speech answered colonialist voices calling for Germany to claim its “place in the 
sun.” In fact, Warneck sought to draw attention to the issue of missionary and 
imperial cooperation and interference and challenged the logic of Weltpolitik. If the 
world was going to be divided into imperial spheres then mission would have to 
develop a working theory for interaction with imperial powers. Finally, this speech is 
an important artifact because it revealed that Warneck was a mature and adaptive 
thinker. He adapted his view of Christian mission to accommodate the changing 
geopolitical circumstances at the turn of the twentieth century, but he also remained 
committed to his central principles: that mission, as Reichel had put it in 1886, protect 
“its godly,…international, and…[politically] independent character.”73 
At the 1906 meeting of the Saxon Mission Conference Carl Mirbt offered his 
thoughts on the mission motivation within Chrstianity. Mirbt, since 1890 Professor of 
Church History at the University of Marburg, was one of the preeminent academics of 
Missionswissenschaft. An expert on Catholic Church history, Mirbt also wrote a 
number of important works on Protestant mission. At the Mission Conference of 1906 
                                                 




he offered an examination of the relative relationships among world religions. He cast 
his examination as a discussion of the “question of the justice of mission,” which 
ultimately came to the supposition that “[mission was a] granted right…and enjoined 
duty” of the Christian church. The right of Christendom to evangelize to all peoples 
was the “fundament and soul of all mission work, with this right [mission] stands [or] 
falls.” 74 He then embarked upon a justification of Christian global evangelization 
based upon its humanitarian benefits. 
He began with a discussion of the major religions in the contemporary world. 
“What [was] playing itself out in Asia and in other forms in Africa,” Mirbt wrote, was 
a battle of world religions; a conflict between Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity that 
would be decided by the number of adherents and the evangelical drive of each faith. 
Mirbt worried over the insidious spread of Buddhist literature and ideas in Europe 
and America.75 Japanese industrialization and military victories had also validated 
Eastern culture.76 Mirbt interpreted both as signs not of the “inner strength of 
Buddhism” but instead as signs of the “weakness of the influence of Christian 
religion on individual groups within the educated circles” of European societies. An 
expansive Buddhism endangered the legitimate position of Christianity. On the other 
hand, the power of Islam in this battle of world religions was not a threat of 
“missionary spirit” but instead one of “missionary fanaticism.” Islam, according to 
Mirbt, had sought “the subjugation of the world under the crescent” since the seventh 
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century, a campaign waged now by “dervish orders, the elite troops” of Islamic might 
in Africa and Asia. The Middle East and the Levant already belonged to Islam; 
millions of Muslims lived in India, China and the islands off Southeast Asia; North 
Africa was long ago lost, and in the West and East of the continent Islam’s power was 
undeniable.77 To Mirbt, the expansionist spirit of Buddhism and Islam threatened to 
overwhelm Christianity. 
In order to explain this global religious conflict, Mirbt examined the 
numerical relationship of the three faiths. He placed the Christian population at about 
535 million, Islam at somewhere between 175 and 345 million, and declined to offer 
an estimate of Buddhists (hamstrung by technical confusion over including Shintoists, 
Daoists, and Confucianists in the total). The intertwined nature of Far Eastern 
religious practices at the time confused Mirbt, and never mind that his entire 
calculation ignored Hinduism. The origins of Mirbt’s confusion regarding the 
relationship of Buddhism to other South, Southeast, and East Asian religions is 
strange, as by the turn of the twentieth century Buddhism had become “well known 
and its variants understood.”78 One explanation might be an aversion by the devout 
professor to the radical, sometimes anti-religious interpretations of Orientalists 
studying Buddhism during the middle years of the nineteenth century, or he might 
have been more interested in avoiding work from the late century that acknowledged 
the historical priority of Buddha to Jesus. He may have avoided the scholarship out of 
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disdain for the scholars.79 Mirbt contented himself by noting that the influence of 
Buddhism was undeniable based just on its power in the Far East. For Mirbt these 
numbers served as a useful marker of the religious-historical position of Christendom 
in the present. At the same time he cautioned that this numerical advantage should not 
be overvalued. “It would be dangerous to ascribe weight to such apparent 
success…because the cult of numbers should have no place in religious matters.”80 
After all, Mirbt pointed out that what truly mattered was the forcefulness of religious 
culture in the contest with Islam and Buddhism.  
Mirbt’s concern over the global religious fight reflected missionary 
intellectuals’ growing global awareness. This new awareness included questions of 
what to do about the effects of global trade and commerce upon non-Western peoples 
and the missionary project. In the waning years of his life, Warneck became more 
concerned with the implications of globalization upon mission work. In particular, he 
wrote in the 1908 issue of the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift on the relationship of 
global trade and mission work. He opened by acknowledging the significant 
assistance that mission had received from trade, “whether mission preceded or 
followed world trade, [mission] received aid and temporal gains [from trade] whose 
worth [mission] fully value[d].”81 Even so, this relationship was not always to the 
advantage of mission and Warneck summarized what he saw to be the key concerns 
raised by world trade for missionary activities. 
The relationship between mission and trade had transformed, Warneck 
explained. Now, in 1908, very few mission stations remained isolated from the 
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systems of global exchange. In past eras mission could believe itself safe from outside 
influence; now mission had become in a sense a “city on a hill” that from its “exposed 
position” must accept the gaze of the world and public judgment. Warneck was 
certainly correct that missionaries and their mission stations had begun to receive ever 
greater scrutiny in the 1890s and early 1900s. What is interesting is that some part of 
this new attention came as a result of efforts by Warneck and others to raise the 
profile of mission activities amongst the German public. His earlier wishes for greater 
notoriety had been granted, yet Warneck did not seem fully satisfied with the result. 
He accepted that the outpouring of criticism of missionary societies’ work had to be 
accepted, when the criticism was justified and based in fact. However, Warneck 
continued, in the same way that a musical understanding was necessary to judge 
musical works, so was a religious understanding necessary for fair judgment of 
missionary activities.82 The growing engagement of other Europeans with mission 
work as a consequence of the growth in global exchange had, in Warneck’s opinion, 
both introduced to missionary enterprise useful advice and subjected it to uninformed 
and dangerous criticism. 
Many of these critics, Warneck went on, came from the growing diaspora of 
Christians. Such a spread could be advantageous for missionaries working in the 
field. The merchants, soldiers, officials, and settlers from Europe could undoubtedly 
provide missionaries with exemplary models of Christian life for their heathen 
students to emulate. Sadly, such an assumption was “only a beautiful dream.” The 
majority of Europeans in the colonies were, in fact, “no worthy representation of 
Christianity.” Instead their behavior provided the “heathen” with counter-examples of 
                                                 




Christian depravity. The bad behavior of white Christians in the colonies and the bad 
example that set for missionized peoples marked, for Warneck, “a long, dark shadow 
thrown by world trade.”83 The undeniable expansion of flows in people, goods, and 
information, which reached its peak in the decade before the First World War, 
worried Warneck. Much like localist anxieties in small German villages and towns, 
Warneck’s internationalist vision applied the same fears to the villages of indigenous 
people gathered around mission stations around the world. Missionaries’ anti-
modernist impulses continued to drive their aversion to the secular project of 
colonization. 
Beyond just the spread of despicable Europeans, Warneck warned of the 
spread of still more despicable European ideas. As German imperialism and mission 
interest began to direct more attention to China and the Far East, Warneck’s writings 
began to reflect a growing worry over the mixing of secular European culture with the 
so-called Kulturvölker of China, Japan, and India. He worried that academic works 
which undermined Christian belief by spreading “agnosticism, atheism, and 
materialism,” “modernism,” in Warneck’s shorthand, to “large half-educated circles 
of non-Christian Kulturvölker and no wall can prevent [its] entrance.” The spread of 
this literature created a public perception of Christianity in the upper classes of the 
non-Christian lands that Christianity had been supplanted by other religions in Europe 
and undermined the worth given Christianity through its attachment to European 
global power.84 
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The competition engendered by world trade and global exchange further 
imperiled Christian mission in the world. To Warneck, colonialism, world trade, and 
economic policies had brought overseas peoples little of worth, the only outcome had 
been “frequent brutality, violence and avarice.” One only needed, Warneck pointed 
out, to take note of the countless wars and uprisings led by native peoples in response 
to the excesses of colonialism, the opium and spirit trades, appropriation of property 
and proletarianization of indigenous peoples, the repression of economic 
independence, and the cruelty of work contracts to recognize the danger of economic 
modernization upon missionized peoples. Warneck’s interpretation of the effects of 
imperialism and globalization upon non-Western societies echoed in many ways 
critics like Lenin and Hobson from his intellectual left. Missionaries shared in the 
suffering of the peoples with whom they lived and worked, Warneck argued. He 
conceded that missionaries lacked the power to stop this global competition for power 
but they could, through their “Christian faith and Christian morality,” help mitigate 
the effects. The more Christian missionaries forced the Christian powers to participate 
in the competition for markets and trade in a moral fashion, the more non-Christian 
peoples would be able to participate in global trade and protect themselves from 
exploitation.85 
Warneck’s analysis of the effect of world trade on mission overwhelmingly 
focused on the negative outcomes of trade. Warneck’s late thought (he would die in 
1910) indicated a mixture of pragmatism with regards to dealing with the colonial 
powers but also a growing distaste for the impact of modern culture on Christianity. 
While his younger contemporaries began to find an accommodation with imperialism, 
                                                 




he seemed to be moving toward a renunciation of the limited compromises he made at 
the turn-of-the-century. The spread of immoral “Christian” Europeans, the diffusion 
of anti-Christian ideas, and the exploitative nature of global capitalism all acted as 
retardants to missionary growth in Warneck’s understanding. In all cases, 
consequently, Warneck’s solutions focused on the European homeland as a secondary 
mission field. The best missionary methods for addressing the challenges of 
expanding world trade were methods for the homeland. “In the home country,” he 
wrote, “lie the sources of our missionary power, the engendering and care of Godly 
living in the home country remains the core of our mission work.”86 No doubt for 
Warneck the power of the Reds and the Blacks (Socialists and Catholics) indicated a 
troubling effect of modern progress upon the very core of German Protestant mission. 
Ultimately, to Warneck the success of mission in a new era of globalization required 
victory on two fronts – against the growing subjugation of the non-Christian world87 
and against the old enemies of heathen superstition and recalcitrance.88 The threat of 
modernity to Christianity had become a key concern of one of Germany’s leading 
missionary figures just as the expansion of global exchange had made greater 
missionary cooperation possible. 
Warneck’s shifting position continued to reflect an aversion to politics as the 
missionaries defined them. The machinations of imperial powers for greater influence 
in the Far East, expanded trade opportunities around the world, and intensified 
colonial development all threatened the operations of missionaries and imperiled the 
lives and souls of indigenous peoples that missionaries sought to evangelize. While 
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men like Warneck remained resolute internationalists, the waves of global economic 
and political development and change reflected much of the formative aspects of the 
later, more nationalist ideology of younger Missionswissenschaftler. 
 
The Younger Generation 
 
Warneck and Mirbt, both established minds in the German missionary 
community, agreed that the world was beginning to change in 1900 and the concerns 
of missionary activity had to expand to deal with expanding challenges. The older 
generation continued to have its adherents, but a younger generation of thinkers also 
saw mission as part of a world in which forces beyond Christianity influenced the 
course of history.89 The two leading figures, Julius Richter and Karl Axenfeld both 
came to see the “nation,” defined as a historical subject, as a determining factor in 
history and in the future of mission. They began working to overturn the dominance 
of Warneck’s doctrine of strict internationalism in the half-decade before and the four 
years of the First World War. 
Richter and Axenfeld were both associated with the Berlin Mission Society 
and both resident in the cosmopolitan Prussian and imperial capital. In the decades 
after Warneck established his journal, Berlin had grown in size and prominence. By 
the 1880s Berlin held over one million people and by 1900 it had undeniably emerged 
as an international center and the capital of a powerful and assertive German 
                                                 




empire.90 The maturation of Berlin and the German Empire must have had a 
formative effect on Richter and Axenfeld. Both men, unlike Warneck and his 
colleagues, had only ever truly known a unified German state. Their maturation as 
Missionswissenschaftler took place firmly within the context of a German colonial 
empire. These two factors, their affiliation with the German metropolitan capital and 
their maturation, explain how both men would serve as the chief rhetoricians of a new 
melding between German national and missionary priorities. Berlin, as the center of 
German national power and intellectual life, led Richter and Axenfeld to think of 
themselves as at the center of a global German empire and to think about mission as a 
key constitutive element of German imperialism. Where Warneck and others would 
remain committed to the past, to the internationalist ideal, Axenfeld and Richter 
became ever more comfortable with the idea of a German missionary nationalism 
committed to promoting German Protestantism and German imperialism. 
Finally, the same geopolitical shift around 1900 that led Warneck to make 
mild revisions to his theories would also introduce a new concern to German 
missionary intellectuals. Mirbt would be a trailblazer of these ideas in the Allgemeine 
Missions-Zeitschrift, but others would follow. The slow success of mission work, the 
growth of Islam in East and West Africa, and the modernization of the non-Christian 
Japanese and Chinese empires led many missionaries to worry over the threat of non-
western religions. In particular the perceived threat of Islam would serve as a 
counterweight to the forces pushing German missionary intellectuals away from 
international mission.  
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The relationship between missionary ideology and the constellation of forces 
customarily thought of as “modernity” by late nineteenth-century intellectuals was 
never clear cut. On the one hand, the roots of the nineteenth-century mission 
movement in the anti-Enlightenment religious awakening predisposed many 
missionary theorists to be suspicious of the influence of industrial society upon the 
world. At the same time a younger generation of missionaries, more comfortable with 
the mechanized landscape of fin-de-siècle Europe, saw technological developments as 
a sign of God’s providence, evidence of divine intention that Christianity finally 
spread across the entire globe. Gustav Warneck’s work showed this ambiguity, but 
Karl Axenfeld provided the best evidence of the younger generation – eager to 
evangelize the world with the tools of the modern age: he wrote, what would our 
forerunners say “if they could see the breach in the Chinese wall” blasted for an 
“express train out of the Christian West!”91 
In one article, drawn from a discussion of the fourteenth verse of the twenty-
fourth chapter of Matthew, Axenfeld clearly foresaw the glorious success of Christian 
mission without a single reference to colonial politics. This certainty was not unique 
to Axenfeld’s work; rather all missionary leaders shared his confidence. So, when we 
consider the relationship of religion and politics in German missionary activities it 
would be easy to dismiss the declarations of religious primacy as a form of 
rationalization. It is easy to believe that missionaries were unable to face the practical 
and political reality that their work existed only because of European political and 
military might. But Axenfeld’s article offers an object lesson in the fact that even the 
most political of missionary animals could see the project of missionary 
                                                 




evangelization as spiritually, morally, and practically independent of political 
considerations. The engagement in politics by missionaries was best understood as 
the contemporary missionary leadership doing its best to see God’s will fulfilled in 
their lifetime. 
Axenfeld exulted, “the fulfillment of our promise is surely the greatest piece 
of evidence that God” has always guided the way and provided the means. God had 
placed Christian missionaries in a world with the steamship, telegraph, and railroad, 
Axenfeld argued, and “we live in the great time of fulfillment” of God’s promise of a 
Christian globe. He went on, “the number of people on earth who have never heard of 
Christ and his authority [Herrschaftsanspruch] rapidly dwindles under the current 
global development.”92 Once all men and women were brought by mission to 
Christianity, every Christian would attend to the teachings of the Bible and would 
hasten the Millennium. However, this end of time and new kingdom would not come 
through human effort but by God’s will, in the flow of history “unexpected like a 
thief, unpredictable like a lightning bolt.” The decisive hour for the kingdom of God 
would be the hour when Christianity had vanquished all other faiths.93 
How do we resolve this vision of Axenfeld’s faith with his later career as a 
deeply political figure? When laid alongside Axenfeld’s expressed desires for a more 
nationally efficacious form of mission work, his 1911 words with their purely 
spiritual direction seem unusual. (Even before the First World War Axenfeld would 
become an ardent nationalist). However, when these ideas were combined it seems 
unlikely that Axenfeld’s devotion to national mission was an abandonment of a 
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theological understanding of international missionary work. Were that the case he 
would not have composed such a conventionally structured discussion of the meaning 
of mission in Christian eschatology. Instead a more reasonable conclusion is that 
Axenfeld’s support for a particularist, German mission effort was a result of a firm 
belief in the place of Germany in history; in his small corner of the world, perhaps, 
Axenfeld sought to utilize German exceptionality to help promote the eventual 
fulfillment of biblical prophecy. In the process, he offered a way forward for 
missionary leaders inclined to a nationalist interpretation of the evangelical project. 
Julius Richter, successor to Warneck as editor of the Allgemeine Missions-
Zeitschrift, wrote the introductory essay of the 1914 issue. From Richter’s point of 
view, peace between England and Germany depended on “the comprehension that the 
vital interests [Lebensinteressen] of both great peoples [did] not stand 
in…opposition.” World peace and world mission were, to Richter, “vitally 
connected.” The past decades had witnessed the most significant human 
developments: European culture’s spread across the globe and the rise of national 
consciousness among the peoples of Asia and Africa.94 
The greatest achievement still ahead for European culture was to bring its 
powerful and important civilization to all the peoples of the world. Any complication 
of the process by military competition would be a “crime against humanity.” 
Therefore, a war between Britain and Germany must be avoided because such a 
conflict would hinder global cultural development by interfering with the work of 
humanitarian mission. The two nations’ spheres of interest would constrict and 
neither nation would be able to devote sufficient resources to support its “brave 
                                                 




missionaries.” Richter concluded, “A world war between the Protestant powers would 
be calamitous.”95 The congruent industrial development of England, Germany, and 
other Christian lands proved Christianity’s advanced cultural development. Should an 
un-Christian egoism bring those powers into conflict, then mission’s ultimate goal: 
the spread of the Gospel and world peace would become impossible.96 Richter 
understood the complicated relationship between politics and mission. To him the 
growth of European power was natural and necessary to support the spread of 
Christian missionaries but by 1914, Richter had clearly grown apprehensive of the 
growing rivalry between Germany and England. What he hoped for, like many other 
German intellectuals, was that the two countries would recognize their shared 
interests. If they did not, Richter worried that the consequences for German mission 
and Protestant Christianity as a whole would be dire. Richter and Axenfeld’s rising 




In their largest venue for ideological expression, the Allgemeine Missions-
Zeitschrift, German missionary leaders considered the relative merits and correct 
relationship between political activity – defined as secular affairs in general, the 
national and colonial state, and any nationally stamped form of colonial activity. This 
group of intellectuals was made up of former missionaries or of men who had 
ongoing contact with missionaries in the field. This contact may have had an 
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important impact upon the development of missionary internationalism but the main 
discussions about internationalism versus nationalism took place in a theoretical plane 
a step removed from practical mission activities. The determination that inflected 
missionary leaders’ reactions to political activity as they understood it was always an 
intellectual position that, as will be shown, rarely stood up to the realities of German 
Protestant mission work. 
 For nearly thirty years the dominant view was that mission should hold itself 
strictly apart from the activities of the colonial state. This position was marked by 
four characteristics. First, it was spearheaded by Gustav Warneck and supported by 
his fellow members of the older generation of German mission leaders. All had been 
born before the establishment of a German nation-state and colonial empire and all 
judged that mission had been successful before there was a Germany and that it could 
and should remain successful independent of a German colonial empire in the future 
as well. Germany’s mission societies belonged to an international community, a 
community that served God’s design. Second, the biblical commission for all 
Christians to spread the Gospel to all peoples meant that the missionary project 
superseded all other human ambition. This meant that German missionaries’ work 
was by definition international and subject to no secular agenda. Third, beyond 
missionaries’ principled separation of mission and politics there was a vital practical 
basis for separating missionary activity from colonial political activity. Politics would 
corrupt mission work if given the chance. Consequently, the older generation of 
missionary thinkers cited protecting the integrity of missionary endeavor as a further 




compatriots agreed that politics in any form was a threat to the resources and attention 
necessary for missionary success. While this set of principles remained dominant 
until the turn of the twentieth century, it was after 1900 that it began to lose ground. 
The older generation began to become ever more concerned about other ideologies 
and the global influence of those ideologies. Warneck and others began thinking 
about politics as a global contest between Christianity and the other faiths. At no 
point did they completely concede that missionaries must engage in political activity, 
but they did propose that the missionary movement adapt to these new circumstances 
and push for support from the colonial powers. Finally, just before and during the 
First World War a younger generation of missionary leaders began to consider the 
power of the nation as paramount. Their nationalism rose to dominate the missionary 
world for the brief moment before the question of the relationship between German 





Chapter Two: Confessions in Conflict 
 
Conflicts between Protestants and Catholics in Germany helped undermine 
the strong internationalist position that most missionary leaders followed during the 
nineteenth century. The vibrating strand of anti-Catholicism in German Protestant 
missionary discourse revealed the obsession with international and national loyalty 
that missionaries carried forward from the pre-imperial period into their own 
particular fixations. Nonetheless, for much of their history Protestant missionaries 
repressed their anti-Catholic urges and concentrated on their own work. And yet, 
Protestant missionaries’ virulent criticism of the Catholic establishment was a taut 
strand stretched from before the establishment of the Kaiserreich to the First World 
War. It vibrated at varying intensities at different times, with its strongest vibrations 
occurring during the so-called Benediktinerstreit. A conflict over mission territories 
in German East Africa, the Benediktinerstreit called into question the very possibility 
of Protestant-Catholic coexistence. To this point the Benediktinerstreit has received 
little coverage from scholars. In general it has been folded into scholarship on the 
general question of territory and competition between mission societies regardless of 
denomination or confession. This chapter will draw upon the correspondence of the 




that the Protestant-Catholic division was far more significant than other such conflicts 
over territory or influence.1 
 The Benediktinerstreit lasted for half a decade; jeopardized the fragile 
coalition that undergirded colonial stability in German East Africa in the aftermath of 
the violent Maji-Maji War; and threatened to reignite confessional rivalries between 
Catholics and Protestants in the German metropole. It pitted the well-established 
Berlin Mission Society against one of the new German Catholic mission orders, the 
Benedictine Oblates of St. Ottilien which had been founded to work in the German 
colonies in 1884. To the Berliners and Benedictines the territorial disagreement 
between the Catholics and Protestants had the potential to send shockwaves across 
German society. The Benediktinerstreit proved to be less calamitous than Protestant, 
Catholic, and secular leaders predicted. In part this is because the First World War 
made the entire issue irrelevant; however, it is also because the Benediktinerstreit was 
a relatively unimportant event whose importance lay in its meaning as a signifier of 
German confessional and political patterns. Nonetheless, the sound and fury whipped 
up by the leaders of the Berlin Mission between 1908 and 1914 proves how important 
that period was to German Protestant missionary ideology. 
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 The German Protestant mission movement at the time of the 
Benediktinerstreit found itself under a significant amount of stress. The reaction of 
the Berlin Mission Society to the Catholic “invasion” of its territory betrayed the 
pressure that the mission felt in German East Africa specifically, as well as the 
shifting identities of German Protestant missionaries during this period. A study of 
the reaction of the leaders of the Berlin Mission to the actions of the Benedictines 
indicates, in the first place, that the rising nationalist ideology among some German 
Protestant missionaries had impact upon colonial policy. Second, German Protestant 
missionary internationalism was not always a force for reconciliation and peace. 
Catholic internationalism and German Protestant missionary internationalism came 
into conflict over mission territories in East Africa. And, in fact, the German 
Protestant missionary movement, even before the development of a compelling 
nationalist mission ideology, proved, at times, to be more concerned with the conflict 
between Protestantism and Catholicism than with its internationalist or nationalist 
credentials. This raises the third point, the challenge that national culture posed to 
missionary internationalism. The border conflict with the Benedictines tapped into a 
long history of anti-Catholicism in Germany.2 The ease with which the leaders of the 
Berlin Mission utilized old traditions of confessionally coded nationalism 
demonstrated the strength of national culture and how difficult it could be to 
transcend national particularity. 
In the end the Benediktinerstreit had no resolution; the conflict disappeared 
along with so much else at the opening of the First World War. But the 
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Benediktinerstreit’s imprint upon the history of the Protestant mission movement in 
Germany far exceeded its imprint upon other histories. It came at a time when the 
previously redoubtable internationalist ideology of German mission life began to 
come under a succession of blows from without. The threats to Protestant mission in 
German East Africa already detailed above were just a small piece, the German 
mission societies also found themselves financial stretched, under pressure from 
secular colonialists and German arch-nationalists, and struggling to navigate an 
increasingly interconnected international scene; all while a new group of leaders 
arose within the movement promoting a nationalist ideology of mission work. The 
Protestant missionaries’ turn to anti-Catholic and nationalist rhetoric during the 
Benediktinerstreit is an indicator of the slipping internationalism of the German 
Protestant mission movement around 1908. 
 
Catholics in Germany 
 
 The origins of German anti-Catholicism are chronologically distinct and yet 
the outbreaks are tightly linked over time. From origins in the Reformation and Thirty 
Years’ War, through the Enlightenment, into the Kulturkampf of the 1870s, and 
continuing in the polemics of the Protestant missionaries’ against Catholics and the 
Catholic Church followed familiar lines of argument. The anti-Catholic language of 
German Protestant missionaries followed many of the themes produced by Bismarck 
and his liberal allies during the 1870s which had themselves drawn from older 




witnessed attacks designed to break the power of the Catholic Church in Germany. 
Priests and bishops were jailed, church property was seized, and the Jesuit order was 
exiled from the country in a flurry of liberal and statist opposition to the Roman 
faith.3 
 In response to concerted attacks by the state and liberal politicians, German 
Catholics banded together in opposition. Paradoxically, Kulturkampf legislation, 
designed to unite the new German Empire culturally, worsened the dissonance 
between Protestant and Catholic communities in Germany. It helped accentuate the 
developing social and political segregation of Catholic and Protestant Germans.4 
David Blackbourn has even argued that by the 1880s there were two Germanys 
within the Kaiserreich, one for each confession.5 Even after the end of the 
Kulturkampf Catholics felt themselves the victims of an ongoing “silent” or 
“creeping” Kulturkampf. Laws across the German states continued to discriminate 
against Catholics and though one-third of the German population was Catholic, 
Catholics were underrepresented in the highest ranks of the Prussian state and 
German imperial civil services, a disproportionate minority in academia, and lagged 
behind Protestants in educational achievement.6 
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The experience of repression brought Catholics together into social and 
political organizations across class and occupation.7 Foremost among these 
organizations was the Catholic Center Party which emerged as the center of political 
Catholicism and the primary advocate of Catholic interests.8 And though the party 
was a coalition of economic, social, and regional constituencies, the party displayed 
remarkable durability with consistent support among German parties aside second 
only to the Social Democrats.9 Because of the peculiar characteristics of the German 
political scene, the Center Party wielded phenomenal influence. From 1890 to 1914 it 
possessed one-quarter of the seats in the Reichstag. Together with the parliamentary 
decline of the nationalist National Liberals and Conservatives, traditional allies of 
imperial chancellors, and ascent of the permanently anti-government Social 
Democrats, the Center Party’s parliamentary strength made it the only possible means 
for the chancellors to construct any parliamentary majority.10 The Center Party, 
therefore, wielded significant power within the Reichstag and, as a consequence, in 
German political life.11 
 The political power of the Catholic Center Party certainly gave the Protestants 
pause during the Benediktinerstreit but did not ultimately dissuade the missionaries 
from attacking the Catholic faith. The Reichstag held significant influence in colonial 
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affairs and the Center Party had proven its influence in these matters in the past.12 In 
spite of these facts the missionaries believed that a strong campaign of nationalist 
anti-Catholicism could be the solution to their territorial conflict in German East 
Africa. The Protestant leadership believed that if the conflict in East Africa could be 
depicted as a battle against anti-nationalist Catholics, then perhaps the Center Party 
could be isolated and the missionaries’ allies could join with the pro-government 
parties, the Conservatives and pro-colonial National Liberals, to force concessions 
from the colonial government or the Catholics. By appealing to a long tradition of 
anti-Catholic rhetoric from the conservative Right and Liberals in Germany the 
Protestant missionaries sought to compel the Colonial Department to enforce a 
system of territorial division that favored Protestants’ long- and short-term interests13. 
Recent history may have also made it appear that the Center Party was out of favor 
and therefore politically vulnerable. Unlike previous chancellors, Bernhard von 
Bülow had not forged any coalition with the Center Party, particularly in the wake of 
the “Hottentot” Election of 1907 which had pitted the government against the Center 
Party and the Social Democrats.14 The successful electoral campaign waged by the 
government and its political allies against the Center Party had demonstrated the 
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residual strength of anti-Catholicism in German politics.15 The missionaries clearly 
had reason to believe that the application of tried and true methods from the recent 
and distant past might lead to success. 
 Relations between Protestants and Catholics during the second half of the 
nineteenth century were suffused with a historical memory of the conflicts of the 
Reformation and the decades of religious warfare that had followed. Protestant 
religious identity carried with it the paired convictions that German Lutherans and 
other Protestants had the duty to complete the Reformation within Germany and at 
the same time a certainty that Catholics had engaged in an ongoing campaign to 
undermine German national strength.16 German liberals and conservative Protestants 
were able to join together behind a program of integrative nationalism focused on a 
shared anti-Catholicism that defined the German nation as Protestant.17 Protestants 
and the liberal national state adopted a view of German Catholic society during the 
early nineteenth century that suspected the Catholic Church, which was undergoing 
revitalization in the period, of conspiring to destroy German national life.18  
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 The conservative Protestant and Liberal suspicion of a Catholic conspiracy 
bent on destroying the heritage of the Reformation provided the basis for the rhetoric 
and mindset of German anti-Catholicism. German Protestants, missionaries among 
them, viewed Catholics as possessing certain qualities that made them less than 
worthy members of the national state.19 The liberals’ attack on the Catholics during 
the period of the Kulturkampf tarred Catholics and their clergy as “stupid, medieval, 
superstitious, feminine, and un-German.” Catholicism, in their view, was the 
antithesis of the German values of “rationalism, bourgeois individualism, high 
industrialization, free-market capitalism, the unified nation-state, and gender-specific 
public and private spheres.”20 Protestant missionary leaders adapted many of these 
accusations to their own needs. They too associated Catholics with hierarchy, 
absolutism, and censorship;21 qualities that were anathema to a Protestant missionary 
leadership built on the ideas of individual and independent pursuit of personal 
salvation and a mission program dependent upon the protection of freedom of 
conscience in the colonies. The Protestant campaign during the Benediktinerstreit, by 
applying the arguments of German Protestant nationalism, subverted the very ideals 
of religious freedom and missionary internationalism that Protestant missionaries had 
treasured since before the establishment of a German Empire. 
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German East African Context 
 
 The German missionaries in East Africa, like missionaries in European 
colonies around the world, had intimate dealings with the colonial state. In the case of 
German East Africa, both the Catholic and Protestant mission societies had entered 
the colony either in collaboration with or at the urging of secular colonial groups 
within a decade of the establishment of the colony. This meant that both the Catholic 
and the Protestant missions passed through similar stages at roughly the same time in 
the colony. The Berlin, Bethel, Moravian, and Leipzig Missions struggled through the 
early phases of establishing a mission, an experience also shared by the Benedictines 
of St. Ottilien.22 Missions of both confessions emerged from this early, challenging 
phase around 1900 and entered a period of expansion in the colony. In particular, the 
Berlin Mission and the Catholic Benedictines’ growth and close proximity in the 
southwest of the colony contributed to the clash between the two confessions. 
 As has been discussed already, the relationship between missionaries and 
colonialism in Germany was, on an ideological level, ambivalent at best. Missionary 
leaders generally viewed the colonial state with skepticism. However, on the ground 
in the colonies missionaries still looked to the colonial state for protection and 
support and some institutions in the metropole brought missionaries and the 
colonizing state together. The most direct link between missionaries and the colonial 
administration in Europe was the Kolonialrat (Colonial Council). The Kolonialrat 
functioned as an advisory council to the German Colonial Director from 1891 until its 
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dissolution in 1906. The Kolonialrat was seen by contemporaries as a check on the 
colonial administration that, nonetheless, generally supported the government’s 
efforts.23 The Protestant representative, Karl von Jacobi, his Catholic colleague, Franz 
Hespers, and their successors served as intermediaries between the mission societies 
and the metropolitan colonial administration. The Kolonialrat’s institutionalized 
position as an intermediary between colonial interests and the Colonial Secretary was 
left vacant after the council’s dissolution during the Dernburg Reforms of 1907-
1908.24   
This link between the mission societies and the German government was 
supplemented by more prosaic relations in East Africa. The anti-slavery campaign 
provided one natural area of alliance between the missions and colonial state, an 
alliance that pitted the Germans against African slave traders.25 But it is dangerous to 
overestimate the strength of these bonds as the German administration’s campaign 
against slavery in German East Africa was intentionally deliberate. Missions of both 
confessions spent the 1890s, 1900s, and 1910s repeatedly pressing the colonial 
government in Berlin and East Africa to further suppress the slave trade and abolish 
slaveholding.26 This complicated relationship did not prevent Berlin missionaries in 
the south of the colony viewing the colonial administration as an ally, even flying the 
flag of the administration and displaying portraits of the Kaiser and his wife the 
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Kaiserin.27 Similarly, Catholics in the colony showed their loyalty by close adherence 
to the administration’s educational policy directives.28 In return for their loyalty the 
missionaries were able to enforce compulsory school attendance with state 
assistance.29 Mission schools and other ventures also received funding from the 
colonial administration, integrating them into the colonial state.30 Colonial tax policy 
also helped incentivize mission and school attendance with tax dispensations for 
Africans resident at mission stations.31 On the other hand, missionaries still 
frequently viewed the colonial state as a rival, seeking to protect “their” Africans 
from the violence of the state and other interest groups like settlers and corporate 
enterprises.32 Clearly, the relationship between missionaries and the colonial state 
was complex. 
The actions of the government could, at times, provoke the concern of the 
Protestant mission societies. In 1892 the colonial government of German East Africa 
opened its own school in coastal Tanga and by 1902 about 4,000 pupils attended 
government schools. The schools trained translators, clerks, and skilled artisans for 
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the needs of the colonial administration.33 The schools were set up as non-
confessional and were from the start the focus of hostility from missionaries.34 
Because these schools had been built in the coastal regions and catered to the Muslim 
coastal elite of the colony, missionaries worried that the schools might feature 
religious instruction in Islam.35 Missionaries increasingly felt that the non-
confessional schools, particularly their largely Muslim student body, meant the 
government was cutting mission schools out of the supply line for colonial 
administrators.36 Catholic and Protestant missions joined together in opposition to the 
government schools but the schools remained in operation and they contributed to a 
fear of an expanding Islam amongst the Protestant missionaries. The growth of Islam 
in general in the region combined with the perception by missionaries that the 
colonial government favored its Muslim subjects to further intensify missionaries’ 
apprehension about their future.37 Efforts to change the policy in Berlin failed as did 
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missionary hopes to use the German administration’s codification of African 
“common law” to suppress Islam.38 Protestant missionaries by 1908 looked at the 
situation in German East Africa and saw their position pressed from all sides. 
The central issue of the Benediktinerstreit was control over land. 
Missionaries’ preoccupation with land rights reflected their existential need for access 
to indigenous peoples. In this pursuit of African “souls” schools served as a tool for 
drawing indigenous communities to the mission stations. A school could bring in 
people but missionaries had little interest in competing for those people. Thus mission 
societies sought monopolistic access to indigenous groups and sought to preserve 
exclusivity with territorial agreements with the colonial state and other mission 
societies. Part of this process involved contentious discussions for and in defense of 
missions’ land ownership rights. Land ownership made visible to indigenous people 
missionaries’ political and economic authority, and to prove this authority the mission 
societies fought against land concession companies and each other over territory.39 In 
East Africa, extensive lands, alienated from Africans by the administration, were 
granted to the Berlin Mission between 1904 and 1907.40 Paradoxically this policy 
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included the destruction of indigenous land rights in a paternalistic plan to protect 
Africans against economic exploitation. In general, the colonial administration sought 
to prevent Europeans from monopolizing land in the colony and expanded the 
program after 1907,41 and, since Protestant missionaries generally distributed land to 
Africans as an incentive for cooperation, missionaries’ use of land generally 
complemented the East African colonial administration’s intentions.  
The different uses to which each confession put its lands further alienated 
Catholics and Protestants from one another. The Catholic orders had a stronger 
hunger for land than the Protestants who demonstrated “relative abstinence.” The 
Catholic Church gathered significant land disproportionately in excess of the 
Protestant societies. Meanwhile, Protestant missionaries emphasized that the land 
would lead to the liberation of African farmers and the creation of an independent 
farming class, a goal that would be shared with the colonial administration following 
the Maji-Maji War and the institution of the Dernburg Reforms.42 The Protestant 
missions probably truly believed that they sought land for the sake of their African 
neighbors and subjects but this frequently meant that the mission ended up taking on 
the political authority of a large landowner. Frequently this resulted in the mission 
becoming ever more interested in land for its own interests rather than for the 
interests of Africans. To the Protestant missionaries, as one scholar has described it, 
the construction of a Christian agrarian community represented a geographical 
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expression of the evangelical project.43 The symbolic, economic, and political value 
of land explains Protestant missionaries’ tetchiness about their territorial rights. 
The Maji-Maji War was a seminal event in the history of German East Africa 
and in the history of modern Tanzania. Historians of the conflict argue that the defeat 
of African military resistance to colonial rule lead to a turn on the part of Africans to 
educational and political paths of resistance.44 Furthermore the near total destruction 
of African polities that had resisted by the Germans and the depopulation of the 
region as a result of guerilla warfare transformed the region. In late July 1905 
societies of Africans dispersed across the southern portion of the colony, despite 
differences in language and culture, inspired by the prophecies of Kinjikitile Ngwale 
joined together in resistance against German rule. Fired by opposition to forced labor 
and certain in the power of the maji medicine propagated by Kinjikitile Ngwane and 
his followers against the bullets of German forces, Africans waged the final violent 
resistance against colonial rule in the territory. The symbolic value of maji to the 
resistance was as an organizing ideology, used to help bring unity and as a purifying 
medicine designed to renew African societies for the conflict with Germans and 
African collaborators. The acceptance of the maji medicine by local African leaders 
followed “established patterns of statecraft and authority.”45 The rebellion 
represented an organized, quasi-national rejection of imperialism by multiple African 
polities and societies.46 
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African insurgents represented twenty-five different languages and their 
unified opposition to colonialism targeted whatever symbol of German rule they 
could find. Attacks on Zanzibari Arab, Indian, and German traders on the coast and 
inland, raids on Protestant and Catholic mission stations, the killing of the 
Benedictine bishop on August 14, all marked the beginnings of an insurgency that 
would stretch from the southeastern coast of the colony all the way to the shores of 
Lake Nyasa which made up the southwestern border of the colony. However, by late 
September 1905 the German forces had begun to turn the tide against the rebels. The 
suppression of the rebellion would last into 1906 and the pursuit of the leaders of 
various rebel groups continued into 1907.47 
The suppression of the rebellion, particularly after the last pitched battles in 
November 1905, became a matter of German-led patrols whose main purpose was the 
seizure of food and the destruction of crops in order to force African resisters to 
submit. In response rebels seized food from loyalists and sought to create safe regions 
in which they could cultivate crops.  The last two years of the Maji-Maji War were a 
guerilla campaign which created a widespread famine in the southern areas of 
German East Africa.  Along with the massive death toll, the defeat of maji medicine 
may have also delegitimized indigenous faiths. Both Islam and Christianity grew 
significantly in the regions most affected by the fighting.48 
Missionaries, targeted by Africans during the Maji-Maji War, had fought on 
the side of the colonial administration and their mission communities had suffered 
significantly. Clearly many Africans interpreted the missionaries as representatives of 
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colonial rule but, nonetheless, the mission leadership seemed to view their position 
vis-à-vis the Africans as distinct from the colonial state’s role. The violent 
suppression of the African population during the later years of the war left both 
confessions’ mission territories depopulated by the colonial forces’ scorched earth 
methods. At the same time, the shortages of food and insecurity in the region led to 
phenomenal expansion of the missionized communities, further straining 
missionaries’ land resources.49 These problems coincided with a rise in the actual 
value of the land and together caused the Berlin missionaries to worry if they could 
secure the acres that they thought necessary for their stations.50 The dislocation of 
indigenous groups as a result of the rebellion made control of territory, and therefore 
of African populations, even more crucial to Protestant leaders. At the same time, 
colonial development organized in the Dernburg Reforms under Colonial Governor 
Albrecht von Rechenberg worked as an incentive for missionary land use policies. 
Rechenberg set as his goal the development of African agriculture and, with the help 
of the newly appointed and promoted Colonial Secretary Bernhard Dernburg, secured 
financial support for a railroad to connect the densely populated regions of central 
and western German East Africa with the coast.51 Colonial economic policy seemed 
to be falling in line with Protestant missionaries’ goals, in particular, their support for 
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the creation of an African agrarian populace.52 The period after 1908 was therefore 
one of opportunity and scarcity – scarce resources and population in the area shared 
by the Berlin and St. Ottilien missionaries, and promising opportunity from an 
economic policy in line with Protestant missionaries’ vision of African economic 
development. 
Political maneuvers in Berlin supported Protestant missionaries’ interpretation 
of contemporary conditions. Dernburg was elevated to the head of the Colonial 
Department and the Colonial Department was made independent of the Foreign 
Office in the wake of the Herero-Nama and Maji-Maji Wars. Long-running shortfalls 
in colonial budgets, the cost of the two colonial wars, and the weight of successive 
scandals from the German protectorates in Africa provided the reform wing of the 
Catholic Center Party and the Social Democrats with the tools to undermine the 
government of Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow. The criticism reached its apex in 
1906 and revealed that Bülow lacked an effective coalition in the Reichstag. 
However, the imperial chancellor saw an opportunity to turn his political weakness 
into advantage. The Chancellor dissolved the Reichstag and called new elections. He 
then set about making the elections a referendum on Germany’s colonial empire – an 
empire he presented as essential to Germany’s future and which he promised to 
reform.53 
The standard bearer for this new program of colonial reform was the banker 
with a reputation for resurrecting moribund businesses, Bernhard Dernburg. The 
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election of January 1907 rewarded Bülow and Dernburg with a resounding victory. 
Dernburg and the government actively participated in the election, a first in German 
history as the government did not represent any party and was not responsible to the 
representatives of the Reichstag. The victory cemented a program of development 
and, where possible, expansion of the German colonial empire.54 Rechenberg, 
governor in East Africa and eager to reform the colony, promoted economic 
colonialism (as opposed to settlement colonialism) focused on African development 
with Dernburg’s blessing.55 Rechenberg’s program was designed to develop 
indigenous cash-crop production. Its marquee project was the construction of the 
Zentralbahn (Central Line) railroad from the coast to the densely populated areas in 
the west of the colony.56 The Zentralbahn served African agricultural production and 
not European settlement by connecting large areas of African cultivation with the 
export market. The program of African agriculture bore fruit for the colony and 
quickly out-produced settler-controlled plantation schemes.57 Dernburg’s program of 
colonial development stimulated the Protestant missionaries’ concerns over land. The 
use of colonial pressure groups and nationalist organizations by the government in the 
1907 election would have put pressure on the mission movement to participate in the 
national program of colonial development. At the same time, Rechenberg’s pro-
African development program made missionaries’ land all the more valuable. 
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Protestant worries over land needed little encouragement to become a conflict 
with Catholics. In addition to the cultural and political prejudices arising from 
Germany, there were circumstances in German East Africa that further aggravated 
Protestant sensitivities. Since the German state had taken control of the colony from 
Carl Peters’ Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft (German East Africa Company) in 
1891 the Catholic missions had developed superior credentials with the colonial state 
and the secular colonial movement in Germany.58 Catholics more eagerly accepted 
the role that colonialists wished for them and pursued a policy of education designed 
to prepare Africans to serve the colonial economy and state.59 This left the Protestant 
missionaries jealous and suspicious of Catholic activities. Second, the distinction 
between Catholic and Protestant mission methods meant that the Catholic mission 
territories had the potential to grow faster than Protestant territories. Protestants 
enforced stricter criteria before baptizing applicants than the Catholics and therefore 
lagged further behind the Catholics in quantities of converts.60 Furthermore, 
Protestant attempts to create ethnically focused churches in their territories required 
significantly more time than the Catholics who baptized applicants more rapidly and 
hoped to develop orthodox belief over the longer term.61 If territorial boundaries 
became meaningless and Catholics and Protestants were left to compete for African 
parishioners in a religious free market, the Protestants had no hopes of success. So, in 
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order to prevent a Catholic “victory” the Protestants sought fixed, monopolistic 




By the turn of the twentieth century the Protestant mission movement had 
formulated a detailed critique of Catholic mission work. Protestant missionary 
intellectuals had long viewed the Catholic mission movement with suspicion. German 
Protestants took pride in their long experience as missionaries in the “modern era” 
and judged Catholics as out of touch with the appropriate spirit of missionary work. 
Catholics lacked the tools of “scientific” mission work that distinguished Protestant 
and especially German Protestant mission.62 The journals and pamphlets of the 
German Protestant missionaries claimed that Catholics manipulated the political 
system of the Kaiserreich to serve their parochial ends. The most frequent Protestant 
critiques were attacks upon Catholics’ supposed political corruption. 
 Catholics’ close relationship to the colonial state frustrated Protestant 
missionaries from a very early date. In particular, the Protestants felt the Catholics 
had done little to earn the colonialists respect. Franz Michael Zahn observed that, 
after all, Catholicism had had 450 years to “conquer Africa.” And yet, the Catholics 
remained more concerned with the “dressings of institutional life” than creating new 
Christians. Catholics, Alexander Merensky of the Berlin Mission argued, “educate[d] 
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the Negro to work” because they could not succeed by spiritual persuasion.63 
Protestant mission methods surpassed Catholic missions, according to Zahn; 
Protestant missionaries had needed just one century to match the achievements of the 
Catholic Church.64 Infuriatingly, the colonial state still preferred Catholics’ 
determination to acclimate Africans to labor in the new economy of the colony. The 
administration’s preference for this approach, according to Julius Richter, threatened 
to undermine the strength of the German Empire. The Catholic missions, he 
cautioned, cared more for the “glorification of Rome” than either Christian 
evangelization or the German nation.65 What Christianity the Roman Catholic 
converts had, one missiologist argued, was “Roman” rather than an independent 
“national” indigenous church. The civilizing mission that justified the entire colonial 
project did not mean perpetual tutelage, Protestants felt, and that was what Catholic 
mission promised to the Africans. Protestants believed the goal of the Catholic 
Church was not individual or national salvation but rather the expansion of the 
Catholic Church’s earthly influence.66 
 Protestant missionaries argued that their work was not only methodologically 
superior but also morally superior because it, unlike the Catholic mission, sought to 
create an indigenous Christian community. The Protestant mission societies, the 
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argument went, worked for Africans as opposed to exploitative economic interests.67 
Though Protestant missionary work took longer than Catholic because of the ease 
with which Catholics baptized converts, one Berlin missionary wrote, “the beautiful 
and rich successes [of Protestant mission]…are evidence that the way we promulgate 
the Gospel has a great strength.”68 In contrast, Protestants argued, the Catholic 
mission societies worked to satisfy the needs of trading companies, plantation 
owners, and other European economic interests as part of a determined strategy to 
displace the Protestant missions.69 As early as 1901, several years before the 
Benediktinerstreit, some in the Protestant movement called for a public campaign 
against Rome and the Catholic mission because of its supposed ultramontanist and 
anti-Protestant agenda.70 The Catholic mission organizations were accused by 
German Protestant missionaries of service to a Catholic political agenda of world 
domination.71 In fact, Carl Mirbt, a prominent scholar of Catholic Church history and 
Protestant missiology, proposed that the growing strength of Rome within the 
Catholic Church was a direct result and further impetus for the expanding power of 
Catholic mission in the late nineteenth century.72 Warneck accused the Catholics of 
taking up an anachronistic “medieval mission of the sword” by declaring their 
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activities a “crusade.”73 The work undertaken by the Catholic mission orders to serve 
the colonial state, Protestant missionary intellectuals declared, concealed the real 
agenda of the Catholic Church, one which sought temporal power for the Pope. 
 Though Protestant missionaries did worry over the doctrinaire differences 
they had with the Catholics, their truest concerns were focused on more concrete 
differences. They mainly objected to the political success that Catholics had achieved 
in Germany. To them, Protestant mission was morally and methodologically superior 
to the Catholic variety of mission work and therefore more legitimate than the 
Catholic mission project. Moral and methodological superiority validated Protestant 
attacks upon the Catholic Church and provided fuel for Protestant missionaries’ anti-
Catholicism. The main, usually unacknowledged, source for hostility was Catholic 
success relative to Protestant efforts. When Germany’s Protestants decided to 
implement a strategy of public anti-Catholicism during the Benediktinerstreit they 




 The Kulturkampf had been the most direct form of anti-Catholic activity in the 
Kaiserreich and legal discrimination continued to be an affront to German Catholics, 
but the most aggressive attacks came from anti-Catholic groups like the Protestant 
League. The accusations of the Protestant League and its allies reproduced the nearly 
century-old indictments of Enlightenment critics and added the nationalist flavoring 
of the liberal supporters of the Kulturkampf. These attacks were designed to 
                                                 




undermine Catholics’ credibility in German national politics. Catholics were depicted 
as anti-intellectual, anachronistic, superstitious, feminine, and generally without the 
fundamental German qualities of sobriety, industriousness, and rationality. Protestant 
activists argued the Catholics in Germany blindly followed the Pope, insincere in 
their protestations of national loyalty.74 The bond between Protestant missionaries 
and the Protestant League was more than rhetorical; in fact, Gustav Warneck and Carl 
Mirbt were both members of the League as was contributor to the Allgemeine 
Missions-Zeitschrift Paul Wurm.75 
Even before 1900 Protestant missionaries attacked the nature of German 
Catholic mission life in order to advance their own agenda.76 France was the center of 
nineteenth-century Catholic mission work and Germany’s historic antagonism with 
the French made that association damning in the eyes of Protestant missionary 
advocates. Furthermore, the missionaries’ latent suspicion of the centralizing forces 
of ultramontanism within the Catholic Church provided further evidence that Catholic 
missionaries did not serve German interests. Protestant missionaries knowingly 
adopted the nationalist discourses in their confessional fight with the Catholics. After 
all, Catholics, in the Protestant missionary narrative, lacked any spiritual motivation 
for their work. The Protestant attacks argued that when Catholics brought their 
institutions to the German colonies, they sought to promote the interests of the 
Catholic Church above the German nation. As one Protestant saw it, “[t]he Catholic 
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Church of today does not promote Christianity; [the Church] seeks only to erect papal 
hegemony across the globe.”77 
Catholic actions in the colonies were dismissed as subterfuge to conceal the 
true intentions of Rome. Protestant missionaries were able to neatly undermine 
defenses of Catholic mission activities that cited the humanitarian achievements of 
the Catholic orders with this attack. Warneck suggested the Catholic Church only 
fought slavery as part of an attempt to cynically garner prestige for the church. He 
charged that the mission orders of the Catholics sought only “ad majorem gloriam,” 
striving solely for the greater glory of the Roman Church and the Papacy. According 
to Warneck the Catholics had done nothing about slavery for centuries and this new 
anti-slavery agenda was thoroughly cynical.78 “Ad majorem Dei gloriam” was the 
motto of the Society of Jesus, the Jesuits, who had been banished from Germany 
during the Kulturkampf and whom had gained a healthy reputation as Counter-
Reformation zealots and anti-Enlightenment crusaders. Warneck’s allusion to the 
Jesuits was clearly designed to draw upon historic German Protestant prejudices. 
According to another mission scholar the Jesuits dictated the path of Catholic mission 
work and used their power to continue their battle against the Reformation. 79 
 The war against the Reformation that Protestant missionaries depicted was 
just part of the true strategy of the Catholic Church. Roman Catholic missionaries, in 
the words of Protestant missionary leaders, served only to promote the political 
ambitions of the Pope and had no true religious purpose. The Catholic Church cared 
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nothing for Germany’s interests and true Germans had no interest in supporting the 
anti-German ambitions of the Roman church. After all, German missionaries pointed 
out, the bulk of support for Germany’s Catholic mission orders came from outside 
Germany.80 These attacks by Warneck and his associates created the image of a 
distinctly anti-Protestant and anti-German program of Catholic aggression emanating 
from Rome in the late nineteenth century. 
 The link to France added another layer to German Protestant missionaries’ 
campaign to depict Catholic mission orders as anti-German. At the 1901 Continental 
Mission Conference in Bremen, one speaker argued that Catholic missionaries had at 
their service French diplomats and soldiers, while in Germany Protestants watched 
unhappily as the power of the Center Party promoted a Catholic triumph.81 Catholics’ 
success in the mission field came from political machinations not from any spiritual 
superiority. After all, the Roman Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, the 
Propaganda Fide, directed all Catholic mission work and did so at the direction of a 
Pope bent on Catholic world conquest. Even the relatively pacific journal of the Basel 
Mission argued that “the Roman mission is predominantly French, its resources and 
its missionaries are mostly recruited from France.” This association with France was 
meant to raise concerns amongst Germans. According to Protestant commentators, 
German Protestantism’s two great enemies, the Catholic Church and France had 
allied themselves to bring the home of the Reformation to its knees.82 Carl Mirbt 
described France’s internal politics as “thoroughly un-clerical” but in the French 
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Empire it was a different story. There the state was a “patron of the Roman 
Church.”83 Protestant missionaries’ described Catholic missionaries’ political and 
religious connections as part of a vast conspiracy designed to serve the Pope and 
expand the secular and religious power of Rome which had even drawn in the fiercely 
anti-clerical Third Republic. 
 Before the Benediktinerstreit began in 1908 Protestant missionaries had 
already begun to hone their anti-Catholic message. They convinced themselves that 
the Catholic mission orders took direction from French Jesuits and the Pope in Rome. 
The Catholic orders did not serve the truest propagation of Christian faith but instead 
worked to increase Catholic political power at the price of Germany and the 
Protestant mission societies. Even before a nationalist missionary ideology appeared 
after 1900, German Protestant mission leaders peppered their anti-Catholic attacks 
with nationalist themes. These themes, developed from Protestant German cultural 
prejudices, would be readily available when missionary leaders, some quite amenable 
to nationalism, entered into their most vicious conflict with the Catholic mission 
orders.  
 
The Fight over Territory 
  
It is no coincidence that this conflict broke out over the division of territory in 
Germany’s colony. While the actual ownership of land was important to missionaries, 
the issue of mission territories turned more on spheres of influence. For missionaries 
territorial control was only valuable for the communities that lived upon that territory. 
                                                 




Within their territories mission societies argued for exclusive privileges of Christian 
evangelization. In the last decade before the First World War the conflict over 
territory in East Africa between the Catholics and Protestants threatened to become a 
matter of national and colonial policy. This section will describe the general view 
Protestants took of Catholic territorial intentions and it will be followed by a 
discussion of the extended conflict between the Berlin Society and the Benedictines 
of St. Ottilien known as the Benediktinerstreit. 
 The intellectual leadership of the German Protestant mission movement saw 
the territorial rivalry with the Catholics as indicative of Catholic deviance and 
Protestants’ control of their own territories as essential. Gustav Warneck explained 
the stakes of the conflict thusly: 
Missions are the outermost outposts of a church and simultaneously the [means of their] 
territorial expansion. The destruction of one such outpost means the destruction of the 
foundation of a new church colony. Rome has attacked [our missions] and we should 
ultimately attack the [Catholics].84 
 
To Protestant leaders like Carl Buchner and Warneck the Catholic Church had 
already shown with its behavior that it was hostile to every aspect of Protestant 
mission work.85 The Catholics bore only political motives – anti-Protestant in the 
extreme, and Protestant leaders surmised that was the source of their brazen flaunting 
of border agreements.86 The centrality of land and the necessity of exclusive 
privileges within a territory to the Protestant method of conversion meant that 
Catholics’ apparent indifference toward territorial boundaries made events like the 
Benediktinerstreit threats to the fundamental activities of Protestant mission societies.  
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 Missionaries from the Protestant mission societies were able to point to 
apparently damning evidence of Catholic intentions in the pages of one of the 
Catholics’ most bellicose publications. Gott will es!, the organ of the Afrika-Verein 
deutscher Katholiken (African Union of German Catholics) an organization which 
supported Catholic mission operations and took a militant line for Catholic causes. As 
early as 1893 the magazine was arguing that the balance of Protestants and Catholics 
in the German colonies would impact the balance of power between the confessions 
in Germany.87 According to Protestant commentators, this call had sparked the 
dangerous expansion of Catholic mission organizations in Germany. One speaker at 
the Bremen Mission Conference of 1901 declared that the twenty-year-old goal of the 
pope had been achieved; “next to every Protestant mission church and school” now 
stood a competing Catholic mission.”88 The Catholics had waged a very direct and 
very effective campaign to catch up to the Protestant mission movement’s 
infrastructural development and even threatened to overtake the Protestants. 
 Protestants in 1897, moved by what they perceived to be a Catholic assault, 
proposed radical action. At the Bremen Conference that year Buchner proposed an 
aggressive program of confrontation. Protestant missions should ignore the territorial 
divisions and show no regard for the activities of Catholic mission orders when 
establishing their stations and schools. The Protestant missions should also consider 
bringing their grievances into the public sphere. Buchner and others remained fully 
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aware of the tenuous confessional relations in the Kaiserreich, bringing Catholic 
“excesses” into open debate would only reignite old prejudices. Buchner cautioned 
his audience in Bremen that “sadly…the aggression of the Catholic Church [would] 
not lessen, but instead [would] expand and that more and more…our Protestant 
mission [would] be forced…to resist these attacks more energetically than before.” 89 
This strategy was not implemented but it demonstrated the near panic many 
Protestants felt under what they perceived to be near constant Catholic assault. 
Still later, as the Catholic threat apparently continued unabated, Gustav 
Warneck proposed a more complete strategy for defending Protestant mission 
interests. He called upon mission societies to appeal to Protestants’ memories of and 
commitments to the Reformation. This would help make support for Protestant 
mission work and Protestant missionaries a matter of “honor” to German Protestants. 
These two elements of Warneck’s plan directly appealed to the German nationalist 
tradition and its anti-Catholic dimensions. Along with proposals designed to reinforce 
the fabric of Protestant mission work with improvements in mission methods to 
answer Catholic advantages and greater unity within the Protestant mission 
movement, Warneck’s nationalist strategy aggressively ignored his stated aversion to 
nationalist politics.90 To him, the Catholic threat was an attack upon the spiritual 
character of Germany. The activities of Catholic missions in German East Africa and 
elsewhere represented to Warneck and his colleagues yet another battle in the 
centuries-long campaign by the Catholic Church to eradicate the Reformation. 
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Buchner and Warneck’s proposals presaged the form of Karl Axenfeld’s eventual 




The Berlin Mission had set up mission stations among the Ngonde and Bena 
peoples on the shores of Lake Nyasa91 in the southern highlands of modern Tanzania 
in 1891. By 1902 the Berliners had thirteen mission stations in the region. At the 
same time Catholic mission orders, the White Fathers and the Benedictines, had also 
established mission territories to the north, northwest, and south of the Berliners 
operating area. In late 1908 the Berlin missionaries built a new “outpost” at Isofi, near 
one of their stations at Lupembe. At least according to the Berlin Mission, this 
outpost had been built in response to Benedictine school construction in the region. 
The Protestant missionaries, already well-primed for an explosion, argued the 
Catholics had violated a 1906 territorial agreement and soon the Berlin Mission 
Society and the Benedictines of St. Ottilien were in a fierce conflict over mission 
territory in the southeast of German East Africa, the Benediktinerstreit. 
Protestant missionaries distrusted the expansion of the Benedictines, 
particularly as it seemed designed to squeeze the Berlin Mission’s Nyasa territories 
from two sides, the north and the south. The importance of mission territories for 
Protestant missionaries was long established; missionaries needed land to distribute to 
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converts and near-converts, they needed clear territories in which only the Protestant 
version of evangelism could operate to prevent the potentially more appealing 
Catholic version taking over, and the Protestant missionaries needed the territory as a 
tangible measure of their influence and power. However, the Protestant missionaries 
felt themselves to be under threat from diverse and powerful assailants. In the first 
place, the depopulation of the colony during the Maji-Maji War meant that resources 
were all the more dearly had. Secondly, the growth of Islam in the colony raised 
tensions between the missions and the colonial administration as did the apparent 
threat posed by government schools to missionaries’ educational activities. Finally, 
the influence of the Center Party in Germany and the rapid expansion of the Catholic 
mission movement in the last decades left the Protestant mission societies worrying 
that they would be overwhelmed by a tide of Catholic mission friars and their hastily 
baptized parishioners. In addition, at the height of the Benediktinerstreit the Berlin 
Mission promoted the missionary nationalist Karl Axenfeld to its directorship. The 
Benediktinerstreit would mark an important moment when the strength of the 
nationalist mission ideology grew and old anti-Catholic prejudices would help 
undermine internationalist principles. 
The Benediktinerstreit dragged on for five years. The length of the 
disagreement owed a good deal to the delays in communication as messages had to 
travel from Berlin to St. Ottilien in Bavaria, Berlin to the unofficial government 
expert on Catholic mission in Cologne Franz Hespers, Berlin or St. Ottilien to Rome, 
and, longest of all, Berlin or St. Ottilien to the mission stations several weeks travel 




been near instantaneous the conflict would have lingered. Protestant mission leaders 
perceived their work in East Africa to be seriously at risk and therefore the Berlin 
Mission had little interest in backing down. On the other hand, the Catholic 
Benedictines had no power to agree to the Protestants’ demands. The Propaganda 
Fide forbade any lasting agreement with the Protestants over territory and thus made 
any agreement satisfactory to the Protestants impossible. 
 
Figure 2. Strategy Map by Martin Klamroth [1902] Showing the expansion of Protestant and Catholic 
mission societies in the area of the Benediktinerstreit. (Source: Marcia Wright, German Missions in 
Tanganyika 1891-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 109.) 
 
For some, territorial agreements were violations of the principles of religious 
freedom. In fact, one in the Protestant mission leadership had dismissed such 
arguments. In 1890 Zahn commented on early proposals for the division of territories 




Berlin on Africa. To Zahn an official division of territories would violate the Catholic 
Church’s principle of catholicity, enflame denominational differences in Germany, 
and draw international politics into mission as each mission society maneuvered for 
territory.92 Nonetheless, in November of 1908, just at the beginning of the 
Benediktinerstreit, Governor Rechenberg and Colonial Secretary Dernburg were both 
willing to place civil peace over confessional freedom, only the Catholics refused to 
agree to any official divisions.93 In 1912 the head of the Benedictines in German East 
Africa, Bishop Thomas Spreiter, made very clear the position of the Catholic Church. 
In a letter to Axenfeld he explained that the Propaganda Fide wished for “peaceful 
coexistence” with Protestant missionaries but would not permit any border 
agreements.94 There was, in fact, no possible resolution to the Benediktinerstreit. 
In the communications of the Protestant missionaries during the 
Benediktinerstreit the Catholic mission orders and their church were depicted as 
aggressively anti-Protestant. Naturally, the entire conflict was the responsibility of the 
Benedictines. Max Berner, the Colonial Department’s liaison with the Protestant 
mission societies and member of the Berlin Mission Society’s Komitee, agreed with 
the Berliners that no blame for the “border conflict” lay on the side of the 
Protestants.95 Theodor Öhler of the Basel Mission Society and chairman of the 
Ausschuß der deutschen evangelischen Missionen (Committee of German Protestant 
Missions) at the time declared that recent history proved the willingness of the 
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Protestant missions to “make great sacrifices in the interest of peace.”96 The 
Ausschuß was formed in 1886 by the German mission societies to serve as their 
national representative and lobbying organization. Its leadership was composed of 
five representatives, three of whom were required to be the executive officers of 
mission societies. By the middle of the 1890s the Ausschuß had emerged as the main 
organization of German mission life, acting as the Protestant mission movement’s 
main liaison with the German imperial government and with foreign mission 
organizations. It support of the Berlin Mission Society demonstrates the breadth of 
anti-Catholicism amongst Germany’s Protestant missions. 
At the same time, Protestant missionaries, predisposed to expect catastrophic 
intentions from their Catholic rivals, hoped that they might be able to turn to the 
colonial administration for a solution to their problems. Above all, the administrators 
hoped to avoid religious conflict. In Dernburg and Berner’s first correspondence on 
the matter, both men took the position that the government’s prime responsibility was 
to maintain peace and order in the colony in order to avoid any indigenous 
disturbance.97 The matter required an assertive governmental position but that was 
not what came to be, Berner’s earliest attempts to facilitate negotiations came to little 
because the Ausschuß proved unable to forge a consensus among its member societies 
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even though the Catholics seemed amenable to discussions.98 The Berlin Mission 
continued from 1908 to 1912 to demand that colonial officials enforce the territorial 
agreements that had been mediated before 1908, but Dernburg, his successors, and 
their subordinates took no action. Öhler of the Ausschuß pointed out to the Colonial 
Secretary that the Protestants had worked for a peaceful resolution against their own 
misgivings but any binding agreement would require the government’s imprimatur 
and backing. Only in that way could anyone be certain of Catholic observance.99 
Even at Protestant urging the Colonial Department resisted taking an assertive action. 
Late efforts by the Colonial Secretary Wilhelm Solf in 1912 to mediate a 
solution came to naught. Solf’s preference for a solution generated outside the 
government appeared in an internal note to Berner. He counseled Berner that “no 
method” should be left unused to ensure the peaceful coexistence of Catholic and 
Protestant missions.100 The Colonial Secretary responded to the prompting from the 
Ausschuß by bringing in the key Center Party Reichstag member on colonial issues, 
Alois, Prince of Löwenstein.101 Solf’s decision to include him indicated the Colonial 
Department’s interest in keeping the matter informal. From this point on most 
attempts to settle this matter would be handled by Berner, Löwenstein, and the 
mission societies. The exit of the Colonial Secretary from the scene made a peaceful 
resolution even less likely. Clearly, no one of any import in the German 
administration wanted anything to do with what was a politically toxic situation. The 
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new colonial governor, Heinrich Schnee, stressed once again that friction between the 
confessions threatened the entire colonial enterprise. His January 1913 proposal of a 
return to pre-1908 conditions was too little too late.102 In fact, as we shall see, by then 
Karl Axenfeld and the other leaders of the Berlin Mission had determined to pursue a 
more aggressive stance. The Center Party’s leading colonial and mission issues 
delegate in the Reichstag, Alois zu Löwenstein, proved just as willing to battle as 
Axenfeld. 
The Benediktinerstreit confirmed to Protestant missionaries in the Berlin 
Mission and its allies that the Catholic Church was pursuing a new Counter-
Reformation. However, the utilization of anti-Catholic critiques premised upon a 
Protestant definition of the German nation also demonstrated the growing 
engagement of Protestant missionaries with nationalist ideologies. To the Protestant 
missionary leadership, the weak response by the government to what was clearly an 
anti-Protestant campaign by the Catholics demanded that the mission societies make 
their struggle an issue of popular politics. Protestants began to expand upon earlier 
arguments that hinted at anti-German behavior by the Catholics. Whereas in the early 
years of the Benediktinerstreit the Berlin Mission’s Komitee only reminded Governor 
Rechenberg, who they distrusted because he was a Catholic and “declared protector 
of the Benedictines,”103 that negative restrictions upon the Protestant missions would 
contradict the good will Protestants had earned with their cooperation during the 
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Maji-Maji War.104 Around 1912 the strategy of the Protestant missionaries became 
more blatantly populist. 
The decision by Protestant missionary leaders to make the Benediktinerstreit a 
battle in the Reichstag and the press arose from opportunity. An apparently 
vulnerable Center Party, a threatened Protestant mission movement, and a new 
national mission ideology converged to encourage missionaries to utilize the rhetoric 
of nation and Protestant unity. Spreiter’s letter of September 1912, finally explicating 
the Benedictines’ inability to sign any territorial agreement, marked the immediate 
cause of the Protestants’ nationalist strategy. However, it seems likely that Axenfeld 
would have taken the opportunity regardless. Shortly after Spreiter’s letter, Axenfeld 
began gathering information from the Protestant missions active in the German East 
African colony to document Catholic “aggression.” He and his colleagues spread 
articles about these Catholic “invasions” in sympathetic nationalist and ecclesiastical 
newspapers across the Kaiserreich.105 For the Protestants, the Catholics’ construction 
of schools and mission stations within what the Protestants perceived to be their 
mission territorial borders “demonstrate[d] that the hindrance of Protestant mission 
[was] more important than conversion” of Africans. Catholics had become, as Martin 
Klamroth, the Berlin Mission’s leader in East Africa, put it, “enemies of the 
Gospel.”106 The Ausschuß believed Catholic actions were an intentional attempt to 
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impede Protestant evangelization.107 Most within the Protestant mission movement 
believed in and began propagating a narrative that Catholic mission had begun 
executing a campaign to expunge the Reformation.108 
In short order Berner, as head of the Komitee, and Karl Axenfeld had rallied 
the Ausschuß to the Berlin Mission’s new strategy. Berner’s letter to the leadership of 
the Protestant mission societies stressed the Berlin Mission’s prior efforts to find a 
peaceful solution but now Catholic actions had made it necessary that the government 
and “public perception” recognize that the Catholics had made peaceful coexistence 
impossible. The press, Colonial Department, and Protestant missionaries’ Reichstag 
allies were all notified of the change in purpose.109 Catholics’ political power 
required that the Protestants mobilize every ally they could in the public sphere. Part 
of this change included the full investment of Axenfeld by the Komitee with the 
authority to deal with the “invasion of the Benedictines into our territory.”110 
Axenfeld described the new siutation in the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift for an 
audience of mission intellectuals. His narrative of the conflict condemned the actions 
of Spreiter and his Benedictines. According to him, the Catholics had knowingly 
defied the legal representative of the Kaiser by breaking the border “treaty” of 1906. 
In addition, the Catholics had abandoned racial and religious solidarity by working to 
undermine established relations between the Berlin missionaries and African 
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leaders.111 A similar article for the supporters of the Berlin Mission appeared in the 
society’s mission journal, the Berliner Missionsberichte. This article shared with 
readers the hoped for outcome of Axenfeld’s new strategy, pressure from the public 
sphere would force the government to act to restore order. The Missionsberichte’s 
summary of the Benediktinerstreit set up the lines of attack that would be used in the 
new campaign: the Catholics had no loyalty to German authority and cared little for 
the spread of the Gospels.112 
In addition to its early efforts in the missionary press, the Berlin Mission 
Society began organizing its allies in the Reichstag. The chief of these allies were the 
Conservative delegate Kuno von Westarp and Reinhold Mumm, both men who would 
continue into prominence during the Weimar years as conservative politicians.113 
Mumm had succeeded his father-in-law Adolf Stöcker as leader of the Christian 
Social Party, a populist Protestant confessional party that had a history of religious 
agitation, most notably anti-Semitic attacks. In January of 1913 Axenfeld’s successor 
as supervisor of East African mission work, Wilhelm Gründler, contacted Mumm 
with materials on the conflict with the Benedictines. Gründler counseled Mumm that 
the Berlin Society was not interested in “fueling the confessional quarrel” in 
Germany. However, he hoped that Mumm and his associates in the Reichstag would 
take up the matter in a unified way to assist the Society as the situation developed. In 
this interest, Gründler informed Mumm that Berner had also contacted von Westarp 
to prepare the Protestant missionaries’ other parliamentary allies if it became 
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necessary for a parliamentary intervention.114 Gründler, Axenfeld, and the rest of the 
Berlin Mission were not so naïve as to think a parliamentary debate on Protestant and 
Catholic missions in conflict could possibly not “fuel the confessional quarrel.” It is 
far more likely that the possibility was exactly what they desired. 
Axenfeld and his associates had by the spring of 1913 informed their 
supporters within the mission community of their new stance. Any reader of the 
articles in the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift or the Berliner Missionsberichte would 
have believed the Benediktinerstreit was the result of a broad anti-German, anti-
Protestant campaign by the Catholic Church. The Komitee and Gründler had 
marshaled members of the bureaucracy and the Reichstag for the coming conflict. All 
of this was a tactic used by the German mission movement in the past. Axenfeld took 
it one step further and began making contacts with the Protestant League. The 
League, determined anti-Catholic crusaders who felt the German nation endangered 
itself by including Catholics within its body, had a long history of inflammatory, 
demagogic anti-Catholic work in the public sphere.115 At the Protestant League’s 
national gathering of 1913 Axenfeld enumerated the Berlin Society’s complaints 
against the St. Ottilien Mission.116 This was the first direct and open step in the 
Protestant missionaries’ effort to bring their confessional conflict with the Catholics 
to the public. 
There is some evidence that the Protestant strategy was beginning to produce 
the desired effect, but what it did most of all was provoke the Catholics. The Colonial 
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Department enlisted Franz Hespers to help make a peace between Axenfeld and the 
Father-Superior of the Benedictines, Norbert Weber. Berner expected that the 
Catholic leadership would “seek the means to lessen the sharpness” of the attacks and 
offer some accommodation.117 Berner was mistaken. To Hespers, the actions of the 
Protestants were less a marker of strength than a marker of weakness. He counseled 
that the Catholics call the Protestants’ bluff.118 
Axenfeld’s public attack upon the Benedictines at the Protestant League 
conference in the spring of 1913 drew an even stronger response from Löwenstein. 
Löwenstein, leader of the Catholic negotiators during the Benediktinerstreit, warned 
Axenfeld away from his belligerent course. He wrote that the Berlin Mission would 
not appreciate what the “Catholics might bring to a broader public” about the 
Protestants’ work. More importantly, Löwenstein acknowledged the dangerous state 
of confessional issues in the metropole. He warned Axenfeld that “should the current 
clash take on the poisonous form of a public incitement of the confessions, [it would] 
shatter the peace” and destroy any hope for peaceful, “neighborly” work. The Center 
Party leader wrote Axenfeld that “the Catholic side, and [he] personally,…discovered 
that you used a gathering of the Evangelischer Bund (Protestant League), our hated 
enemies, to publicize the conflict in East Africa.” Löwenstein felt both sides were 
lucky that the Catholic press had thus far ignored the conflict, but informed Axenfeld 
that he must restrain the Protestant press in order to “hold back a public fight.”119 
Such attacks were likely to lead to a public confrontation between both confessions. 
Löwenstein missed that this was exactly Axenfeld’s intent, to put public pressure 
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upon the Catholic mission orders. He answered Löwenstein with offense, questioning 
Löwenstein’s characterization of the Protestant League and arguing that whatever 
turmoil arose from the Benediktinerstreit in Germany was the fault of the 
Catholics.120 To the Protestant missionaries the strength of the Catholic Center Party 
in the established political arenas of the Reichstag and the imperial government 
needed to be circumvented. The model laid out by Bülow in the 1907 elections must 
have offered a promising way forward. 
Axenfeld’s commitment to the conflict is very clearly seen in a letter from 
him to one of his leading missionaries in German East Africa, Christian Schumann. In 
that letter Axenfeld left unambiguous his mood in the late spring of 1913. He wrote of 
how his “battle” against the Catholics had moved into the open. According to 
Axenfeld, Norbert Weber hoped by closing two offending schools that would lead 
Axenfeld to “declare himself satisfied and silence” the fight in the press. Despite 
Weber’s requests in the name of “religious consideration,” Axenfeld intended that the 
Berlin Society immediately occupy the stations vacated by the Catholics. This 
“defeat” should be immediately communicated to the “natives” as a victory of 
Protestantism over Catholicism. By the end of May, Axenfeld saw the conflict with 
the Benedictines not as a misunderstanding but as an open confessional conflict 
which demanded that the Protestants give no ground. He ended his letter to 
Schumann, “God lead you justly in every responsibility and effort and in the battle 
[forced] upon us!” And he signed, “Your true companion and spear-carrier.”121 While 
Axenfeld’s position in the late spring was clear, the Komitee continued to appeal to 
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the Colonial Department. For his part, the Colonial Secretary remained only 
concerned with protecting public order in the colonies and remained unwilling to take 
on any position that might anger either the Protestant or Catholic constituencies.122 
The strategies utilized by the Berlin Mission during this final phase of the 
Benediktinerstreit indicate a number of things. First, the strategies demonstrate how 
weak the ideology of internationalism had grown by 1912. The entire missionary 
strategy was suffused with the despised “politics” and nationalism condemned by 
earlier mission intellectuals. Second, the efforts by the Protestants revealed how 
powerful confessional differences remained in German political and social life. 
Finally, Axenfeld and his associates’ efforts demonstrate that the Protestant 
missionaries believed these tactics would work. The examples of German political 
life from the 1870s and 1907 must have seemed like proof that the aversion 
missionaries felt towards “politics” might have denied the mission societies a tool that 
they could have used to build their position within Germany. The Benediktinerstreit 
was one example of a historical opportunity that the Protestant mission societies 
discovered and attempted to capitalize upon to defend their interests. Like the others 
detailed in this dissertation it required an accommodation with nationalist ideology 
that undermined missionaries’ commitment to internationalism. 
The nearly intractable hostility between the Protestants and Catholics forced 
Colonial Secretary Solf to take action in December 1913. He felt the conflict was 
beginning to spill over to both missions’ African associates. So he forced a meeting 
between Spreiter and forged a compromise. The substance of the compromise was a 
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formal dissolution of the treaty of 1909 and the earlier agreement of 1906. The 
Catholics and Protestants would both agree to avoid interfering with each other’s 
work. As a third stipulation, Solf declared that both sides would cease promoting the 
conflict in public, especially in the press. Furthermore, the Berlin Society would 
publicize through its organs that an agreement had been reached (the Benedictines 
had no such requirement as, Solf stated, “they had made nothing public.”) Solf 
offered these points as a basis for further negotiations toward a more lasting 
understanding. The Colonial Secretary bid the Berlin Mission appoint a delegate to 
work with Hespers in pursuing a more permanent peace.123  
Negotiations on a permanent solution never came to much and, though the 
temporary solution to the conflict in East Africa held, the Protestants continued their 
campaign against the Catholics. They had won a partial victory and seemed 
determined to fight for a final victory, especially since it seemed to them that Catholic 
resistance might be waning. Already in June of 1913 the Komitee determined to cease 
negotiations, and informed the Colonial Department that the Berlin Mission “[was] no 
longer prepared to take part in negotiations with the Benedictine Mission and [could] 
no longer avoid” further expanding its public campaign.124 The Berlin Mission’s 
Komitee continued its attacks on the Catholics through the spring and summer of 
1914 because, as Axenfeld put it, “Löwenstein knew for a long time of the pending 
conflict and could have prevented the public denunciations [of the Catholics], had he 
proposed timely solutions.” Consequently, the attacks upon the Catholics had 
                                                 
123 Solf to the Berlin Mission Society (December 28, 1913), BMW/bmw1/895; and Berner to Axenfeld 
(March 1, 1914), BMW/bmw1/895. 




continued.125 Though the Berlin Mission worried that the balance of political power 
in Germany favored the Catholics,126 on the eve of the First World War the Komitee 
again informed the Colonial Secretary that reconciliation was completely impossible 
and that full guilt lay upon the Catholics and their unwillingness to compromise.127 
The Komitee informed Berner and Solf of this decision and defended itself in writing, 
“We hope that you will agree completely with our even-tempered, factual 
presentation of our relations with the Benedictines…May this piece help bring final 




The Benediktinerstreit was more an indicator of deeper patterns than an 
important historical event in its own right. At the end of four years of correspondence, 
conflict, and rancor neither the Benedictines nor the Berlin missionaries had retreated 
from their antagonistic rhetorical and territorial positions. However, the actions of 
Karl Axenfeld and his allies indicated much about the state of the German Protestant 
mission movement in the five years before World War I. These last years of the 
German Protestant mission movement seemed filled with opportunity and risk, 
especially to the new leaders who advocated a more nationalist course like Axenfeld 
and Julius Richter. The language of the nation and of German nationalist 
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Protestantism offered a tool for the mission societies that might lead out of the 
challenges facing the societies. The episode also showed the weakening resolve of 
internationalists within the movement. They could no longer hold back the 
nationalists, especially when the nationalists seemed to be getting results. 
 Anti-Catholicism was always present within the German Protestant mission 
movement. It had old roots and internationalists like Warneck and Zahn did not lack 
ugly opinions of the Catholics and their church. However, the older generations’ 
focus on internationalism and aversion to “politics” prevented anti-Catholic prejudice 
from facilitating a link between nationalism and Protestant mission work. However, a 
world that was seeing greater forces for interconnection and global collaboration also 
witnessed efforts by communities and polities to define their membership more 
stringently. The decade before the First World War witnessed Germany’s Protestant 
missionaries joining in that contest of definition. The “Catholic International” became 
an enemy of German Protestant national mission as a response to a multitude of 




Chapter Three: Language and Labor 
 
Mission Christianity, many believed and believe, reinforced and justified 
colonialism. Yet the activities of German Protestant missionaries challenged the 
economic colonialist’s intentions particularly in school policy. German Protestant 
missionaries found the work of evangelization in East Africa and elsewhere 
challenging beyond their expectations. But they were neither without experience nor 
without ideas as to how to proceed. By the 1860s missionaries had settled on two 
strategies that they judged integral to their work, linguistic study and school building. 
Both required slow, arduous work. However, missionaries remained confident that in 
the long run their hard work would bear fruit. After all, this work was done at the 
command of God, with the promise of salvation, and, ultimately, for the very 
immortal souls of the “heathens.” Mission societies expected that within the first year 
of establishing a mission station a missionary would establish a school and, if he had 
not already learned the local language either in Germany or at another mission 
station, that the missionary would commence serious study of local languages. To a 
Protestant missionary these strategies were essential. As Warneck put it, “Man thinks 
in his native language, it is the mirror of the spirit which enlivens him. And as with 
the individual it is the same with the nations; the national soul comes to the Word 
through the national language.”1 
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Missionary autonomy in school and language policy was therefore a matter of 
central importance to missionary identity, methodology, and politics. Schools’ 
centrality to the evangelical project made control over educational policy an 
existential issue for Germany’s Protestant missionaries.2 This chapter will examine 
both missionaries’ own conception of education in the mission field and the strong 
internationalist critique of school policy promoted by secular German colonialists. 
Furthermore, the analysis will show that missionaries developed a theology that 
imagined a future in which non-European congregations would be equal partners in a 
global Christian community. From this theological viewpoint German Protestants 
defended their independent school policy against opponents from within the German 
colonial lobby. School policy called forth Protestant missionaries’ strongest defense 
of Christian universalism. 
German Protestant missionaries’ educational agenda rested on the principle 
that a man or woman was more likely to receive the grace of the Gospels in his or her 
native language. This belief carried with it a view amongst most missionaries that 
regarded indigenous culture as a valuable conduit for Christianity. Some German 
Protestant missionaries’ theology even suggested that indigenous cultures might 
possess special insight into scripture and help enrich global Christianity. Protestant 
missionaries from Germany therefore encouraged their representatives to learn the 
local vernaculars and to teach in their schools in local languages. Protestant 
missionaries in Germany’s colonies instructed their students in many different 
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languages, all of them derived from local communal contexts. Indigenous-language 
instruction and cultural respect were important components of the German Protestant 
missionaries’ internationalism. Their insistence on indigenous instruction and devoted 
internationalism led the secular colonial groups of Germany and, at times, the 
German colonial government to attack missionary independence. On several 
occasions the German Colonial Society attacked mission pedagogical practices in 
order to force a change to German-language instruction. To missionaries this 
amounted to an effort to subvert the entire Christian project of evangelization. The 
Protestant mission movement’s internationalism provided a strong defense against 
efforts by outsiders to nationalize their work. 
The chief opponents of the missionaries in this fight were economic and 
settler interests who either valued colonialism for its own sake or who saw support for 
colonial expansion as a tool for gathering support for their interests from segments of 
the population most motivated by nationalist or patriotic sentiment. As Woodruff D. 
Smith has pointed out, the groups who sought to capitalize on colonial politics for 
their own goals included Prussian Junkers, big business, and the various ultra-
nationalist populist groups of the German Right.3 To the secular colonial 
organizations indigenous-language instruction was an affront to German prestige and 
power. In addition, other groups saw German-language instruction as a key to 
economic development of the colonies. The Colonial Society and the Colonial 
Economic Committee (Kolonial-Wirtschaftliches Komitee or KWK) supported 
German-language instruction because of their support for the economic development 
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of the colonies. Together the two groups favored a form of economic colonialism that 
demanded that Africans be trained for service on plantations and in other economic 
concerns.4 This strain of thought sought economic self-sufficiency for Germany’s 
colonies that would eventually develop into profitability. Leaders within these 
organizations and their supporters thought that Africans should be taught the 
minimum of skills necessary to become a viable labor force for market-oriented 
activities. Both organizations utilized nationalist rhetoric as a political lever to 
dislodge the missionaries from their positions.  
Missionaries resisted this instrumentalization of their work on theological and 
practical grounds. When German ultra-nationalists demanded that missionaries make 
German the lingua franca of Germany’s colonial empire, missionaries insisted that 
their evangelical goals demanded that mission policy respond to indigenous needs 
and demands.5 Missionary intellectuals ridiculed chauvinist cultural views and 
defended indigenous cultures as positive sources of identity for missionized peoples. 
Mission schools helped build indigenous Christian cultures, missionary leaders 
argued, and therefore, for pedagogical and religious reasons, instruction had to 
continue in indigenous languages. Mission societies refused to adulterate their 
spiritual purpose for nationalist reasons and insisted vehemently that missionary 
schools must continue instructing in whatever indigenous language the missionaries 
thought most suitable. Missionaries interpreted the attacks by the nationalists and the 
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apparent support the nationalists received from the German colonial state as a mortal 
threat to the evangelical project, and when national “political” pressure threatened, 
the German Protestant mission movement returned to its basic principles, in this case 
the primacy of a universal Gospel over secular political concerns.  
This chapter will discuss the Protestant mission movement’s self-
understanding of its educational programs in the colonies and analyze the defense of 
indigenous-language instruction as evidence of the strength of missionaries’ 
internationalism. First, the chapter will briefly discuss missionaries’ own description 
of their educational policy. Then it will discuss the relationship between missionaries’ 
educational goals and the goals of economic colonialists. Missionaries’ response to 
the attack upon their educational policy rested upon their firm belief that those 
elements of indigenous culture that could be retained should be. These ideas make up 
the third section of the chapter. The final portion of the chapter takes up missionaries’ 
active defense of their linguistic policies and discusses missionaries’ eventual 
acceptance of Swahili as their language of instruction throughout German East 
Africa. 
Education occupied such a central role in missionaries’ imagined international 
community that attacks upon it from nationalists led intellectuals in the Protestant 
mission movement to a profound restatement of their internationalist principles. The 
missionary leaders defended their indigenous-language instruction by defending 
indigenous culture. In the process, missionaries described a Christianity that may 
have had European origins but that could and should change some of its contours in 




imagined internationalist community of believers, had to be defended against efforts 
by national “political” groups meant to control missionaries’ religious work. This 
chapter will show that though missionary intellectuals in Germany were beginning to 
integrate missionary principles with nationalist ideals, the universalist and 
internationalist principles of the mission movement remained strong in many parts of 




 Missionary leaders called for full autonomy on the part of missionary schools 
and minimized any goal of educating Africans to create a compliant workforce. For 
missionaries, this issue symbolized an important battle over the correct relationship 
between their evangelical work and secular attempts to create a functioning, rational, 
and economically viable colonial empire. To missionaries, any commonality of goals 
represented only a happy coincidence and missionary goals should remain, as ever, 
supreme. They argued that for this reason their schools should remain independent 
and unburdened by the colonial state. Those missionaries willing to participate in a 
colonial project to “educate the Negro to work” and serve the colonial state remained 
a small minority. Most missionaries refused to tailor their educational programs to 
practical economic demands. Mission schools were instead designed to create the 
basic skills needed to be a good Protestant: basic literacy and numeracy, the basic 
principles of Protestant religious life, and to instill in the students the basic 




it, “the best apology for the education of the native is that through education mission 
can promote [the native to] lead in his own affairs.”6 Ideally, Protestant missionaries 
hoped to create the autonomous Protestant individual. 
 German missionaries viewed schools as the foundation of their work. By the 
late nineteenth century missionaries had settled upon schools as the best way to 
develop Christian communities. Children were seen as ripe for conversion because 
“heathen superstition” had yet to fully take root. Schools had the secondary virtue of 
providing indigenous leaders with an incentive to allow missionaries to remain in 
local communities. In those African communities where a central authority existed, 
missionaries were frequently welcomed with the expectation that they would establish 
a school. Missionaries cited examples in their many publications of the versatility of 
schools as entrepôt to indigenous societies. For example, the ruler of Bali in modern-
day Cameroon “knew nothing” about the Basel missionaries who came to create a 
mission station among his people in 1902 except that they were teachers and this 
“was enough for him.”7 Schools also provided the training grounds for indigenous 
catechists and teachers who could help spread the Christian Gospel, who could go to 
all the small villages like those on New Guinea and prove to resistant communities 
that one could be a “true Batak8 and also a Christian.” 9 While missionaries developed 
their fluency in indigenous languages, their pupils and local assistants also provided 
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invaluable language practice and assistance. In short, schools touched on every aspect 
of the missionaries’ work. 
By the 1900s missionaries shared a common vision of the appropriate 
curriculum for a mission school. In 1897 the Ausschuß had sent the German Colonial 
Office a memorandum emphasizing schools’ main goal as “plant[ing] and 
advanc[ing] the Holy Scripture” whose prerequisites included strict missionary 
autonomy and instruction in indigenous languages.10 The actual curricula taught did 
not drastically differ from the curricula of late nineteenth-century grammar schools in 
Germany. Students received instruction in the elements of literacy (reading and 
writing), basic mathematics, some basic instruction in the social and natural sciences, 
and the arts.11 According to one missionary leader, education in the schools should be 
confined to the simplest skills and in the “native tongue;” only older students should 
be given German-language instruction.12  The Ausschuß defined mission schools as 
“Christian primary schools,”13 and Julius Richter argued that the project of cultural 
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elevation, pedagogical principles, and the missionaries’ goal to create a “solid native 
community” required instruction remain in indigenous vernaculars.14  
School curricula from mission schools communicate clearly that the goals of 
mission education did not coincide with the goals of economic colonialism. The 
secular colonialists did not fail to note this discrepancy. In 1904, at the height of the 
Herero-Nama War, German secular colonialists attempted to use the shock felt by the 
German public and German leadership over the uprising to bring the German 
Protestant missions under control. At the urging of the secular colonial movement a 
law was proposed that would grant colonial governors extensive control over the 
placement of mission stations and “the right to supervise teaching activities” in 
mission schools.15 The law capitalized on missionaries’ dubious public standing at 
that moment. Settlers in German Southwest Africa and their allies had used the fact 
that missionaries had been spared by African forces as proof of their specious 
argument that missionaries were to blame for the uprising in the colony.16 Gustav 
Warneck led the resistance to this law with an article in the Allgemeine Missions-
Zeitschrift. This law, Warneck wrote, “made the governor a Pope with final deciding 
word on the content of teaching instruction…against which the Protestant and 
Catholic missionaries [would] energetically protest.” The state would now be 
deciding on the content of religious instruction, Warneck argued. He went on to 
suggest that the secular critics of missionaries were motivated by missionaries’ 
insistence that “Blacks are just as beloved by God as Whites,” and that the secular 
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colonialists wished only to see indigenous peoples made into serfs of trading 
concessions, plantations, and mining companies.17 The emancipatory qualities 
ascribed by Warneck to mission schools challenged the secular colonialists’ plans, 
and this fact, according to Warneck, provided the basis for the campaign against 
Christian missionaries. The missionaries’ defense of their autonomy was successful; 
the colonial state had little interest in getting involved in administering the mission 
schools and, judging from the Colonial Department’s aversion to religious matters 
during the Benediktinerstreit, colonial bureaucrats were probably also more than 
happy to avoid religious politics whenever they could. 
 
Erziehung des Negers zur Arbeit 
 
German Protestant missionaries thought their role was to train Africans to the 
pleasures of individual industriousness. Paul Rohrbach and other economic 
colonialists hoped to train Africans to the demands of the global capitalist economy.18 
To economic colonialists Germany’s colonies needed to be transformed into a source 
of raw materials for Germany’s massive industrial sector and a market for Germany’s 
consumer goods. This would be achieved by transforming the African populations 
into wage-earners working for large economic enterprises and using their wages to 
purchase German products. One of the chief proponents of this program of colonial 
development was the KWK, the major advocate of economic colonialism within the 
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secular colonial movement. The KWK supported research into colonial development 
schemes and helped organize and promote the Tuskegee cotton-growing expedition to 
Togo in 1901-1909 as well as agricultural research in German East Africa.19 While 
the Dernburg Reforms sought simply to make the German colonies pay for 
themselves, colonial development schemes like those promoted by the KWK sought 
to maximize colonial production and consumption. The schemes usually entailed the 
operations of concessionary companies and large plantation companies, entities with 
which German Protestant mission companies had already clashed by 1904.20 These 
large capitalist enterprises demanded docile and reliable labor supplies and economic 
colonialists began to insist from the 1890s on that Protestant and Catholic mission 
schools provide a pliable work force. 
 Other scholars have discussed the connection between European educational 
efforts and European economic interests in their African colonies. Historians of the 
British colonial empire and of British missionaries who have considered the 
relationship between education and economic change have focused on the role that 
missionaries played in preparing Africans for participation in the capitalist 
agricultural and mining enterprises of European settler regimes. Europeans interested 
in maintaining the “aristocracy of color” in Britain’s colonies precluded African 
participation in European working-class traditions and helped encourage the 
formation of an African peasantry. According to Terence Ranger, Africans’ 
subordinate role in the colonial cultural system had been defined by mission 
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Christianity.21 And Carol Summers’ research in Southern Rhodesia also argues that 
missionaries were far more concerned with the desires of the settler population than 
they were with their own ideas of Christian equality; missionaries, when pressed, 
constantly hedged their answers about the possibilities of African uplift. For 
missionaries in Southern Rhodesia, settlers were an equally important constituency of 
mission education as the Africans actually being educated.22 Both Ranger and 
Summers argue for a convergence of economic and missionary interests, which is not 
surprising among scholars of the British Empire. David Livingstone, Wiliam Carey, 
and their compatriots closely linked the spread of “legitimate trade” and European 
commerce with the positive spread of Christianity.23 But this close linkage does not 
hold up as well in the German case. As has been detailed earlier in this dissertation, 
German missionaries were highly skeptical of the modern, capitalist world and sought 
to insulate their converts from the worst excesses of global trade and its purveyors.24 
The most recent and well-known work on German Protestant missionary 
school policy argues that missionaries were happy to collaborate with economic 
demands for a reliable African work force.25 In his study of German globalization and 
nationalism, Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany, Sebastian Conrad 
argues that globalization and nationalism were interdependent products of the 
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expanding “interlinkages” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Conrad 
examines this link between German nationalism and globalization through the lens of 
nineteenth-century German debates about labor mobility and its possible 
repercussions. The concern over labor, Conrad asserts, came to be organized around 
an “ahistoric, unchangeable and nationally specific character of ‘German work.’” The 
growth of nationalism during this period was not a holdover from an earlier time but a 
product of international circulation, as efforts to define who was a member of the 
national community increased.26 To Conrad, it was understandable that Germans and 
other Europeans became obsessed with defining membership in the national 
community during a time when the meaning of economic and political boundaries 
seemed to be disappearing. 
 One of Conrad’s key examples of the German obsession with the idea of work 
and labor is his discussion of the colonial project of “educating to work.” Conrad 
rightly shows that this was not only a colonial project but also tied to efforts to 
control the masses of unemployed and indigent in metropolitan Germany. German 
politicians acted to regulate and control the workforce which was continually shifting 
to include Poles, Belgians, Dutch, Italians, and even Chinese.27 Politicians and 
academics scrambled to develop techniques and technologies like border controls, 
immigration policies, work passes, and racial science to identify who was and who 
was not German. Conrad’s argument for the link between the colonial and the 
metropolitan hinges upon the work of Friedrich von Bodelschwingh and his Bethel 
community. In the 1860s Bodelschwingh organized workers’ colonies in Germany for 
                                                 
26 Sebastian Conrad, Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany, tr. Sorcha O’Hagan 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3-5. 




the vocational education of mentally handicapped individuals. In a little over a decade 
these institutions expanded to include training for the “vagabonds” and “work-shy.”28 
The Bodelschwingh workers’ colonies all taught a curriculum of manual labor for the 
salvation of the individual. When Bodelschwingh expanded his philanthropy to the 
German colony of East Africa, Conrad concludes, this obsession with inculcating the 
inexperienced, inept, ignorant, and indolent with the virtues of hard work was 
transmitted to the African who was, by turns, called all those things. The link between 
training poor Germans and Africans to work was not coincidental. As Conrad argues 
it, “ʽEducating the negro to work’ [Die Erziehung des Negers zur Arbeit] was one of 
the main projects of state policy, and especially of church policy, since the acquisition 
of the first German colonies in 1884.” Missionaries were, in Conrad’s presentation, 
close supporters of a program of training Africans to raise the value of the German 
colonies for Germany.29 
 Conrad’s work is correct to link the operations of the Bethel community and 
Bodelschwingh in western Germany and in Africa. The connection between works of 
inner mission, efforts to save Christians at home, and foreign mission, efforts to 
create Christians abroad, have been covered quite well in the British context and his 
addition of a German case is invaluable.30 The Bethel Mission Society provides the 
best example of this connection in Germany, but connections also existed within the 
Herrnhut Mission of the Moravian Brotherhood and in the work of the North German 
Mission Society as covered by Werner Ustorf.31 Nonetheless, Conrad overgeneralizes 
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from the particular, and assumes the other missions shared the Bethel Mission’s 
preoccupation with national labor. While the Bethel Mission Society was 
undoubtedly interested in training Africans to work and was not opposed to working 
closely with the colonial government, other mission societies and their leaders were 
less eager to cooperate in an economically motivated program of “educating the 
Negro to work.” 
The reasons for this disparity lie in a number of factors. First, the Bethel 
Mission Society and its leader, Friedrich von Bodelschwingh, were the most 
politically conservative and nationalist of the German mission societies working in 
Africa.32 Second, though many missionary intellectuals spoke of “educating the 
Negro to work,” their meaning deviated greatly from Conrad’s description of church 
policy. Finally, the Bethel Mission Society joined the ranks of the foreign missions in 
the 1880s, making it one of the so-called “new missions.” Missionaries from the 
Bethel Society viewed themselves as part of a communal project to “elevate” 
colonized peoples and needed the work of “government schools and mission 
schools,” “planters, administrators, teachers, and missionaries” for success.33 The 
other societies operating in German East Africa had much longer histories stretching 
back into the era before there was a German Empire in Europe let alone one in Africa, 
and their view of “educating Africans to work” differed drastically as a result. 
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Missionaries in societies other than the Bethel Mission developed an antipathy 
toward education for colonial economic interests early in the colonial period.34 At the 
1887 meeting of the Saxon Mission Conference two of German Protestantism’s 
leading missionaries spoke in a session on educating “savage” peoples to work. The 
Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift reprinted their discussion shortly thereafter and 
appended an editorial afterword by Gustav Warneck.35 The reprinted discussion 
opened with a presentation by the Berlin Mission Society’s new Mission Inspector 
Alexander Merensky, a response by Theodor Öhler, who was Mission Inspector of 
the Basel Mission Society, and concluded with the editorial comment by Warneck. 
Each missionary leader considered what role missionaries should play in the 
integration of Africans into the colonial economy. 
Merensky acknowledged that the health of a settlement colony depended upon 
the “labor question.” Missionaries could not avoid the issue and their mere presence 
in the colonies demanded they take some role in the “education of the primitives to 
work.”36 However, Merensky’s use of the phrasing “Erziehung…zur Arbeit 
[educate…to work]” was not the same as its use by economic colonialists. To 
Merensky the duty to educate arose from the need to speed the decline of “heathen 
traditional belief” and “plant the Holy Ghost” in indigenous people’s hearts. Christian 
missionaries, Merensky wrote, had always kept the moral “improvement” of 
                                                 
34 Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, 179-181; Rainer Tetzlaff, “Die Mission im 
Spannungsfeld zwischen kolonialer Herrschaft und Zivilisierungsanspruch in Deutsch-Ostafrika,” in 
Bade, Imperialismus und Kolonialmission, 190. 
35 The lecture also included a comment by Eduard Kratzenstein of the Berlin Mission Society but his 
remarks were of little substance to this discussion. 
36 Alexander Merensky, “Welches Interesse und welchen Anteil hat die Mission an der Erziehung der 




uncivilized peoples at the forefront of their minds.37 Protestant mission, Merensky 
argued, should be certain to choose the “just, successful” path for training 
missionized peoples to work. Training indigenous peoples to the standards of the 
colonial state and colonial economic actors too often led to abuses of indigenous 
laborers, leading to a harmful association by colonized peoples of fruitful vocations 
and labor with violence and slavery. Mission should “exert itself in its own interest, 
as well as in the interests of the [missionized] peoples themselves.” Educational 
programs by the mission societies should be “grounded in the character of 
Christianity.”38 Mission training was not for economic imperialist purposes but for 
Christian purposes focused on the spiritual transformation of indigenous peoples. 
Öhler’s comment to Merensky’s lecture condemned training non-Western 
peoples for plantation work because such education only favored Europeans and 
helped “the rich become richer” while ignoring the “moral facets” of hard work. 
Labor for the sake of an employer lacked the moral value of independent toil. Öhler 
defended Africans’ work ethic against contemporary accusations of laziness. The 
“Negro” was not by his nature lazy but simply appeared to be lazy as a result of 
circumstance, Öhler argued. First,  
There are amongst us [Europeans] many rich people who do not work very much because 
they are rich. Rich people believe it is not necessary to work. The Negroes, one can say, are 
rich people…they have a truly rich countryside which delivers that which they require and 
more to them in copious abundance with little effort. In this way are Negroes rich people as 
they have in excess what they require or [what they need] can be easily acquired in 
abundance.39  
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Second, whereas in Europe, Öhler contended, a man works for his wife and child; the 
“Negro” understands labor differently. It is much more the opposite, the wife and 
child work for the father and husband. Polygyny just intensified this situation and 
when the labor system of polygamous households was paired with slavery it created 
the “opinion that work [was] for wives and slaves and unworthy of a free man.” 
Finally, the “Negro” appeared to be lazy because he labored for whites. As Öhler put 
it, why work hard for a master when it only makes the rich richer and leaves the 
“Negro” poor?40 Öhler’s comments represented what was for the time a sensitive 
rendering of African society and presaged the defenses of African culture that would 
be used in later debates by German missionaries to protect their school language 
policies. 
Warneck’s editorial comment translated the conference discussion into a 
political position for the mission movement. He reminded his readers that the 
utilization of indigenous labor had become “the main question on the agenda for 
colonial political discussion.” The mission movement’s disregard for “training the 
Negro to work” placed the mission in clear opposition to the abusers of colonial 
power.41 Work, and by this Warneck meant, like his colleagues, the hard work and 
industriousness of an independent individual, could serve to civilize and educate 
people in “the spiritual ethic” of Christianity. This work ethic could help root out 
negative cultural qualities like polygamy and slavery by showing African men the 
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“dignity of work.”42 Warneck and his colleagues agreed that “work” could help 
spread the gospel and build churches and schools but capitalist labor could not. 
The discussion of Merensky and Öhler at the 1887 Saxon Mission Conference 
and Warneck’s commentary after the fact showed that missionaries did not devalue 
labor in all its forms. They did, however, oppose using the Christian missions to 
economically develop the colonies for Europeans. All three shared the view that 
Africans’ educational, economic, and moral conditions required a concerted strategy 
for improvement. They also agreed that missionaries should see the “improvement” 
of African culture as an essentially moral project. As special experts in “native 
affairs” and defenders of African culture, the missionary leaders pointed out, 
Germany’s missionaries were not in Africa to promote capitalist development. Their 
project remained one focused on instilling the social and cultural markers of 
Christianity. Mission schools were tools for making Christians, not for making a 
proletariat.43 
The Protestants’ opinions of “Erziehung des Negers zur Arbeit” and the 
outcomes they foresaw of such training were supported by their rival Catholic 
missions’ views on education. In an 1897 debate the Catholic mission representative 
on the Kolonialrat, Franz Hespers, agreed that training Africans to the dignity of 
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labor would establish the first step to “cultural competence.”44 Ten years later, 
Norbert Weber, abbot of the Benedictines of St. Ottilien, told a meeting of colonial 
enthusiasts in Strasbourg that Africans did not need to be educated to take part in the 
global economy. In fact, paying Africans wages was not necessary to induce Africans 
to purchase Western goods. Like Öhler twenty years before, Weber argued that 
Africans were not lazy rather, so long as the African, Weber wrote, believed the 
surplus of his labor would be taken from him by “brigands” (whom Weber implied 
included European merchants and colonial tax collectors), the African would be 
unwilling to work as the European wished. Colonialism required a government strong 
enough to protect its subjects from exploitation, and only then could Africans, Weber 
concluded, learn “work, because work ennobles men” and the newly industrious 
Africans would then be ready to advance further in their cultural development.45 In 
this particular area, the attitudes of missionary personnel to training indigenous 
peoples to serve as a labor force in capitalist ventures, Catholics and Protestants 
found common ground. The agreement between bitter confessional opponents on this 
issue further highlights the peculiarity of the Bethel Mission and its missionaries’ 
attitudes toward labor. 
On the local level in German East Africa, most Protestant German 
missionaries distrusted any project designed to “educate the Negro to work.” The 
majority of Protestant missionaries believed Africans gained little from any 
economically motivated educational program. Merensky, Öhler, and Warneck’s 1887 
articulation of the missionary view held true for the entire German colonial period. 
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“Educating the Negro to work” only had secondary value to educating Africans in the 
basic skills of reading, writing, arithmetic, and a basic knowledge of Protestant tenets. 
Mission stations did set up vocational instruction but such instruction tended to be in 
artisanal skills like cabinetmaking. Missionaries feared that involving their schools in 
the secular goals of the colonial state would pollute Christian mission. Karl Axenfeld 
neatly demonstrated the entirely different meaning that Protestant missionaries 
attached to inculcating Africans with the industriousness they supposedly lacked. He 
also took the opportunity to criticize Catholics: “The Berlin Mission [has] achieved 
pleasing results in the promotion of native culture and…the education to 
work….which is much more valuable, in my opinion, than the Catholic attempts [to 
make] the natives dependent upon plantations.”46 
Over time missionaries’ resistance to economic colonialists’ goals drew 
greater and greater attention. Occasionally the colonial government joined with 
secular colonialists to criticize mission school policies, though the interests of the 
colonial governors were usually designed to promote the training of clerks, 
translators, and the occasional craftsmen to support the colonial state.47 Secular 
colonialists wished to see Germany’s colonies, and their inhabitants, more directly 
put to work to serve Germany’s international economic and political interests. As a 
result, missionaries frequently locked horns with the secular colonial movement; the 
source of this conflict arose, in large measure, from German Protestant missionaries’ 
resistance to settlers’, plantation owners’, and concessionary companies’ frequently 
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violent efforts to maximize their usage of labor. Missionaries regularly stood with 
colonized Africans against abuses by employers and the colonial state and criticized 
the “immoral” behavior of colonial administrators.48 By the twentieth century, and 
particularly during the Dernburg colonial administration, missionaries and the 
colonial state had mostly worked out a collaborative arrangement. The colonial state 
provided support to mission schools because of the work schools did training 
advanced students in German. On the other hand, the secular colonial movement had 
increasingly adopted the white settlers in Germany’s colonies as the core of 
Germany’s overseas future and simultaneously resolved that missionaries needed to 
be brought to heel. 
The intensification of the conflict during the first decade of the twentieth 
century led Julius Richter to formulate a new defense of mission schools. He 
acknowledged the shared interests of the missions and the colonial administration in 
schools. He wrote that in circumstances like education policy, where missionaries and 
administrators had the same goals, both sides should be governed by the slogan 
“march separately and attack in unison.” As Richter pointed out, both the government 
and the missions sought to improve the cultural level of the Africans but that did not 
mean either the religious or administrative forces should adopt any agenda but their 
own. Schools were necessary to the colonial state because the indigenous peoples of 
Germany’s colonies needed to be “elevated” in their cultural achievements before 
they could purchase German goods or produce products for Germany in large 
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quantities.49 And because Africans were not yet ready and required basic instruction, 
Richter argued, missionaries should be left to control their own schools and do the 
fundamental work of civilizing the Africans. This meant the care and development of 
African religious communities and churches built around Africans’ “natural” 
communities and languages. The needs of the state could be met by providing 
students with “basic German instruction” in upper classes.50 
 Over time, and as the economic situation of Germany’s Protestant mission 
societies grew more dire,51 government subsidies grew increasingly essential to 
missionary schools. Warneck wrote in his protest over the intrusive law against 
mission schools proposed in 1904, “Certainly the school is an area in which the 
colonial government may have a word; so long as [colonial state] supports [the 
schools] financially.” The aging missiologist went on to argue that the governors’ 
power to interfere in curriculum should be limited, “especially in the content of 
religious instruction.”52 This admission of state power came hard to mission scholars. 
They recognized that surrendering power over the schools carried with it the threat of 
surrendering control over their most significant contact with the peoples the 
missionaries hoped to evangelize. The Ausschuß re-presented its position with regards 
to the relationship between mission schools and the colonial administration and its 
assertion of the necessity of indigenous language instruction to the new Colonial 
Secretary Dernburg in the summer of 1907. Again the Ausschuß argued for the 
primacy of Christian evangelization and the obligatory use of indigenous languages in 
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instruction. However, this time the Ausschuß acknowledged the interest of the state in 
German-language courses. The association of mission leaders informed Dernburg of 
their “preparedness to implement German instruction in [their] schools” following 
elementary instruction of students in “local languages.”53 In exchange the Ausschuß 
expected the colonial department to recognize the independence of missionary 
activities and resist the urge to interfere in mission schools’ curricula. 
Though the internationalist and anti-economic colonialist vision of mission 
schools remained hegemonic amongst German Protestant missionaries up to the First 
World War, the area of school education did not avoid the creeping tide of nationalist 
feeling that had begun to appear amongst missionary leaders after 1900. Indicative of 
the growth of nationalist urges and colonial entanglements was the effort, led by the 
North German Mission Society and its nationalist leader August Wilhelm Schreiber, 
for the “publication of a German reader for the Protestant mission schools in the 
German colonies.” The proposal originated in October of 1908 with a letter sent to 
the leaders of German mission societies active in Germany’s colonies. 
The North German Mission Society argued that the production of such a text 
would “emphasize the mutuality” of Germany’s colonial peoples. This mutuality, 
created by “German conquest, [the] development of commerce and trade, 
membership in the German Empire, and…the mission work of German Protestant 
missionaries,” justified a German-language reader to help strengthen German culture 
in the colonies. Remarkably, this reader would be produced with no “cooperation 
with members of the government and Catholic missions.”54 The North German 
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Mission’s proposal was endorsed by the other mission societies and Schreiber ordered 
the missionary Diedrich Westermann to plan the book along with a team that included 
Karl Axenfeld, Carl Meinhof, and Julius Richter, all of whom supported a 
nationalization of the German Protestant mission movement.55 Together they 
proposed a text that would teach students to “understand and treasure” their 
“environs” and gain understanding for the conditions in other German colonies so that 
they could develop feelings of fellow membership in the German Empire with other 
colonized peoples. Children would be inaugurated into the “culture and learning” of 
Europe and “especially Germany,” naturally with an “accentuation” of religious life; 
and, finally, the book should show “in what way and with what success European 
culture and learning had been transplanted to the colonies.” The last should be done 
with examples from “real life.” Westermann and his commission advised, “The 
difference between the old and the new period [should] be emphatically presented to 
the students. The blessings of the mission, government, trade and economic 
undertakings are overall on the rise…The dark pages of the present time need not be 
silenced, but rather minimized as the [understandable] dangers of so sudden and so 
energetic” an introduction of “civilizing” influences.56 The German mission societies’ 
textbook was to be a grand display of the community of German Protestantism that 
was emerging in the German Empire.57 
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Little is heard of this project after 1909. Probably because the book’s chief 
architect, Diedrich Westermann, soon found other work. An expert in the Ewe 
language and student of Carl Meinhof, Westermann joined the Seminar for Oriental 
Languages in Berlin as an instructor in Ewe and in 1909 become a professor of the 
seminar. These two positions marked his full membership in the growing academic 
establishment around African languages and anthropology. He seems thus to have 
shifted to more academic projects. The other notable members of his commission, 
Axenfeld and Richter, both continued to gain prominence in the German Protestant 
mission movement and likely lost interest in the project as their involvement in 
leading the movement expanded. But, nonetheless, the German-language textbook 
project offers an interesting point of emphasis for the exceptional unity of spirit 
which Germany’s mission societies had achieved by the end of the first decade of the 
twentieth century. It also shows the changing view of empire that the new generation 
of missionaries had. Westermann, Richter, and Axenfeld were all in their late thirties 
and forties in 1908 and all had a very different experience of the relationship between 
mission work and colonialism than their predecessors like Warneck and Zahn. The 
book which they proposed would have attempted to create a transnational German 
imperial culture of Christian subjects. 
Nationalist missionaries like Westermann, Richter, and Axenfeld represented 
the potential for a radically different mission school policy. But they did not 
successfully change Germany’s Protestant missionaries’ commitment to an 
internationalist educational policy. Missionaries defended their autonomy in 




Missionaries did wish to inculcate Africans with a Protestant vision of 
industriousness, a quality Africans supposedly lacked, but for missionaries “training 
to work” was directed towards individual productivity and not wage-labor.58 Part of 
the defense that missionaries’ made of their schools included the development of a 
rhetoric that defended the cultural worth of indigenous, in particular African, ways of 
life. By defending the cultures of missionized peoples, missionaries took their 
internationalist worldview to its logical extent – arguing that Africans did not 




 Germany’s Protestant missionaries had by 1900 embraced the practical 
theological principle of the Volkskirche.59 The Volkskirche concept emerged as both 
the natural conclusion of Protestant missionary theology in Germany and as a 
practical solution to the challenges of managing and financing the growing 
communities of indigenous Christians that began to form around mission stations by 
the end of the nineteenth century.60 It meant, simply, that each identifiable “Volk,” a 
categorization process impeded from the beginning by colonialists’ flawed 
understandings of indigenous social organization, would organize itself into its own 
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church, like the Danes, Frisians, Saxons, Prussians, Dutch, and others peoples had in 
Europe. 
On the one hand, missionaries expected that Christian communities built 
around the Protestant tenets would govern themselves, naturally with continuing 
advice and counsel from the missionaries, but formally independent. On the other 
hand, missionaries also wished to shift the economic burden of running these 
churches on to indigenous congregations. If pastors, teachers, and deacons could be 
found amongst the local Christian communities, then white missionaries could move 
to new areas and evangelize new groups of heathens.61 In Warneck’s view the 
transformation of a mission field into a Volkskirche was the ultimate purpose of all 
mission decisions and education. The “civilizing” project was only relevant when it 
meant the eradication of “superstitions” and “sins” like slavery, polygamy, sorcery, 
blood feuds, ordeal by poison, or the consultation of oracles.62 He and other 
Missionswissenschaftler encouraged missionaries to work to develop the “völkisch” 
identities of their congregants so that those new Christians could become the core of a 
new “national” faith. In practice this meant the identification and cultivation of an 
indigenous “Volkssprache” or national language, cultivation of “natural” communal 
forms within the missionized community, the establishment of schools to reach the 
youth of the community, and enticements to keep Christians concentrated in 
communities – in sum, this was a campaign of “ethnicization” but not a concerted 
campaign of Europeanization. Schools were to help develop certain “modern” skills 
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needed to support a future independent church and also mediate between Christian 
ethics and European scientific and technological achievements but strive to avoid 
wholesale transformations of cultural practices.63 As discussed in Chapter Two, 
missionaries wished to nurture the development of an African class of independent 
farmers that would form the social foundation for a healthy and vital Volkskirche.64 
This methodology had mixed results, but it did represent strong evidence of 
missionaries’ belief in a universal Christianity and an educational program geared 
toward indigenizing Christianity and a denial of mission education as a tool for 
creating a pliant capitalist labor supply.65 
At the same time Germans developed the theology of the Volkskirche, 
Protestants in Britain and America were in the midst of a traumatic crisis of the faith. 
According to Colin Kidd this crisis included challenges to the Bible’s explanation of 
human origins posed by the expanding knowledge of human difference produced 
during the imperial era. He depicts this period as one in which monogenetic American 
and British theologians strove to interpret scripture so that it resisted a developing 
polygenetic description of human origins from the social sciences.66 Kidd’s work 
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does not consider the German case, but German missionaries were as much 
concerned with understanding human difference as Anglo-Saxon theologians. In the 
main, German missionaries’ concluded that all human beings shared in the essential 
human ability to make and sustain a culture.  
The German conception of Kultur differed from British missionaries’ ideas 
about African societies and the process of acculturation. The German missionaries, 
like the British, were certainly an important force for the “colonization of 
consciousness,” as Jean and John L. Comaroff described missionaries’ impact upon 
the Tswana.67 German Protestant missionaries may have imagined that they could 
eradicate “superstition” and replace it with Christianity, making little alteration to 
indigenous culture; but this prospect is clearly impossible. Missionaries’ choices 
about which cultural practices entailed “superstition” and which cultural practices 
were appropriate representations of indigenous difference and values deeply involved 
missionaries in the process of colonization that included the contested and 
collaborative creation of African ethnicities and tribes.68 The embrace by 
missionaries of African “customary communities” had important implications for 
African peoples.69 British missionaries embraced their role in transforming African 
societies, with an unambiguous adoption of the civilizing project: the creation of 
African individuals in contrast to Africans’ pre-colonial communal identities; 
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instilling some basic affiliation among Africans with European culture through the 
English language, literacy, and Christianity; and integration of Africans into the 
capitalist marketplace as a laborer and consumer. British missionaries also sought to 
separate the African Christian from his non-Christian community. This British 
mission policy dominated at precisely the time German mission societies were 
embracing the creation of the Volkskirche which sought to create a core of Christians 
amongst non-Christians to encourage the spread of the faith by example.70 Though 
German missionaries shared in the colonializing effects of European Christianity, 
their interest in the economic colonial project was weak. Instead, German 
missionaries created a practical theology of Christian evangelization that 
accommodated cultural difference. 
German Protestant missionaries’ substantiated their defense of autonomous 
mission schools with arguments that showed indigenous peoples had cultural value 
for themselves but also for German society. Missionaries argued that Africans were 
educable and, if superstition could be eradicated through good Christian teachings, 
capable of the same spiritual achievements as Europeans.71 Missionaries’ discussions 
about Africans’ educability turned on the term Kultur. Translated simply Kultur 
means “culture,” but in the missionaries’ lexicon it came to represent culture, 
technologies, social mores, and every marker of “civilization.” What differed about 
missionaries’ use of the term was that Africans were not automatically judged to lack 
Kultur.72 A further resonance of this term in German thought was the juxtaposition 
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presented by many in Germany of German “Kultur” and French or English 
“Zivilisation (Civilization).” In Germany Kultur was spiritually vital and alive, while 
Zivilisation lacked humanity. Missionaries could not have been unaware of the 
semantic power of rejecting Zivilisation and embracing Kultur for African 
communities. What follows will discuss German Protestant missionaries’ views on 
the issue of African cultural achievement and potential. It will then contextualize 
missionaries’ ideas within the anthropological social sciences. To the missionary 
intellectual, humanity was a diverse collection of cultures, each in need of Christian 
salvation but not necessarily in need of Europeanization.73 
We must, of course, take this presentation of German Protestant missionaries 
as culturally enlightened vis-à-vis their contemporary European colonialists with a 
grain of salt. No matter what missionaries’ intentions, the extension of Western 
Christian culture through mission education could not help but facilitate the 
integration of African cultures into the global economy.74 Furthermore, missionaries’ 
authoritative descriptions of “authentic” indigenous cultures were themselves political 
declarations of authority in a contested German colonial space where, as George 
Steinmetz has shown, ethnographic knowledge translated directly into authority.75 
With their work to define indigenous cultures and “Völker” missionaries participated 
in a process that mirrored efforts by colonial administrators and scholars to define 
African traditions, customs, and polities – a process that, in the end, served to 
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essentialize indigenous cultures based upon an imagined past fashioned by colonizers 
and colonized alike.76 On the other hand, contests between missionaries and Africans 
of all social strata who saw Christianity as a tool for political and social advantage 
constituted the fundamental genetic material of mission Christianity. In these 
negotiations Christian missionaries’ understandings of African Christianity stretched 
and morphed as an outcome of missionary and African behavior.77 
The key argument made by missionary leaders was that Africa was fertile 
ground for the spread of Western cultural values, for Christianity. Africans could 
learn but the process demanded patience and the application of the correct methods. 
The missionaries’ approach to African cultures, undeniably paternalistic, reflected a 
surprising level of cultural understanding. Though from a twenty-first-century 
perspective we can recognize that the goal of replacing “native superstition” with the 
“truth of Christianity” denied any true possibility of a non-intrusive cultural 
exchange, it is remarkable how seriously the missionaries cautioned themselves and 
their readers to avoid unnecessarily interfering with African culture. As Warneck put 
it, “Christianity comes to the peoples as a foreign religion, and this foreign religion 
can only become indigenous to [these peoples]…if they [can] grasp it in their mother 
tongue.”78 
 While Warneck’s ideas appeared in the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift for an 
educated readership, other examples of missionary views about Kultur appeared in 
                                                 
76 For an example of this process see Martin Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial 
Experience in Malawi and Zambia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
77 Altena, “Ein Häuflein Christen mitten in der Heidenwelt des dunklen Erdteils”, 413-414; Landau, 
The Realm of the Word, xvii and 30-52; Price, Making Empire, 8; and Robert, introduction to 
Converting Colonialism, 4-5. 




the publications of individual mission societies. For example, embedded within a 
fairly typical piece of reportage about the Herrnhut mission station on Lake Nyasa in 
German East Africa missionary Theodor Bechler demolished the idea that prior to 
European contact the Konde of Nyasa lacked any culture whatsoever. If their skills as 
weavers and ironworkers were not sufficient he could “speak of their huts, 
astoundingly clean and with four-cornered or round construction; of farming and 
cattle-raising; of boat- and bridge-building, of drums and pipes, of foodways 
[Kochkunst] and medicines....” There was more than enough evidence of culture. 
Since the arrival of the Moravian Church, the culture of the Konde, according to 
Bechler, had taken on a more “refined character.” The missionaries had introduced a 
written form of the local dialects and begun training teachers and catechists to work 
in their mission and form the core of a future, independent Konde church. In 
Bechler’s presentation Kultur was an important element of the missionary project; he 
wrote that, “Truly, mission is a culture-bearer of the first echelon! Work and cultured 
behavior [Gesittung], education and ultimate fortune are brought to those who not 
only have an equal right to Kultur as the white race, but also show themselves to be 
just as worthy.”79 Richter agreed that mission “[tried] to bridge the abyss between our 
cultural affluence and the [Africans’] lack of culture [Unkultur].”80 The Kultur of an 
African community could be improved by contact with Europeans and refined by 
missionaries’ efforts to build a Volkskirche. 
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 Carl Buchner, a leader of the Moravians, defended Africans against claims of 
cultural decline in an April 1904 lecture to the Brandenburg Mission Conference, one 
of a number of regional conventions of German mission societies. According to 
Buchner, the evidence of the recent past showed that unlike other “uncivilized” 
peoples like the Eskimos and the peoples of New Guinea who had declined after 
contact with whites and Europe’s “celebrated and notorious” culture, peoples of 
African descent had prospered. He claimed that where the “influence of civilization” 
had ended civil strife and slave raids, peoples of African descent flourished with even 
greater success than peoples of European descent.81 The great success of colonized 
Africans meant they had boundless capacity for improving their cultural 
achievements. His chief evidence: the condition of African Americans. He cited W. 
E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folks, favorably and quoted at length a passage in 
which Du Bois laid out the technical, economic, and cultural accomplishments of 
African Americans. Buchner commented about these accomplishments that they 
“prove[d] nothing less than that the black race in America in every area of culture, 
science, and technic [has begun] to distinguish itself” and these successes undermined 
the accepted belief in the “spiritual inferiority of the Negro.”82 
 The apparent positive response of African peoples to “civilization” was a 
result of education, Buchner continued. Western civilization, in general, had failed to 
make an “earnest effort through education” to develop African people’s “psychic” 
and “intellectual” strengths. Missions had addressed some of this shortfall and, 
according to Buchner, “Wherever the formation and development of a mission 
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station” had been permitted, one “[saw] how the primitive people [Naturkinder] first 
in garments, then in their housing, then in conventional labor, [and] gradually in 
language and spiritual views, as well, emulate[d] Whites.” Buchner’s description 
seems to violate the principle of leaving African cultures as untainted by 
“civilization” as possible, and this reflects the diversity of mission thought on the 
specifics of Africans’ potential. However, Buchner’s main point of the promise in 
Africans remains representative of the general position of missionaries in Germany 
with respect to African communities. With the good example of Christian 
missionaries and the training that missionaries offered to African peoples, Buchner 
argued, the African could be converted into a good Christian global citizen.83  
 Other leaders of the Protestant mission movement argued for the educative 
capacity of Africans. Alexander Merensky’s pamphlet, Deutschlands Pflict 
gegenüber den Heiden und dem Heidentum in seinen Kolonien (Germany’s 
Responsibility with Respect to the Heathens and Heathendom in her Colonies), 
argued forcefully that the solution to the “native question,” as in “what to do about 
the natives,” lay in improving the material and spiritual conditions of indigenous 
peoples with effective and moral policies. Merensky’s pamphlet was intended for a 
broad audience and it conveyed the German missionaries’ viewpoint of African 
societies. He called for Germany’s colonial policies to be defined and determined “by 
the fact that natives are men [Menschen].” Non-Western peoples were in need of 
education because “these so-called primitive peoples [Naturvölker] [were] nothing 
other than members of a great human family who have lagged behind in their 
                                                 




development.”84 He wrote that it was the responsibility of Germany to see to the 
moral improvement of its subject peoples but “[t]heir language, customs, morals, and 
legal views must be treated with care.” Only those practices which he called “pagan 
atrocities” could be forbidden.85 Germans had the obligation to advance the material, 
moral, and spiritual capacity of their colonized people.  
The “Mission Pastor [Missionsprediger]” H. Kurz produced a remarkable 
discussion of the meaning of Kultur in the Basel Mission Society’s journal in 1906. 
He differentiated Kultur carefully from “Mission.” In fact, he presented his work as a 
choice; “Mission or Kultur?” Kultur as a concept had two components; the subjective: 
“the labor, care, and formation of our spiritual constructions and physical 
capabilities”; and the objective: “the contest with the environment which surrounds 
us, its commodities and power, in order that we might make them useful.”86 Kurz’s 
use of the term Kultur seems better understood as “civilization” and his skepticism of 
the benefits of Kultur are better understood as a rejection of the “civilizing” mission. 
Like Bechler, Kurz argued no “cultureless people” existed; differences in material 
culture mainly grew from environmental differences. For example, peoples of the 
equatorial regions had little use for warm clothing or housing and so they had not 
developed an extensive sartorial or architectural heritage. Though there were no 
“cultureless” peoples, Kurz did identify “culture-poor” peoples. The great difference 
between those peoples and “culture-rich” peoples (i.e. Europeans) grew out of the 
idea of “work which leads to the concept of property, and out of heterogeneity of the 
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same trade and commerce.”87 But clearly the concept of property could be learned, so 
no culture was excluded from the ranks of “culture-rich” peoples. 
To Kurz Kultur represented a dangerous threat to missionaries. The peoples 
who were rich in Kultur were driven by their nature to conquer and their presence 
seemed to bring benefits – conquest brought “spiritual and material culture in its 
wake.”88 So far, Kurz would concede, Kultur sounded a suitable partner for mission. 
After all, whites stood “in scientific-intellectual, esthetic-cultural and practical-
industrial activities” above all other peoples. And yet, these “Kulturmensch” – the 
bearers of Kultur – frequently lacked religious elevation. Missionaries had to 
maintain a skeptical stance when it came to the “advancements” of European culture, 
the material benefits of colonialism were not reliable partners for the evangelist. 
Mission should focus on a clear moral uplift, not the promotion of European Kultur.89 
By the first decade of the twentieth century Germany’s Protestant mission 
movement had developed a theology and anthropology that confirmed African 
communities as culturally relevant. Theodor Öhler, the head of the Basel Mission, 
summed up this view in the Basel Mission’s Evangelisches Missions-Magazin in 
1908. His article appeared during the height of efforts by the secular colonialists to 
force a change in missionaries’ pedagogical practices. Öhler reminded readers that 
there were no “culture-less” people, only those whose culture was “undeveloped,” 
                                                 
87 Kurz, “Mission oder Kultur,” 317-318. For more on cultural relativism in missionary thought see 
A[lbert] Hauck, Evangelische Mission und deutsches Christentum, Flugschriften der Deutschen 
Evangelischen Missions-Hilfe 4, (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1916); P[aul] O[tto] Hennig, “Die 
Erziehung des Afrikaners,“ Jahrbuch der sächsischen Missionskonferenz 23(1912): 67-79; and “Die 
Stellung der evangelischen Mission in Afrika zur Volkssitte,“ Evangelisch-Lutherisches Missionsblatt 
46(1893): 291-293. 
88 Kurz, “Mission oder Kultur,” 320. 




who were nonetheless “capable of development.90 The key to encouraging this 
development was education. Schools provided valuable literacy that helped deliver to 
“primitive” peoples a greater understanding of the “civilized” world. He wrote, 
“Schools destroy superstition with their lessons in history, geography, natural science 
[and] contribute to the destruction of heathendom.” These lessons in the cultural 
products of Western peoples showed the entangled vines of mission and Kultur; to 
Öhler “Nothing shows us more convincingly the close and indivisible connection 
between mission and cultural work than the area of mission schools.”91 Schools could 
help eliminate superstition and develop the cultural life of non-Western peoples 
around the world. 
Öhler acknowledged the impossibility of separating mission from Kultur but 
he did not surrender the independence of mission from political pressure. He 
recounted contemporary opinions that missions should act as “cultural pioneers,” 
promote the development of the colonies for the sake of the Fatherland, “train the 
Negro to work,” enrich scientific knowledge, and, “in the interests of the ruling 
nation[,] spread the language.” But with this aspect of Kultur, Öhler contended, 
mission had nothing in common. If mission followed these calls then it became 
faithless toward its true calling. In his opinion, “Mission [was] not in service of 
Kultur, but of the Kingdom of God” and should contribute to the spread of Kultur 
only for the good of bringing the world’s peoples to Christianity.92 Öhler’s article 
expressed in another way the general principle that missionaries should remain aloof 
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from the contemporary project of “civilizing” the African, since to many this project 
of “civilizing” meant subjugating Africans to European culture. 
 Missionaries’ ideas about Kultur and its presence or absence amongst 
Africans were not exclusively missionary ideas. Missionswissenschaftler regularly 
sought to learn from and even participate in anthropological discussions during this 
period. So, it is no surprise that their ideas had much in common with the ideas of 
contemporary anthropologists. Missionaries seemed to draw the line in their 
ethnological researches at the collection of body parts, however. Eugen Fischer 
solicited body parts from National Socialist concentration camps in much the same 
way that his predecessor Felix Luschan did from his contacts in the colonial 
administration and military.93 This view seems to have transmuted into the racialist, 
eugenicist vision of Eugen Fischer and other anthropologists who collaborated with 
the National Socialist regime in the 1930s and -40s. Unlike anthropologists in France, 
Great Britain, and the United States, German anthropologists of the middle and late 
decades of the nineteenth century were “liberal champions of cultural pluralism.”94 In 
general, like missionaries, German anthropologists’ encounters with non-Western 
peoples were informed by factors other than politics. To the ethnologists of Germany 
the interaction with colonized peoples was motivated by cultural ideology. In fact, 
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German concern with Kultur and preserving indigenous peoples was set against the 
political and colonial designs of the other colonial powers in anthropologists’ self-
understanding.95 
 The shift among anthropologists to a nationalist agenda of service to the state 
around 1914 provides a useful comparison with Protestant missionaries’ own 
ideological trajectory. While there is no evidence that missionaries’ view of Kultur 
and race changed at the same moments and with the same results as anthropologists’ 
views, similar forces explain the gradual shift in missionaries’ views of nationalism 
and internationalism. One source of the change may have been generational. In 
missiology the accession of Karl Axenfeld and Julius Richter following the deaths of 
stalwart internationalists like Gustav Warneck and Franz Michael Zahn coincided 
with the shift to nationalist ideology in the mission movement.96 Axenfeld and 
Richter had come of age in a period when nationalism and colonial ambitions 
suffused the political culture of the German Empire. 97 Like their anthropologist 
contemporaries, German Protestant missionaries’ relationship to the secular state held 
the seeds of the movement’s gradual adoption of a particularist vision of missionary 
activity. The historical link between Christian evangelism and European civilization 
meant that whoever could claim to be the “bearer of civilization” held the upper hand. 
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Protestantism’s close link with the state in Prussia and the German Empire meant that 
missionaries who rose to prominence after 1880 frequently held more favorable views 
of German nationalism and the German imperial state. At the same time they viewed 
the priorities of the secular colonial movement with more sympathy than their 
predecessors. Furthermore, the association of German mission work with the German 
Empire increased the likelihood that German Protestant missionaries would adopt a 
nationalist ideology of Christian mission. Finally, the crucible of the First World War 
affected German anthropological thought with much the same intensity that it did 
other fields, including Missionswissenschaft. In the case of missionaries, the First 
World War helped verify nationalist missionaries’ depiction of a world divided into 
competing nations.98 
 During the late nineteenth century, missionaries argued that Africans 
possessed the facility to join the cultured peoples of the earth. This view not only 
validated their work as Christian missionaries seeking converts, it also argued for the 
value of missionaries’ educational and social welfare activities. Missionaries likely 
held these beliefs for much of the nineteenth century but felt little need to justify 
themselves before 1900. The intensification of national feeling in Germany after 
1900, the growing challenges to missionary capabilities in the colonies, and direct 
attempts by secular colonialists to force a change in missionary school language 
policy caused missionary intellectuals to produce defenses of their work. Their 
arguments for the cultural potential and value of indigenous peoples served to 
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substantiate missionaries’ claims for the superiority and moral value of their 
educational activities. Missionized peoples’ cultural value supplied missionaries with 
justifications for maintaining indigenous language instruction and reasserted 
missionary internationalism. German mission scholars justified their activities as 
legitimated by the “truth” of human cultural equality. Missionaries deployed their 




 For missionaries, the language of instruction in their schools represented the 
very core of missionary activities. Schools’ central place in missionaries’ work meant 
that missionaries were sensitive to any perceived infringement upon their autonomy 
in education. The episode during the first year of the Herero-Nama War in which 
secular colonialists sought to place missionaries under the control of colonial 
governors, was only the most direct attack by the Colonial Society and other secular 
groups. The Colonial Society situated itself politically with the many nationalist 
groups extant in German civil society from the 1880s up to and beyond World War I. 
Like the Navy League it had a more moderate nationalist tone than groups like the 
Pan-German League but it remained firmly ensconced in the milieu of German 
popular nationalism. 
To burnish its nationalist credentials, promote the economic development of 
Germany’s colonies by large corporations, and support the interests of white settlers 




economic colonialist, and pro-settler organizations, made sporadic efforts starting in 
the 1890s to force mission schools to adopt German as their primary language of 
instruction. As has already been discussed, German missionaries considered 
instruction in indigenous languages essential to effective mission practice. 
Missionaries’ resistance to German-language instruction drew accusations of 
disloyalty and “un-patriotic-ness” from the Colonial Society and its allies. To 
missionaries the question of language was one of existential import. The vernacular 
was the key to Christian evangelization because only through an “indigenization” of 
the Gospel could indigenous people find salvation. Missionaries therefore fought to 
preserve control over linguistic policy in their schools. 
An example of an earnest move by the secular colonial movement to force 
German-language instruction began in 1896. At the 1896 meeting of the Kolonialrat 
the head of the German Colonial Society, Duke Johann Albrecht zu Mecklenburg, 
proposed that it should be obligatory that European language instruction be made in 
German. Mecklenburg cited “patriotic reasons” for his proposal and argued that if 
mission societies wished to work in German territories then they should not object to 
teaching in German.99 Though Mecklenburg and his allies were chiefly annoyed by 
the teaching of English in the North German Mission Society’s schools in Togo, this 
attack was interpreted by missionaries on the Kolonialrat and across Germany as an 
effort to interfere with missionaries’ pedagogical efforts. 
On the Kolonialrat Karl Jacobi spoke in defense of the North German Mission 
Society’s right to teach as it wished. The Society offered English because that was 
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what the Africans wanted because English had developed a place as the dominant 
language of the coastal trade.100 Jacobi argued that the proposal “[did] the mission no 
favors with such a reform, better to leave in place the freedom that mission has had 
up to now in [linguistic matters].101 Jacobi’s opposition demonstrated how school 
language policy cut to the heart of German missionary principles. He supported 
missionary internationalism by arguing that if the German government sought to 
enforce language policy in its colonies then the work of German missionaries might 
be impeded in a similar manner by other colonial powers. By favoring independence 
in language instruction, Jacobi endorsed missionary autonomy and internationalism 
against nationalistic patriotism. 
 Jacobi’s defense of English-language instruction reveals a tantalizing hint of 
the role that African motives and polities played in school administration. The Basel 
missionaries continued to teach their students English because that was the language 
in demand in the region. Missionary motivations in other instances may have been for 
instruction in a local, indigenous language but in this case it’s clear that African 
parents and students did not wish to be instructed in their own languages but instead 
in the most economically useful language, the trade language of the region, English. 
Greater analysis needs to be done if similar pressures were brought to bear in German 
East Africa but it is apparent from missionary arguments in favor of Swahili as a 
language of instruction late in the colonial period that the missionaries hoped to 
transform Swahili, an administrative and trade language for the entire region, into a 
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language of Christian practice. Missionary leaders might have hoped that by adopting 
a language desirable to local Africans they could stimulate greater responsiveness to 
the Protestant missions’ message. 
Mecklenburg would not surrender on this issue. Two years later a 
memorandum was presented to the Kolonialrat “concerning the taking up of the 
German language in the curriculum of the schools in the protectorates.” In the view of 
the head of the German Colonial Society, “we must act as the French and 
English;…we must show the natives that we Germans are the masters. Therefore it 
[was] undeniably necessary that German must be promoted…in the schools of the 
colonies.” The Colonial Secretary, Paul Kayser, agreed with Mecklenburg’s assertion 
that “it [was] our national responsibility” to teach German in the colonies. The 
Catholic mission representative, Franz Hespers, was able to deflect this attack upon 
missionaries’ autonomy by making Mecklenburg’s proposal voluntary for mission 
societies, with the incentive of government subsidies for those schools that taught 
German. Hespers’ proposal was adopted unanimously and the meeting moved on to 
other matters.102 But the issue would not remain settled for long. 
The fight over missionary language instruction continued through the first 
years of the twentieth century. Secular colonialists sought to use the Kolonialrat and 
the Reichstag to force mission schools to change their language policies. Attacks in 
1904 sought to create government schools as a direct challenge to missionaries’ 
schools, expressly for the purpose of spreading German in the colonies.103 And even 
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as late as 1913, when nationalism was increasingly becoming a priority of missionary 
intellectuals, many in the missionary ranks argued for schools to retain their 
educational autonomy. When the imperial governor of the German colony of 
Kamerun tried to force German instruction on the Basel Mission Society’s schools in 
the colony, the Basel missionaries appealed to the Colonial Minister. They argued 
that for “pedagogical reasons and general consideration” German instruction should 
not be elevated above the educational interests of the mission schools. In the 
missionaries’ view, a system of education “adapted to the cultural level of the 
peoples” did the colony greater service than a “rash and an inevitably superficial 
Germanization.”104 Friends of the missionary societies fought to protect missionaries’ 
autonomy in the Reichstag as well. Reichstag Member Reinhold Mumm of Stöcker’s 
Christian Social Party spoke in the early spring of 1913 against legislation designed 
to bring the mission schools under a “more exacting oversight.”105 Throughout this 
period missionaries held to a strong defense of their educational prerogatives. 
In 1895, Franz Michael Zahn of the North German Mission Society offered a 
defense of missionaries’ indigenous language use that integrated the practical benefits 
with a cultural understanding of indigenous peoples that embraced human diversity. 
The main thrust of Zahn’s argument was that God had intended the world to be a 
diverse place. This diversity provided Christians with a multitude of cultural 
perspectives and revelations which collectively allowed for a more complete 
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Christianity to develop. The imposition of German or any other universal language 
would therefore lead to the destruction of indigenous cultures and violate Christian 
dogma. Zahn’s view on this point remained strong amongst missionary intellectuals 
even as nationalism spread in missionary circles, the linguist and mission scholar Carl 
Meinhof argued in 1906 that when a people gives up its language then that people 
gives up its “fundamental character and the form of its peculiar mentality.”106 
The study of language, to Zahn, allowed for believers to publish in every 
language the “great deeds of God,” the use of indigenous language for evangelization 
“opened the door to the most expansive philosophical, philological, historical, [and] 
theological considerations.” Language was, after all, the means by which a person 
expressed his or her spiritual being; it was only through language that a man or 
woman could fully participate in a personal and collective spiritual life.107 Meinhof 
agreed, writing, “[T]he thousands of languages glorify the great deeds of God…with 
their own rhythms, their own melodies.” The European understanding of Christianity 
was not universal, and “every non-European [finds] beauty in the Gospel that we 
[Europeans] do not see.”108 Like Warneck before him, Zahn argued that the only 
correct way to develop a person’s faith was through his or her mother language, and 
the linguistic diversity of the earth reflected God’s intentions.109 The many and 
strange cultures of the world, Zahn felt, reflected the scattering of the nations as told 
in the story of the Tower of Babel. But these different peoples all possessed a spark of 
God’s message; missionaries discovered everywhere peoples who “[spoke] 
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differently and at the same time [thought] differently of God.”110 Zahn defended 
indigenous language use on the grounds that it aided in the spread of the Gospels and 
that the multiplicity of languages on Earth sprang from a divine plan, and the 
challenge of reconciling human difference served to strengthen the global Christian 
faith. 
In application, Zahn imagined mission schools as the key support for 
communities of Christians joined together in Volkskirchen. He wrote that “only a true 
national education, that is to say one conveyed in the national language, is healthy…” 
Foreign language instruction should be limited. The establishment of European 
languages as languages of instruction created an “educational construct [Bildungsbau] 
without a healthy national foundation and [bore] radical fruit,” Zahn contended. If 
language were detached from cultural roots, Zahn argued, peoples might learn a 
language but not develop an appreciation for cultural values. Another risk was that by 
not using the indigenous language for instruction the European colonial state would 
only create subjects able to “parrot” English, French, or German;111 far better to 
integrate the moral education offered by the missionaries through their religious 
teachings with the education of indigenous peoples in their own languages. 
Zahn concluded, “It is possible and it is necessary to missionize in native 
language[s].” After all, the “goal of human history and of mission history [was] not 
the earthly kingdom...” it was “one great people, whose numbers no one can count, 
out of all the peoples and tribes and nations and tongues standing before the Throne 
                                                 
110 Zahn, “Die Muttersprache,” 342. 




and before the Lamb…”112 The message of revelation gave the ultimate basis to 
Zahn’s view that it was God’s intention that there be human difference and that the 
dissolution of that difference through Christian faith could only be aided by Christian 
missionaries. But first, all peoples would have to be made Christian, and only after 
that great success could the coalescence of humanity become possible. Because of 
this precondition to earthly salvation Zahn argued that the first step should be making 
the Christians and the appropriate way to do so, according to the scriptures and 
principled reasoning, was to evangelize in indigenous languages. Zahn’s argument 
neatly fused indigenous language instruction and German Protestant missionary 
cultural attitudes into a defense of missionary independence and internationalism. 
Missionary intellectuals devoted considerable time and energy to explaining 
the importance of language in their work. Above all, a consideration of missionary 
language policy revealed missionaries’ influence upon the pasts and presents of the 
peoples among whom they worked.113 In German East Africa the decisions made by 
missionaries encouraged the propagation of Swahili. The eventual decision by 
missionaries to instruct in Swahili in the East African colony arose from three 
missionary concerns. First, missionaries’ adhered to the overriding principle that 
Africans should be instructed in an African language to help stimulate the 
development of Volkskirchen and Christian communities. Second, missionaries hoped 
adopting Swahili as the language of their work would arrest the spread of Islam in the 
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colony.114 Third, Africans on the coast and inland seemed to desire instruction in 
Swahili and, by obliging, missionaries could bring more Africans into contact with 
missionary institutions. Last, the colonial state’s adoption of Swahili as a key 
language of administration allowed missionaries’ to collaborate with the colonial 
state.115 This gained them an ally in their fight against the secular colonialists who 
wanted German-language schools. This compromise with the East African colonial 
administration allowed missionaries to preserve their internationalist vision but it also 
reflected the German Protestant mission movement’s growing difficulties in the 
decade before the First World War. Under threat from nationalists outside the 
movement and with internal proponents of a more national tone, mission leaders 
found a compromise on language issues that avoided total surrender to the nationalist 
trend. 
 Karl Axenfeld helped develop the missionaries’ policy of Swahili instruction 
in German East Africa. As Axenfeld was one of the strongest nationalists among the 
German missionary leadership one might be surprised to learn he was no advocate of 
German-language instruction in the schools. There are two possible reasons for 
Axenfeld’s position. In the first place, schools and the relatively positive views of 
indigenous culture that German Protestant missionaries held were essential to the 
German Protestant evangelical project. Their symbolic and intellectual importance 
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meant that even a nationalist like Axenfeld had no desire to undermine German 
mission principles and German mission school autonomy. Second, Axenfeld’s ideas 
about Swahili took form around 1908, before transformative events of Germany’s 
Protestant mission movement’s history intensified his nationalist opinions. It was 
only in late 1908 that the Benediktinerstreit began and that would take four years for 
Axenfeld to fully commit to a strategy linking Protestantism with German 
nationalism. The financial difficulties afflicting Germany’s Protestant mission 
societies had not yet led to the embrace of nationalist fundraising in the 
Nationalspende of 1913,116 and the First World War was still six years away. 
Axenfeld’s 1908 essay on “The Language Question in East Africa from the 
Standpoint of Mission” proposed a closer link between the missions and the colonial 
government on language policy. Axenfeld counted more than 600 different languages 
in East Africa of which most, he claimed, were only spoken by “a handful of people.” 
This linguistic diversity, if missionaries sought to instruct all Africans in their mother 
tongues, threatened to fracture the evangelical project into ever diminishing pieces. 
At the same time, Axenfeld reminded his readers of missionaries’ basic principle that 
“every nation should be presented the Gospel in its native language” and that the 
“displacement of native languages by European [languages]” was a “pedagogical 
mistake.” To reconcile these two challenges, Axenfeld proposed that missionaries 
consider consolidating their principles to better aid the establishment of “healthy 
native churches [Volkskirchen].”117 
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However, Axenfeld felt the power of the government and economic growth 
had to be considered when choosing and developing linguistic policy. He declared 
that mission’s powerful evangelical message, system of schools, development of 
indigenous-language literature, and training of catechists made mission a “great 
language-forming and language-preserving power; but the government and the 
tendency of commerce are stronger yet.”118 For this reason, Axenfeld argued, the 
most rational choice of a language for East African missionary instruction was 
Swahili.119 Swahili was the language of East African coastal traders and their slavers, 
a group Axenfeld and contemporaries called “Arabs.” The favor shown Swahili by 
the administrative and economic impulses of the colony meant that European 
missionaries should adopt the language, already favored by the indigenous elites, for 
practical, political, and religious reasons.120 
Practically speaking, Swahili was, to Axenfeld’s perspective, already the 
dominant language of the region. The language served in East Africa as the language 
of trade and Axenfeld suggested that the German government was likely to adopt the 
language as well.121 In fact, in July of 1907 the Ausschuß agreed to Colonial 
Secretary Dernburg’s request that the Protestant and Catholic missions working in 
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East Africa come together and standardize the orthography of Swahili.122 
Furthermore, Swahili had political advantages that missionaries could use to help 
increase the prestige of Christianity, as Axenfeld described it, to the “uneducated 
backcountry African [Buschneger]” whoever even “[spoke] broken Swahili” appeared 
“an educated man.”123 If missionaries and their Christianized students came to be 
perceived as fluent in Swahili then, the reasoning followed, Christianity would come 
to be seen as a path to upward mobility. 
Axenfeld’s final argument for mission schools to adopt Swahili as their 
instructional language envisioned the change in policy as an attack on Islam. The 
long-standing opposition to Swahili by older missionary leaders rested on the view 
that Swahili, as the language of the “Arabs,” was a carrier of Islam. Axenfeld 
countered, “The victory of Swahili [in the colony] is long since decided, but it need 
not necessarily be a harbinger of Islam.” Furthermore, Swahili was superior to 
German as a daily language because German, Axenfeld wrote, was too difficult for 
most speakers of Bantu languages. The adoption of Swahili would not be a 
concession to Islam; Axenfeld saw it as an opportunity to win a great victory against 
the spread of Islam. The key step was to convert Swahili from a written language 
which used the Arabic alphabet to one which utilized the Latin alphabet. Such a 
transformation would allow missionaries to appropriate the language of the Muslims 
for their own evangelical purposes.124 
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As Axenfeld put it, “The land and the time needs a unifying language, and no 
one can prevent it from developing….One can lament the victory of Swahili for 
linguistic, cultural, or religious reasons but one must make the best of the matter. Not 
only the government but also the natives wish…for instruction in Swahili.” Mission 
could either take advantage of the situation or miss an opportunity to make itself 
indispensable to Africans and German colonial administrators alike. Axenfeld 
concluded with this proposal: in general, missionaries should continue to seek to learn 
and utilize the “higher-impact” local languages in order to communicate with the 
Africans in their mission fields. However, the major dialects should be elevated as the 
most promising general pastoral and school languages. On top of this local program, 
Axenfeld proposed that Swahili become an integral part of curricula; as either a 
secondary language or, wherever appropriate, as the language of instruction. In this 
way “the day [would] come when [the printed word in Swahili] [would] serve a 
greater Christian [purpose] in East Africa.”125 The historical record shows that the 
work of missionaries and the German colonial administration helped spread a 




  The participation of Africans in missionaries’ schools was of inherent 
importance to missionary strategies. Debates between missionaries and secular 
colonialists over the language of instruction and the purpose of schools excluded 
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African students, families, polities, and indigenous instructors from deliberations. 
This project does not attempt to develop the influence of African stakeholders upon 
the development of a missionary school policy. Missionaries may have engaged in 
debates with their own missionized communities but the influence of these likely but 
not evident in these sources contests over control are invisible from the intellectual 
and political literature of the mission leadership and the colonial administrations. It is 
reasonable to expect, without suggesting any level of collaboration, that African 
motives would have been more sympathetic with the goals of the missionaries than 
those of the secular colonial authorities. 
Schools with indigenous-language instruction were, after all, the most 
important element of German Protestant missionaries’ plan for evangelization. 
Missionaries rejected economic colonial demands that their schools work to train an 
indigenous labor force for economic exploitation. And when German nationalists 
targeted these schools as representative of missionaries’ insincere devotion to the 
German nation, missionaries responded with a spirited and principled defense of their 
methods. To missionaries, indigenous language instruction was spiritually, 
pedagogically, and practically adaptive to the realities of mission work on the ground. 
The defense that missionaries formulated emphasized the appropriateness of 
indigenous-language instruction based on evidence from scripture and contemporary 
ethnology. Missionaries argued for a basic dignity of indigenous culture and defended 
their commitment to learn and teach in indigenous languages as essential to the 
successful spread of Christianity. In this area, education, missionaries held to their 




with more nationalist views. However, missionary policies did make one concession 
to outside influences. The compromise with the East African colonial administration 
on the use of Swahili as a language of instruction represented a tactical maneuver that 
helped bring together the missionaries and the state during the period of the Dernburg 
Reforms when the colonial state and missionaries shared a general economic plan for 
the colony as well. Schools and indigenous-language development represented 
missionaries’ most valuable tool and missionaries’ historic internationalism, cultural 
sensitivity to indigenous peoples, and local political circumstances in German East 











Chapter Four: Mission on the Home Front 
 
 By the 1890s Germany’s Protestant missionary movement had become firmly 
entrenched in the German colonial milieux. Missionaries from German mission 
societies labored in every German colony or protectorate, a Protestant and a Catholic 
clergyman sat on the Kolonialrat to represent missionaries’ interests, and (at least for 
the Protestants) a national organization for German missionaries had been 
established. From a political perspective, the leaders of the German Protestant 
mission movement ought to have felt sanguine about their future prospects. 
Furthermore, the leadership had constructed an effective rhetorical and ideological 
defense of their aversion to “politics” and nationalism. The majority of the movement 
remained committed to autonomy and internationalism and the movement’s political 
influence had matured. Even so, other factors had already begun to prepare the field 
for a new form of Protestant mission in Germany. 
As shown in previous chapters, the turn of the twentieth century challenged 
German Protestant missionary internationalism. The changing economic and political 
conditions in the German East African colony revealed one danger to German 
Protestant missionaries’ internationalism – the danger of a strongly nationalist anti-
Catholicism leading to a general nationalization of the movement. In the same period 
attacks on missionary autonomy in the colonies in the form of secular colonialist calls 
for German-language instruction put missionary internationalism at risk but also led 




Missionary leaders in Germany were similarly tested to maintain their remove from 
the national state by new challenges, particularly in key fundraising activities. On the 
one hand, it will be made clear in this chapter that the German Protestant movement 
would become a partial victim of its own success. The expansion of the mission 
movement and the construction of more and more mission stations, the “conquest” of 
ever greater mission territories, and the expansion of mission activities and services 
provided by missionaries would stretch the budgets of mission societies to their 
limits. As the missionary leadership would make clear in its private communications 
and public media, the old funding model for mission in Germany was not working. 
 The cause of this challenge, missionary theologians and theoreticians 
declared, was that the German people had an insufficiency of “Missionsgeist” 
(mission spirit). In their publications and at their conference meetings, missionary 
intellectuals debated the causes, symptoms, and effects of this shortage and proposed 
solutions to the problem. One marker of the crack in the internationalism of the 
missions was the jealousy German missionaries expressed regarding Britain and 
America’s strong financial and popular missionary support – an ideal internationalism 
would have celebrated the strength of the British and American movements as a 
universal benefit. Early solutions called on ministers and mission support networks to 
innovate and redouble their efforts to inspire religiously motivated support. The 
disappointing results garnered by these efforts and the growing popular nationalism in 
the Wilhelmine Reich suggested, for some, another path. At the same time that 
younger mission leaders like Karl Axenfeld and Julius Richter began articulating a 




financial difficulties. Around 1900 a growing sentiment in favor of combining 
“missionary spirit” with a nationalist mood proposed to bind the evangelical mission 
to the German nation. 
 For some the 1913 Nationalspende would provide the potential for a lasting 
solution to Germany’s shortage of “mission spirit” and the mission societies’ 
economic troubles. But the Nationalspende placed internationalist mission leaders in 
an uncomfortable position. A national fundraiser with the Kaiser’s blessing, the 
Nationalspende’s full name was the Nationalspende zum Kaisersjubliäum für die 
christlichen Missionen in den deutschen Kolonien und Schutzgebieten (National 
Offering on the Kaiser’s Jubilee for Christian Missions in the German Colonies and 
Protectorates, Nationalspende for short). Missionary leaders in 1913, many of whom 
remained internationalist and ambivalent about the imperial state, suspected the 
motives and worried what the possible effects of a national campaign predominantly 
organized by secular colonialists and representatives of the Prussian state church 
might be. This chapter argues that the Nationalspende and the organization founded 
in its aftermath, the Evangelisches Missions-Hilfe (Evangelical Mission Aid), were 
phenomena that presaged the ultimate triumph of nationalistic mission ideology in 
Germany in the First World War.1 The Nationalspende entangled the German mission 
movement more tightly with the secular colonial movement than ever before, and the 
Missions-Hilfe became an institutionalized representation of nationalist mission 
ideology within Germany. 
 
 
                                                 




The Financial Problem 
 
Germany’s Protestant missionary societies were perennially concerned about 
their financial states. The cost of training missionaries, transporting missionaries and 
their supplies to distant mission fields, and supporting mission station operations was 
an expensive enough undertaking. What is more, harsh environments and long 
distances charged a significant toll of men and materiel. On top of these expenses, the 
driving impulse of missionary culture cost mission societies still more. By its nature, 
the mission project demanded nearly continuous growth, and that ongoing growth led 
to growing budgets for German mission societies.2 A continual feature during the 
Kaiserreich for mission societies in Germany was the desperate search for financial 
security and a reluctance to appeal to official sources for relief.3 
The costs of the constantly expanding missionary operations meant that 
German mission societies had to constantly increase their fundraising as well. In 1878 
Gustav Warneck noted that between 1848 and 1878 the costs of German mission 
activities had increased from around 800,000 Marks to over 2.4 million Marks. In that 
same period the amount of money raised had also increased about three-fold, from 
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about 750,000 Marks to around 2.2 million Marks.4 Even at this early date the 
German mission movement operated at a deficit. This problem was only likely to 
expand over time. In 1908 the Berlin Mission reported to the Twelfth Brandenburg 
Provincial Synod that the growing scale of its activities required still greater 
contributions from the German home front.5 That same year the Herrnhut Mission 
considered the possibility of contracting its activities because of financial shortfalls.6 
Here was clear testimony to the source of mission societies’ financial difficulties: 
expanding obligations driven by religious duty drawing on resources that failed to 
keep pace with mission costs. 
 The establishment of a German colonial empire did little to alleviate the 
financial difficulties of the German missionary movement. All of the fervor and 
excitement inspired in the German public by the creation of an overseas empire 
dislodged no new financial support from the official church. The Prussian 
Oberkirchenrat, the governing council of the Prussian state Protestant church, and the 
General Synod of the Prussian Church which met in the fall of 1885 urged that the 
mission societies in Prussia act quickly to support German imperialism by 
establishing themselves in the German colonies.7 Yet, they extended no offers of 
financial support at the time. Even at the greatest moment of popular support for 
German colonialism, the Prussian state church remained unwilling to supply 
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resources to foreign mission.8 This did not concern Gustav Warneck all that much; he 
noted that mission had grown into a significant force without the help of the church, 
which he argued would continue to treat missionaries and their work as an 
“unimportant matter [Winkelsache].”9 For many, mission work and support was more 
than simply gathering funds; it was also a deeply spiritual commitment to building a 
Christian world through personal sacrifice and devotion.10 Transforming missions 
into official elements of the organized church might address financial troubles but 
would probably strip mission of its driving energies.11 For these reasons, along with 
the close relationship between the Protestant church and German state, the official 
church and the state remained ideologically incompatible with German Protestant 
missions. Before the turn of the twentieth century the links between the colonial and 
national state on the one hand, and the German Protestant missionary movement on 
the other, had been kept intentionally weak by the missionaries. 
Mission societies began to increasingly discuss their financial challenges in 
the 1890s. The venerable Moravian Mission faced tough choices on the eve of the 
twentieth century in particular. In a publication produced to prepare representatives to 
the Herrnhut General Synod of 1899, the Moravian mission leader Carl Buchner 
reported on the financial condition of the Herrnhuter Mission. According to him, the 
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mission’s condition was so dire that it had to choose between abandoning old mission 
territories and suspending expansion into new mission territories.12 The long-term 
financial challenges of the mission model of constant growth had to be addressed. 
Buchner feared that giving up new territories, especially in Africa, would threaten to 
place the Moravians in a state of stagnation. Possibly, abandoning the Protestant 
mission movement’s quest to evangelize the world presented the Moravian Church 
with a hard choice. Buchner resisted abandoning expansion plans but could not see an 
alternative; abandoning the congregations the Moravians had developed in their 
existing mission fields was impossible in his opinion.13 Buchner left the situation for 
the General Synod to decide but his agonized testimony exhibited in clear form the 
anxiety that financial matters provoked in missionary leaders.  
In response to Buchner’s concerns, the General Synod undertook a “point-by-
point” reform of the Herrnhut Brotherhood’s mission arm designed to allow the 
Brotherhood to continue to build its mission work rather than contract it. The 
solutions offered followed an old pattern. The General Synod proposed an 
improvement of the mission’s printed materials to entice contributions from a “wider 
public.”14 Beyond this suggestion, most other proposals seemed simply to be seen by 
synod members as an opportunity to reform the general form of the Herrnhut 
Society’s mission policies. None of them offered any real innovation or modification 
to the situation.15 As it had for many decades, the financial hardship of the Herrnhut 
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Society, like its fellow Protestant mission societies in Germany, depended upon 
leaders ability to connect with the German public and inspire their “Missionsgeist” 
(mission spirit). The fault lay on the home front, and the missionary leadership began 





From the start of the mission societies’ financial difficulties, missionary 
intellectuals proffered suggestions to fill mission coffers. Yet, all their suggestions 
amounted to the same basic proposal: Protestant Germans should be convinced to 
meet their Christian obligation to support the mission societies’ work. This required 
in each case that the mission societies redouble their efforts to inspire and cajole 
parishioners across Germany to donate money with more and better religious rhetoric. 
In private and professional correspondence, at mission conferences, and in the 
publications of the mission societies, mission leaders and scholars called for an 
increase in German “Missionsgeist.” The strategies proposed tended to concentrate on 
traditional methods and target traditional constituencies. Leaders staunchly resisted 
using patriotism and the language of nationalism to secure support. German 
Missionswissenschaftler and mission committees remained devoted to traditional 





A key tenet of missionary leaders’ attitude towards mission and towards the 
German mission home front (called by missionaries the Heimat) was the idea that the 
existence of missions in foreign lands and the support of those missions by Christians 
in their homelands strengthened Christianity in European communities. Missionaries, 
the argument ran, provided parishioners and clergy in Germany with Christian 
paragons. In addition, by transmitting the ideas and values of Christianity to non-
Western lands, Christian missionaries created a source for the spiritual rejuvenation 
of German society. By drawing ordinary Germans into supporting their mission 
societies, missionaries built up a bulwark against socialism, excessive rationalism, 
Catholicism, and other societal ills. Many Missionswissenschaftler and mission 
leaders also argued that mission connected Germans with a wider world and gave 
them a greater understanding of their own place in it. Finally, some even argued that 
by introducing the Gospel to new peoples German Christianity would gain access to 
new insights and a greater understanding of divine revelation.16 All these arguments 
                                                 
16 For examples of these arguments see [Lars] Dahle, “Die segensreiche Rückwirkung der 
Heidenmission auf die heimatliche Gemeinde,” Verhandlungen der Kontinentalen Missions-Konferenz 
12(1909): 141-143; “Die äussere Mission eine Gehilfin der inner,” Evangelisches Missions-Magazin 
26(1882): 7-12; “Die Belebung des Missionssinnes in der Heimath,”;  R[einhold] Grundemann, “Die 
Mission auf der Kreissynode: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie des heimatlichen Missionswesens,” AMZ 
26(1899): 365-372; Carl Meinhof, “Gedanken über die Vertiefung unseres Missionsinteresses,” 
Evangelisches Missions-Magazin 56(1912): 164-170; H. Meinhof, “Welchen Gewinn bringt die Arbeit 
für die Mission Pastoren und Gemeinden?” AMZ 37(1910): 233-250; Th[eodor] Öhler, “Was kann die 
heimatliche Kirche von der Mission der Gegenwart lernen?” AMZ 35(1908): 217-233; Carl Paul, 
“Zwanzig Jahre deutscher Kolonialpolitik in ihrer Bedeutung für die Christianisierung unserer 
überseeischen Gebiete” in Missionswissenschaftliche Studien: Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag des 
Herrn Prof. D. Dr. Gustav Warneck ed. Karl Axenfeld (Berlin: Martin Warneck, 1904), 103-128; 
[Gustav Warneck], “Die Rückwirkung der Heidenmission auf das religiöse Leben der Heimat,” AMZ 
8(1881): 145-170; [Gustav Warneck], “Pflänzung und Pflege des Missionslebens in Gemeinde und 
Schule,” AMZ 14(1887): 385-405; Warneck, “Kirchenmission oder Freie Mission”; [Gustav Warneck], 
“Die gegenwärtige Lage der deutschen evangelischen Mission,” AMZ 32(1905): 157-176;  and the 
internal communication of the Bethel Mission, Walther Trittelvitz, “Grundlinien unserer heimatlichen 




were deployed in missionary periodicals to motivate supporters and justify the work 
of German Protestants in distant locales. 
As early as 1876, before there was any possibility of German missionaries 
serving in a non-existent German colonial empire, Protestant missionaries and their 
advocates worried over the state of “mission spirit” in the German Heimat. At the 
1876 Bremen Mission Conference a session was devoted to the question, “What is to 
be done in order to encourage and expand home mission circles?” August Schreiber 
of the Rhenish Mission (no relation to the second-generation nationalist August 
Wilhelm Schreiber) argued that, in order to inspire greater support, mission journals 
should be “descriptive and interesting,” a proposal backed by Gustav Warneck in the 
succeeding discussion and that was designed to broaden the appeal of the journals. At 
this time the mission leadership remained committed to drawing the educated middle 
class into its work, and Schreiber suggested one way to fight opposition in those 
circles to religious topics was with a natural scientific focus to emphasize the 
“universal cultural relevance of mission.” Schreiber and especially Warneck’s 
optimistic hopes for the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift, only a few years old at this 
point, are apparent in their suggestions to their colleagues. 
Others in the audience called for an intensification of “mission lessons,” lay 
study circles led by ministers and missionary candidates to spread knowledge and 
support for missions’ works. These salon-like activities fit neatly into existing 
philanthropic and social activities in the German middle classes at mid-century.17 
Missionary leaders believed that wherever a strong Christian conviviality existed one 
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could find the “roots for a love of mission” and that it would require only the barest 
of exertions from mission societies to reap the benefits of that affection. Franz 
Michael Zahn, in the ensuing discussion, argued that the “educational conditions” of 
the Germans impeded missionary efforts in the Heimat. The educated circles of 
Germany did not know enough of missionaries’ activities and so he called for the 
creation of a general periodical of mission information (like the Allgemeine Missions-
Zeitschrift) to raise awareness of mission work in all educated circles of the nation.18 
Nearly a decade before the establishment of a German colonial empire, Protestant 
missionary leaders judged Germany’s Missionsgeist inadequate. But there was no 
proposal that the spirit of German unity brought about by the creation of the German 
Empire in 1871 might somehow serve. It would take more than three decades of 
greater association with the German Empire and financial hardship to break the 
internationalist commitment to religious appeals. 
 As has been discussed in previous chapters, Friedrich von Bodelschwingh’s 
Bethel Mission Society differed from the older mission societies. From its inception it 
linked support for its work with support for and from the German nation. In an 1886 
broadside the Bethel Mission Society called on “Germany’s women” to support its 
activities by joining the mission’s Women’s Committee. It argued that in Africa “a 
great, rich area of activity [Arbeitsfeld], a source of an improved German prosperity 
has been opened up by our wise imperial government with the help of bold, energetic 
men.” Supporting the hard work of the government and its “bold, energetic men” was 
a “Christian duty.” The Bethel Mission in German East Africa, founded explicitly to 
support the colonial project, linked financial support for its work with concrete 
                                                 




contributions to the strengthening of the German nation. Through collaboration 
women and the mission could “honor God for the benefit of the German 
Fatherland.”19 This same message was carried in broadsides produced for a wider 
audience that called on Germans to continue the long history of German achievement 
amongst the “heathens.”20 Another argued that missionary service in the colony aided 
in the building of Germany’s “national strength” in East Africa so that “no other 
political power would dare challenge” the Reich’s claims to the region.21 
 In 1890 the Bethel Mission heightened its rhetoric. Bodelschwingh authored a 
supplement that appeared in the weekly newspaper of the Hospitalers 
(Johanniterorden).22 The pastor opened his call to “the Christian nobility of the 
German nation, especially its youth,” with a glorious recounting of the outpouring of 
German volunteers, Freiwilliger (“among them many students of theology”), during 
the Franco-Prussian War. This recollection of German unity and service caused 
Bodelschwingh to ask if so many German youth would join a new “battle against the 
forces of darkness at home and abroad.” In particular, the struggle abroad demanded 
that trained ministers join with “natural scientists, officers, soldiers, merchants, 
administrators” to make the empire serve the nation against the threat of heathen, 
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Muslim, and Catholic domination.23 Bodelschwingh’s argument referenced one of the 
dominant missionary arguments in favor of mission, that the fight for the Gospels was 
also a fight against societal ills in Germany. Germans could join in the fight against 
unrest in Germany (socialism and ultramontanism) by joining in the work of 
spreading German Protestantism abroad. Bodelschwingh and his mission society 
rhetorically linked the Christian mission with nationalist goals at an early date, once 
again marking the society as idiosyncratically nationalist from the very beginning and 
during a period when the majority of Protestant mission societies remained opposed 
to adopting statist or nationalist agendas in their work. 
 Far from adopting a nationalist public face, the Ausschuß and its leader, 
Gustav Warneck, refused to accept any patriotic influence upon their mission work. 
The Protestant mission societies demurred when asked by the German imperial 
government to commence mission work in the new German colonies, citing the 
expense that would be entailed in taking on new territories.24 Eventually the various 
societies did establish presences in the German colonies but not without financial and 
ideological reservations.25 Warneck argued to his readers in the Allgemeine Missions-
Zeitschrift that patriotism might draw “adventurers” to Germany’s colonies but would 
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turn away the sorts of men that made good missionaries.26 And in March 1891 
Warneck, writing to Colonial Secretary Paul Kayser for the Ausschuß, refuted 
Bodelschwingh’s arguments and argued the familiar refrain that mission work was 
better work if it kept away from “worldly affairs.”27 Instead, in these years Protestant 
missionary organizations (with the exception of Bodelschwingh’s Bethel Society) 
continued to pursue a policy designed to draw greater support out of Protestant 
congregations without appealing to national identity. This approach was typified by a 
presentation by August Schreiber of the Rhenish Mission that urged the deployment 
of the same mission festivals and mission study circles advocated by the gathered 
mission leaders in Bremen fourteen years before in 1876.28 
 In spite of the Ausschuß’s reluctance to join the colonial project, relations with 
the Colonial Office during the secretary-ship of Kayser remained congenial. Kayser 
included on his advisory council representatives of Protestant and Catholic mission, 
Karl Jacobi and Franz Hespers, respectively, and, in spite of Protestants’ general 
reluctance to lend their support to a national colonial project, he voluntarily began 
publicizing the work of missionaries in the German colonies in the official 
publication of the Colonial Office, the Kolonialblatt. He informed Jacobi and Hespers 
that his intent was to “promote and nourish the interest of the public” in both 
confessions’ activities with information about the numbers of missionaries and 
mission stations and maps of the mission territories.29 The Ausschuß supported this 
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practice and warned its member societies that the Catholics were more assiduous 
about promoting their activities in this manner.30 The presentation of these statistics 
was frequently applied to the problem of Missionsgeist. The missionaries’ 
involvement on the Kolonialrat, their voluntary reporting for the Kolonialblatt, and 
the confessional rivalry with the Catholics all combined to stimulate an ever greater 
entanglement between the Protestant mission movement and the colonial state. 
 The use of the Catholic bogeyman to inspire Protestant mission circles 
appeared in other venues as well. In their internal conversations and in their 
presentations to a wider public the leadership of the German Protestant mission 
movement integrated appeals to confessional pride long before it considered 
appealing to nationalist pride. Warneck, a dedicated anti-Catholic, tried to apply 
others’ anti-Catholicism to the project of inspiring greater Missionsgeist. He pointed 
out to readers of the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift that in the Catholic Church the 
“churchly consciousness” exceeded the “Christian consciousness.” But, he claimed, 
in spite of this deficit the disunited Protestants still generated greater mission efforts. 
If Protestants could be inspired to match Catholics in “churchly” commitment then 
the contributions for mission work would grow.31 Warneck’s description of the 
Catholic Church provided a tool to try and shame his readers into greater efforts to 
inspire “mission spirit.” 
 The financial crisis that began in the 1890s continued the long conversation 
amongst Protestant missionary leaders and intellectuals about the difficulties of 
inspiring sufficient support for their work in the wider Protestant public. As Warneck 
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put it in 1896, “the home [heimatliche] Christians must take up [the] work [of 
mission]” if they wished for the mission project to fulfill the potential gains in a 
world opened by God for evangelization.32 Twelve years later he remained 
determined to foster mission in the Heimat because, he wrote, “In the Heimat is the 
source of our mission strength,” and the strength of mission to “create and nourish” 
Christians in Germany remained a core element of the missionary project. In a 
reciprocal fashion, because of the connection Warneck argued existed between 
Heimat and mission field, the failings of mission were not only the fault of 
missionaries, mission methods, heathens and recent converts. The blame also rested 
in “large measure” on the spread of “Christians-in-name-only” from the West and 
metropolitan Christians who did not take their “mission obligations” seriously 
enough.33 The challenges of financing missionary activities did not abate during the 
first decade of the twentieth century. And in response Missionswissenschaftler 
continued to advocate expanding religious paths to address the problem. 
 Local Protestant clergy frequently served as the focus of mission society 
leaders’ and Missionswissenschaftlers’ plans to cultivate “mission spirit.” In a 
communication with the Brandenburg Provincial Synod of 1908 the Berlin Mission 
Society emphasized local clergymen’s role. “We consider [the clergymen] as the 
natural guardians of mission life,” the Society wrote. The Berlin Society promised 
that it would improve its delivery of the latest in mission information so that pastors 
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would not have to be “autodidacts.”34 At the same time, the Berlin Mission 
complained to the Synod of its difficulties raising enough money to support its 
activities. Once again the hope that “in the future an active interest in mission work 
would be seized upon by our Protestant Volk” appeared from the leaders of the Berlin 
Mission.35 And again missionary leaders proposed an intensification of educational 
efforts to induce donations, and the Berlin Mission called on the Ausschuß to take up 
the responsibility as well.36 
In the same vein, a proposal was offered by Friedrich Würz of the Basel 
Mission Society to Paul Schwartz of the Leipzig Mission to combine the efforts of all 
the members of the Bremen Continental Mission Conference. By joining together 
their promotional activities the mission societies would both avoid conflict amongst 
themselves and alienation of their supporters. The leadership of the societies would 
be “loyal” to one another and prohibited from defaming sister organizations.37 By the 
standards of promotional efforts up to this point, Würz’s proposal amounted to a 
radical innovation. The Berlin Society told its regional supporters that at the urging of 
the Ausschuß it proposed a regulation of fundraising and advocacy work to avoid 
unnecessary conflicts between mission societies and the wasted resources that could 
result.38 The Berlin Komitee then forwarded to its regional supporters strategies 
proposed by Würz and Schwartz to address foreign mission societies’ fundraising 
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difficulties in the Heimat.39 Pastors and other philanthropists in the provinces were 
asked by the Berlin Mission to follow the suggestion and commit to supporting one 
mission society rather than diffusing their support to multiple societies. This was 
expected to help concentrate moneys and prevent the duplication of effort by multiple 
societies, all in the interest of fundraising innovation. 
 At the 1909 Bremen Mission Conference some more “rethinking” of 
missions’ relationships to their supporters was offered by the Swede Karl Fries, 
founding secretary of the World’s Student Christian Federation. He was an important 
international figure in the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and a leader 
in the student mission movement. His presentation, “Cooperation by the Educated 
Classes in Heathen Mission,” argued that while God made no preference for 
“educated” over “uneducated” followers, mission could benefit by concentrating on 
the educated circles because “[t]heir example work[ed] with ten-fold force.” The 
seizure of the educated classes for mission would be the key to a victory for mission 
in all social circles.40 In reality, however, Fries’ proposal did not markedly differ 
from the very strategy Warneck and his associates had put into practice with their 
editorial policy at the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift. Fries examined the success of 
the lay mission movement in North America and provided a list of concrete 
suggestions for matching that success elsewhere. His proposals included “greater 
consideration” of the print media in the work of mission society leaders, recruitment 
of “distinguished” men to speak for the interests of mission, the greater development 
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of effective publicity in the form of lectures and print materials, and “strengthening 
and deepening” of faith life.41 In short, Fries proposed a typical program of greater 
awareness and education directed in the same manner toward the same groups whom 
German missionary leaders had sought out since the 1870s. 
 Fries was not the only missionary leader thinking about how to reignite the 
mission fire in 1909. The linguist Carl Meinhof presented on a similar topic to the 
Saxon Mission Conference that same year. He renewed the rejection by Warneck and 
others of official church sanction because “[h]eathen mission in Germany had always 
been a work of the freest love” drawn from people of every class. Even so, support 
for mission remained weakest in the prosperous and educated cities. Meinhof listed 
the causes for this, each, according to him, vested in a misconception. The educated 
and prosperous merchants and industrialists of the cities held misperceptions that 
non-Christians were converted by force, that conflict between the different churches 
damaged the esteem of Whites, that elevation of “natives” gave Europeans 
difficulties, that indigenous religions suited indigenous peoples better than 
Christianity, and that money and effort spent on foreign mission neglected necessary 
causes in Germany.42 To each of these objections Meinhof offered a rebuttal and went 
on to suggest that once mission societies successfully delegitimized these ideas 
merchants and industrialists would support mission as an “obligation of honor.” This 
would be achieved by missionary leaders demonstrating the “mercantile, industrial, 
[and] juristic works” achieved by every mission enterprise.43 
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 Meinhof’s innovation was not in identifying the problem. But his call for 
Germany’s mission leaders to demonstrate the utility of missionaries to practical 
interests shows the beginnings of a slippage away from the religious ideal of mission 
fundraising and popularization. He proposed the use of “magic lantern” shows in 
public gatherings to appeal to this target audience. It is noteworthy that these were the 
same methods used to great success by the Colonial Society and the Navy League to 
promote their nationalist agendas.44 Meinhof’s target audience resembled in every 
way the “educated circles” of earlier years; but Meinhof did acknowledge that the 
middle class had changed somewhat in character as a result of the industrial and 
commercial changes wrought in Germany during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. He adopted the idea of a collective promotional organization for the 
German Protestant mission, telling his audience that “[w]hat one society cannot 
achieve with all its friends, could be achieved by all the societies” if they 
implemented an improved program of propaganda.45 Most importantly, Meinhof 
opened the door for missionaries to make an argument for support that emphasized 
mission’s “practical” over its “religious” utility. 
 
The Nationalist Argument 
 
With his proposal that German mission sought to present a more popular 
public face to Germany’s middle classes Meinhof joined a growing chorus of voices 
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in the mission movement interested in demonstrating the national utility of German 
Protestant mission. This change, as has been shown in other areas, took place around 
1908 and 1909. As was true in the ideological debates of Missionswissenschaftler and 
educational policy debates amongst German mission leaders, the total shift to a 
nationalist tack was not complete until after the start of the First World War in 
August 1914. However, around 1908-1909 the financial difficulties of the missions 
provided those in favor of a more nationalist missionary program another opportunity 
to bring the nation into conversations about the missions’ promotional messages. 
Voices within the Protestant mission movement had trouble overcoming more 
traditional “anti-“nationalists and much of the impetus for nationalization of 
missionary fundraising would come from outside the movement. 
An indicator of this new situation came in 1909 in a memorandum from the 
Oberkirchenrat of Prussia as well as a report by a commission appointed by the 
General Synod of Prussia, both regarding foreign mission. In both documents 
officials of the organized church showed a new interest in the activities of the mission 
societies. In contrast to their ambivalence during the 1860s and -70s, the 
Oberkirchenrat chastised German Protestants for not doing enough to support the 
mission societies.46 Officials of the Oberkirchenrat and the General Synod had 
apparently both been swayed to the growing view amongst some Christians 
(including many missionaries) that the twentieth century would be a century marked 
by great conflicts among the so-called “world religions.” The memorandum produced 
by the Prussian church council noted the growth of national movements in East Asia 
as an indicator of the expanded need for Christian evangelization to protect against 
                                                 




the birth of “Christ-less culture[s] direct[ed] toward apostasy, atheism, and 
materialism.”47 The commission of the General Synod shared these sentiments, “The 
searching and wrestling by awakened peoples for truth and freedom must be guided 
on the right course; only the Gospels can lead to truth and freedom, to the noblest 
culture.”48 Drawn into a worldview that perceived the world’s cultures on the brink of 
some great religious clash, the official church authorities grasped at the mission 
societies as a tool to help win the struggle. 
The Oberkirchenrat ignored its role in creating the historically disappointing 
support for mission. Instead it criticized the cultural place of mission in German 
society and, to do so, adopted a common motif of complaints around this period. The 
memorandum gloried in the strength of the mission movement in the United Kingdom 
and the United States and lamented Germany’s mission movement’s weakness. 
Unlike the situation in Germany, mission in the Anglophone countries was able to 
effectively bring together the religious, humanitarian, national, and economic 
impulses; mission was an essential element of British and American culture. 
According to the Oberkirchenrat mission was “volkstümlich” – an intimate part of 
British and American life. All hope was not lost, according to the authors of the 
memorandum. The colonial interest had begun to grow in Germany in recent years 
and hopefully Germans would soon begin to see mission work as a national project 
like the British did. The Oberkirchenrat’s memorandum must have met with the 
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approval of the leaders of the mission societies because it was further distributed by 
the societies to their support networks. The Berlin society asked its supporters to 
distribute it to “small and middling” newspapers to ensure it reached as wide a public 
as possible.49 Mission societies here demonstrated a response that would be repeated 
in 1913 during the Nationalspende; they themselves might not be willing to adopt a 
nationalist argument (excepting the Bethel Mission, of course), but mission societies 
had become more than willing to have other institutions and groups make the 
argument for them. 
It was not only the organized church that sought to inspire Germans to greater 
missionary efforts out of rivalry with the Anglophone nations. Gustav Warneck noted 
the dominance of the British and Americans within the international mission 
movement as early as 1896.50 He wrote, “Our Lord God ordered it so that the 
different nations possessed different gifts,” which required that Germany participate 
in the world evangelical project with its fullest resources.51 And early in his career 
Julius Richter made a study trip in England and Scotland to investigate British 
fundraising and promotional methods. In 1898, he produced for the Allgemeine 
Missions-Zeitschrift a report of his conclusions, which were, in short, that in all things 
Germany had much to learn from its co-religionists across the North Sea. The British 
missions’ activities rested in part on their success in the major cities, where they 
organized substantial “mission weeks,” during which mission gatherings were put on 
in such profusion that the “entire population [was] absorbed” with the topic of 
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mission.52 The great financial resources of the British mission movement both made 
possible and were provided for by the substantial publishing arm that English and 
Scot mission societies had at their disposal. And this literature effectively reached the 
British middle classes, the very soul of British religious associational life. This, 
according to Richter, was one of the greatest deficits of the German literature; it 
failed to appeal to the educated classes.53 Unfortunately, German missions could not 
afford to do what the British did, spend considerable effort and sums on publishing 
efforts, which, according to Richter, “[brought] a return of millions.”54 The British 
excelled at inspiring Missionsgeist amongst those groups the German missionaries 
had coveted for a generation. Richter’s report did not offer any substantive solution to 
the Germans’ deficits but the tone of awe and envy at British success betrayed a 
growing sense of inferiority amongst German leaders and supporters of mission. In 
1898 the rivalry was not particularly heated, but the general message that the British 
and Americans were superior Christians by virtue of the support mission received on 
their “home front” would grow and help feed bitterness amongst German missionary 
intellectuals. 
The commission’s report from the General Synod seized upon the clash of 
religions. It asked its audience, “Should German East Africa become Christian or 
Mohammedan?” The commission’s members argued that all of Protestant Christianity 
had been called to the flag, and Germany must take its place in the line of battle.55 
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Furthermore, Germany’s place in the international order and responsibilities as a 
colonial power required that the nation support its missionaries. Both the General 
Synod’s and the Oberkirchenrat’s reports show how the official church had gone 
from seeing support for mission as a matter of private faith to one of national purpose. 
This linkage was echoed in a report produced for the Berlin Komitee in late 1913. 
Siegfried Knak, one of the Berlin Mission’s inspectors, noted that in eastern Germany 
the mission was “tightly bound” with the organized church. Knak noted the fraught 
nature of this connection as it might lead many of the mission’s supporters to fear for 
the mission’s independence. But Knak was not as concerned. He observed that the 
mission stood between the organized church and the Pietist associational movements 
that viewed the state church with suspicion. This position provided the “chance and 
therefore the responsibility…to cross-fertilize the vibrant vigor” of both religious 
groups and use them to advance the goals of the Berlin Mission.56 
The new strategy of calling on Germans’ national pride may have originated, 
in part, in the minds of officials of the state churches, but it had antecedents internal 
to the mission movement as well. It should be no surprise that Karl Axenfeld offered 
an opinion in this vein as early as 1910. He had been added to the Ausschuß and taken 
on the planning for German Protestant mission societies’ participation in the 1910 
Colonial Congress in Berlin. In that capacity he contacted the other mission societies. 
In his letter he urged the other missions to encourage their supporters to attend the 
Congress in support of German mission and German colonialism. He referred to the 
recently concluded Edinburgh Mission Conference with tones similar to Richter’s 
1898 report on England and Scotland. The Edinburgh Conference, according to 
                                                 




Axenfeld, had revealed that Germany lagged behind its “Anglo-Saxon cousins, 
especially in the winning of broader circles of the population to an understanding of 
the extent of our work” and, beyond that, the gathering of financial support.57 The 
Berlin Congress presented the Ausschuß and its constituents with an opportunity to 
address this deficit. “It is rightly said that the Colonial Congress can earn for our 
German mission work a great repute.”58 Axenfeld represented a new generation of 
missionary leaders focused on the German character of the mission movement and 
interested in attaching it to the German nation. Along with this ideological goal 
Axenfeld also hoped the mission societies might address their financial needs. 
Axenfeld’s view, though increasingly common, did not dominate in all circles. 
The future head of the Ausschuß, Theodor Öhler, clung to the message of Christian 
universalism during this period. His position as a member of the German mission 
movement based outside the Kaiserreich may have encouraged this stance but he was 
also made the head of the Ausschuß by his German peers. Though Öhler’s mission 
was headquartered in Basel, Switzerland, it was considered by the German mission 
societies to be one of their own. He argued that the strength of mission in the Heimat 
was its universalism and its ability to unite Christians religiously, not nationally.59 
Carl Paul of the Leipzig Mission noted that, in the past, mission societies founded 
from a “mixture of religious and national blood” were completely gone by 1900.60 
Both men continued to distrust the linkage of mission work with nationalist publicity 
even for financial purposes. 
                                                 
57 Karl Axenfeld to the German Protestant mission societies (July 29, 1910), BMW/bmw1/8340 
58 Axenfeld to the German Protestant mission societies (July 29, 1910), BMW/bmw1/8340. Emphasis 
in the original. 
59 Öhler, “Was kann die heimatliche Kirche,” 220-221. 




But others began implementing new strategies to address mission societies’ 
growing fiscal difficulties. In late 1913 the Komitee of the Berlin Mission shared a 
plan of action for “reviving the mission mind” in Germany. The report identified a 
number of strategies that could be pursued to maximize the effectiveness of mission 
activities in Germany in support of overseas evangelical work. Included was a 
commitment to “winning the colonially interested circles.” This would be done by 
“clarifying” the importance of mission to colonial success and through presentations 
directly to these groups, including the officer corps. These presentations must have 
been organized around national themes, especially when one takes into account the 
strong nationalism espoused by the various associations and groups interested in 
colonial issues. These groups were more important to the plan of the Komitee than 
religious groups.61 The Komitee’s new plan marked a shift in the thinking towards the 
national argument by missionary leaders when it came to solving the mission 
societies’ financial challenges. 
 Axenfeld’s interests echoed a mood amongst German Protestant missionaries 
gaining influence in the last years before World War I. He and like-minded leaders 
wanted to promote the place of the mission movement in Germany and to establish a 
specifically German mission movement as an important player within the 
international movement. Advocates of “Germanizing” the mission movement in this 
manner began aggressively campaigning for the next international mission conference 
to be held in a German city. The conference, scheduled for 1920 and conceived by the 
delegates at the 1910 Edinburgh Conference, had passed into the hands of a 
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Continuation Committee which included Julius Richter and Friedrich Würz. The 
Ausschuß called on both to continue their advocacy in favor of a German host city for 
the conference to solidify Germany’s place in the international mission movement 
and to legitimize missionaries in German national culture.62 
 Nine months later the Ausschuß produced an “expert opinion” that the 1920 
World Mission Conference should take place in Germany. Their argument 
emphasized that the European continent was the important third leg of the world 
Protestant missionary movement (Great Britain and North America were the other 
two), and since Great Britain had hosted the 1910 conference and New York had 
hosted the 1900 conference, therefore the continent should be next, and Germany 
made the best candidate. Second, the Ausschuß argued that “Germany need[ed] the 
World Mission Conference.” Germany had achieved unification and become a great 
people of global importance (Weltvolk) “overnight.” This had complicated the crisis 
of faith in Germany encouraged by secularization and rationalism. According to the 
Germans, this crisis threatened to overwhelm all the other nations, but it could be 
avoided with a global mission conference, which could give German Protestants the 
strongest presentation of the achievements and practical successes of the “Age of 
Global Mission.” A strong presentation of Protestant missionary strength could 
provide a key counterattack in the struggle against secularizing forces.63 By holding 
the 1920 Conference in Germany the force of international cooperation would resolve 
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the “political and ecclesiastical” social crisis in Germany. At the core of this 
justification was a desire to assert Germany’s international influence in the mission 
sphere as a companion to its obvious international economic and political influence. 
Nationalist missionaries’ arguments matched the theories of German Weltpolitik 
being promoted by the Kaiser’s circle and in the ultra-nationalist movements during 
the period. Like those groups’ arguments, the missionaries’ position asserted German 
Protestant missionaries’ right to a place in the international missionary order 




In late 1912 and early 1913 some missionary intellectuals began to develop 
new ideas for developing Germany’s “mission spirit” oriented around patriotic 
justifications. Karl Axenfeld and Julius Richter led this move and articulated a new 
ideology of national mission in the literature of Missionswissenschaft. At the same 
time, a remarkable national event with repercussions for the German mission 
movement took shape. It started outside of the mission movement before drawing the 
mission societies into its operations. This event, the Nationalspende, was initiated on 
the national level by Kurt von Wedel of the Prussian Herrenhaus, the upper house of 
Prussia’s bicameral legislature, to honor Kaiser Wilhelm II’s twenty-fifth royal 
jubilee. The Nationalspende marked a true sea change in the relationship between the 
German Protestant mission movement and the rhetoric and institutions of the nation 




national service and duty in conjunction with German missions, its organization and 
operations were coordinated in cooperation with the Prussian state and German 
imperial governments, the campaign in support of the offering brought in politicians 
and associations from the secular colonial and nationalist movements, and it 
ultimately confirmed to missionary leaders the effectiveness of adopting nationalist 
tropes in support of their religious mission. 
 The specific germ for the Nationalspende came from the mind of the 
Magedeburg-based publisher Robert Friedrich Faber. Faber favored the national 
liberal political view, joining the Deutsche Volkspartei (German People’s Party) of 
Gustav Stresemann in the Weimar years. His influence as the chairperson of the 
Vereins Deutscher Zeitungs-Verleger (Association of German Newspaper Publishers) 
gave his support for the Nationalspende particular force. He communicated his initial 
idea for a celebration of the Kaiser’s jubilee in a letter to the Oberpräsident 
(Provincial Governor) of the Prussian province of Saxony, Eduard Wilhelm von 
Hegel who, fortuitously, had experience in the Prussian Ministry of Spiritual, 
Educational, and Medical Affairs (Kultusministerium). Hegel’s own political loyalties 
were with the German Conservative Party, for whom he served in the Reichstag from 
1887 to 1890 for Jerichow near Magdeburg. 
 Faber proposed that the province make some gesture to honor the Kaiser’s 
jubilee in 1913 and that the celebration be in support of German mission. He had been 
struck by the idea after reading an essay in Paul Rohrbach’s book on Germany’s 
“cultural work” in China.64 The Magdeburg publisher noted Rohrbach’s argument 
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that “our world-economic and world-political expansion” included achievements in 
foreign mission, “but nonetheless [German foreign mission] remained not nearly as 
robust…as those of the great Anglo-Saxon nations.” German missions lacked the 
commitment from the highest to the lowest members of society that British and 
American mission societies enjoyed. Faber suggested that if German missions did a 
better job of supplementing their message of Christian spirituality with messages of 
economic expansion they would have greater success.65 
 The form of the event to honor the Kaiser was amorphous in Faber’s letter; he 
suggested initially a grand assembly of supporters of mission and hoped that such an 
event would be organized in every province of Prussia and the German Empire. The 
connection, for Faber, of missions and the Kaiser he explained to Hegel. He argued 
that Wilhelm II was “the first to recognize the necessity for [Germany’s] global 
economic and political activities,” a restatement of Weltpolitik. Faber continued that 
to him it seemed that it was also an “urgent and compelling national necessity” that 
an interest in Germany’s colonies be stimulated in the Empire. This program would 
assuredly excite the support of every citizen; if every German province took part then 
there would be no question of Catholic-Protestant animosity. He even noted that “Our 
Jewish countrymen would perhaps be prepared to contribute for medical mission.”66 
Faber’s proposal clearly had its roots in the secular colonialist movement as revealed 
by Faber’s direct reference to the work of Paul Rohrbach. Furthermore, it sought to 
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unify Germany’s disparate confessions to support mission through the unifying 
language and ideology of nationalism – a devout wish of many German nationalists. 
 The early path from Faber’s letter to the nation-wide Nationalspende is 
somewhat difficult to reconstruct from the records. In late December 1912 the 
younger Friedrich von Bodelschwingh, son of the founder of the Bethel movement 
and his father’s successor, answered Julius Richter on the topic. Bodelschwingh’s 
answer revealed that many missionaries were ambivalent about participating in the 
proposed Nationalspende. Bodelschwingh acknowledged that the proposed 
fundraising campaign violated the traditions of the mission movement. In fact, he 
regarded the plan with concern for the spiritual and political autonomy of missionary 
endeavors. But even without official mission society support the Nationalspende 
moved forward. Supporters had already begun forming provincial committees to 
manage activities locally.67 From this evidence it took about two months for Faber’s 
idea to move from proposal to a nation-wide organized fundraising operation. The 
spark of Faber’s celebratory idea had clearly ignited waiting tinder amongst groups 
outside the Protestant mission movement. 
 The first meetings of the Central Committee for the Nationalspende took 
place in early December of 1912. These meetings were organized by presidents of the 
Herrenhaus, von Wedel, and of the Prussian Landtag, the Lower House, Hans von 
Schwerin-Löwitz. Both men were members of the Prussian aristocracy and firmly 
entrenched members of conservative circles. A second meeting was scheduled for 
January 9, and that meeting’s attendees included powerful and influential individuals 
who stood in close proximity to the imperial royal family, as well as important 
                                                 




leaders of the Prussian religious establishment. Faber attended and was joined by the 
most important colonial publisher in Germany and economic colonialist member of 
the Kolonialrat, Ernst Vohsen.68 Among those on the committee from the royal court 
were von Wedel, who, in addition to his position in the Herrenhaus, held the 
ceremonial title of Rittermeister; Albert von Schwerin, who had a long career of 
aristocratic philanthropy including the Johanniterorden and as a member of the 
Empress Auguste Victoria’s Evangelischer Kirchenbauverein which raised funds to 
build churches to combat socialism in Germany’s cities;69 and the Court Chaplain, 
Ernst Dryander. Other key state officials on the committee included, along with 
Hegel, the President of the Oberkirchenrat, Bodo Voigts, and the President of the 
Consistory of the Protestant Church of Kassel, Kurt Schenk, the retired 
Kultusminister, Heinrich von Studt, and Undersecretary of the Colonial Office, Peter 
Conze, sent in Colonial Minister Wilhelm Solf’s place.70 Representatives of both the 
Catholic and Protestant missionary movements were also in attendance, from the 
Protestants: the Missionswissenschaftler Carl Meinhof and Julius Richter; the 
President of the liberal Universal Evangelical Protestant Mission Association, August 
Kind; and Max Berner, from both the Colonial Office and the Berlin Mission; and 
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from the Catholics: Felix Porsch, chairman of the Catholic Center Party;71 Alois zu 
Löwenstein, the Center Party’s colonial expert; and Amandus Acker, head of the 
German branch of the missionary Holy Ghost Fathers. Apologetic non-attendees 
included Paul Rohrbach, Franz Hespers, and other esteemed secular and religious 
colonialists.72 
 From the beginning the Central Committee for the Nationalspende committed 
to making the organization “national…of all confessions and every middle-class 
[party].” Johann Albrecht zu Mecklenburg, Prince of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and 
titular head of the German Colonial Society, took the Nationalspende under his 
aristocratic protection, an act which further linked the movement with secular 
colonial interests. Catholic participation was assured by the Center delegates with the 
guarantee that moneys raised by Catholic Germans would be designated only for 
Catholic missions. The assembled agreed that funds raised should be restricted to the 
German territories and those “Christian missions working in a German spirit in the 
German protectorates.” This convoluted phrasing came about to assure that societies 
like the Basel Mission, whose base was in Switzerland, and the White Fathers, 
officially based in French Algeria but with a sizeable German branch operating in the 
German colonies, could be included as beneficiaries of the campaign. The 
missionaries in attendance did not give in completely to the national tone, arguing 
successfully that since missions were first and foremost a religious endeavor they 
would not participate in a campaign that completely deemphasized those qualities. 
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They did, nonetheless,  concede that the “civilizing” work of the missions was of 
“priceless value” and should be emphasized in promotional materials for the 
Nationalspende.73 
 As its final action the committee formed a “working group” to take over most 
of the work of organizing the Nationalspende. Wedel was made chairman with 
Löwenstein as his deputy. The other members were the two originators, Hegel and 
Faber; Porsch, Berner, Kind, and Richter. The option was left open to add a 
representative from financial circles. The working group was given its instructions 
and the meeting closed.74 Shortly thereafter the Kaiser “benevolently sanctioned” the 
plan presented by the Central Committee.75 The outcome of this first meeting was an 
integration of national priorities with the missionary project only barely resisted by 
the missionary representatives. This acquiescence was not universal, as we will see, 
but the Nationalspende carried such symbolic and financial weight that it 
overwhelmed missionary attempts at independence. 
 The Nationalspende’s Central Committee’s emphasis on national legitimacy 
came through in Schwerin-Löwitz’s letter to Solf following the meeting. Per Conze’s 
comments during the January 9 meeting, Schwerin-Löwitz inquired if Solf wished to 
accept a position on the Central Committee.76 The president of the Prussian Landtag 
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informed Solf that the Central Committee had agreed to support all German missions 
working in German colonies, and an agreement from both confessions had formed the 
Nationalspende and the Central Committee as a communal project integrating 
members of both confessions. The presence of the Colonial Secretary on the Central 
Committee would further “legitimize” the endeavor before the nation.77 While there 
is no extant record of Solf agreeing to participate on the Central Committee in 
January of 1913, in a later letter from Solf to Wedel, the Colonial Secretary asked to 
be included as a sponsor of the Nationalspende.78 
 Among the instructions issued to the working group of the Central Committee 
was the directive to draft an appeal to the German people, an Aufruf, to launch the 
new fundraising campaign.79 It was decided at an early point to use two separate 
appeals, one for each confession, because the Catholic bishops insisted that they 
could not place their seal upon any call for donations that supported the Protestant 
church, a principle that must have sounded familiar to anyone aware of the details of 
the Benediktinerstreit which was at its hottest in early 1913.80 As a consequence, two 
committees, one for each confession, were formed for the production and distribution 
of the initial Aufruf.81 These two committees would also produce a newsletter of the 
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Nationalspende’s activities for distribution within the organization and to interested 
third parties.82 
 In the end the published call for donations was not substantively different 
between the Catholic and Protestant versions. In both versions of the Aufruf support 
for the Nationalspende was cast as a national duty. Unsurprisingly, a call for 
donations in the name of the Kaiser opened with a declaration that the German people 
needed a way to express their “gratitude” to the emperor. The Central Committee 
made public its argument that the twenty-five years of Wilhelm II’s reign had marked 
Germany’s ascension to global prominence. Germany’s colonies, “developed and 
brought to flower,” served as evidence that “German character and German culture” 
were the basis of this success. And it told readers, “Among the most effective 
pioneers of German civilization [Gesittung] in the protectorates belong the Christian 
missions.”83 
 According to the Aufruf, all of Germany bore the responsibility to serve the 
“national and humanitarian” project of the Christian missions in Germany’s colonies. 
84 To redouble this appeal to Germans’ national pride the writers of the Aufruf 
informed their readers that the other colonial states had recognized their 
responsibilities long ago and provided their missions with rich support. It was the 
design of the Nationalspende to address this “gap in the fulfillment of [Germany’s] 
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national duty.” The Nationalspende was itself an expression of national duty, the 
Aufruf made that obvious. It noted that Germans of both confessions had set aside 
their differences for the dual goal of honoring the Kaiser and raising awareness and 
financial support for the German missions. The missions were now transformed, 
against their wishes in many cases, into servants of German global power and 
German national culture. The call for contributions made this transformation of the 
mission societies all the clearer with the presence, displayed in the banner at the top 
of the Aufruf, of the name of the protector of the Nationalspende, Johann Albrecht zu 
Mecklenburg, President of the German Colonial Society, and proven opponent of 
missionary internationalism.85 
 The decision reached at the earlier meetings of the Central Committee, to 
emphasize missionaries’ “cultural work,” came through in the Aufruf produced for 
Protestant consumption. It told readers that Protestant missionaries, along with their 
religious work, had built up schools and medical services at their mission stations. 
Missionaries’ work would “train” the “natives” into “sensible, suitable 
workers…dependable people” with a “Christian philosophy of life.”86 At the behest 
of the Colonial Society, secular nationalists, and government officials, the German 
Protestant missionaries were transformed in the Aufruf into adjunct members of the 
colonial economic and political machine. And this, as Faber had imagined it in 
October 1912, became the chief justification for support of German missionaries, not 
spiritual or religious duty. As the Aufruf concluded its plea, “The Jubilee of the Kaiser 
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offers us [the German people] the opportunity…to help our missions and at the same 
time advance a national interest.”87 
 A second promotional broadside more explicitly emphasized the failings of 
the German people in contrast to Britain and America. This flyer, “A National 
Offering for the Kaiser’s Jubilee – for Missions?” (Eine Nationalspende zum Kaiser-
Jubiläum – für die Missionen?), saw the financial support of the British and 
Americans for their missionaries as part of a “peaceful competition to conquer the 
world and draw the heathen peoples” into the American and British spheres. Their 
missions were the “pioneers of their trade and their national power. Why would we 
not wish to do the same [with ours]?” This plea continued the secular colonialists’ 
argument that German missionaries bring German culture to the colonies, that they 
act as the “first flag-bearers, trailblazers, and cultural pioneers,” and that they pave 
the way for complete cultural and economic development of the colonies. The 
Nationalspende was to bring together all Germans in “homage” to the Kaiser and the 
Fatherland. In a peaceful contest with the Anglo-Saxons, the broadsheet closed, 
America’s yearly contribution to mission was seventy million Marks; England gave 
52 million Marks, and Germany contributed “only” 3 million Marks. This must be 
corrected, “Germany always to the front!”88 
 These calls were followed by the national organization and regional 
organizations with an extensive program of lectures, revival-style meetings, and 
publicity programs to promote support for Germany’s “national” missions. By March 
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of 1913 most German states and nearly every Prussian province had a local 
committee for organizing events and gathering donations.89 In the four months of its 
activities, over four thousand newspaper articles were published about the 
Nationalspende.90 Prominent Missionswissenschaftler and nationalist mission 
leaders91 did give lectures but they were far outnumbered by representatives of the 
secular colonial movement and their nationalist allies in the publicity campaign. 
Secular colonialists and nationalists proved more than willing to speak up in favor of 
Christian mission if it was directed toward German political and economic goals. 
Though the texts of these speeches are unavailable, it is hard to imagine that a former 
critic of missionaries’ activities like Paul Rohrbach would give much emphasis to the 
religious achievements and goals of the Christian mission societies. Far fewer 
members of the mission movement volunteered to speak in favor of the 
Nationalspende. 
Official church support was strong. The Prussian Oberkirchenrat continued its 
recent advocacy for overseas mission by throwing its support behind the 
Nationalspende. On Sunday, April 27, every Protestant church under the Prussian 
state church’s authority held a special collection for the Nationalspende. The 
Oberkirchenrat instructed pastors to explain the offering as a “reminder of the 
Christian obligation” to mission and the “special responsibility of the German Volk” 
to the natives of Germany’s colonies. The Oberkirchenrat also recommended that a 
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special collection be taken up in every church on the day of the Kaiser’s Jubilee, June 
15, and care be taken that it not interfere with the traditional Pentecostal collection for 
mission in the Protestant churches.92 The campaign for the promotion of the 
Nationalspende, though done for the Protestant and Catholic missions, operated 
thoroughly outside the traditional advocacy groups for Christian mission. The 
Ausschuß put together no organized campaign and, aside from publishing the Aufruf 
in their pages, missionary publications wrote very few articles in support of the 
Nationalspende. The nationalist tone of the campaign echoed a vocal minority’s plans 
for the German Protestant mission societies, but most missionary leaders held their 
noses and left the nationalization of their project to outside forces. 
 This hands-off approach undoubtedly grew out of the financial straits into 
which the Protestant missions had sailed. The prospective government-supported 
bailout of their evangelical mission must have made many in the mission 
establishment willing to accept a change in emphasis and rhetoric. This change was, 
as has been argued, also supported by a new generation of missionary leaders and 
accepted as a solution to a decades-long financial crisis that had plagued the 
Protestant mission societies and had proven thoroughly unresponsive to traditional 
cures by missionaries to elevate Germany’s “mission spirit.” As a result, support for 
the Nationalspende from the mission societies themselves was sporadic. 
According to Knak, the future director of the Berlin Mission, the 
Nationalspende had received a mixed response, “here great excitement, there surprise 
and restraint,” and from other quarters concern and warnings from supporters of the 
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mission society. Skeptics questioned if the nationalistic methods utilized in the 
Nationalspende were appropriately pious, if it were appropriate to address the “inner 
deficit[s]” of German faith with patriotic fervor for the prosaic goal of replenishing 
mission coffers.93 Knak answered that, for one, the impetus for the Nationalspende 
had not arisen from the Berlin Mission Society. Therefore, he seemed to suggest, the 
Berlin Mission Society was innocent of any patriotic excess. According to the 
missionary leader, the new fundraising effort would bring contributions and support 
from groups previously unaware of missionaries’ activities and, it was implied, such 
support was vitally necessary for the Berlin Mission, which was deeply in debt. 
Knak ignored the ways in which the Nationalspende entwined German 
missionaries with secular colonial organizations and instead emphasized that now 
more Germans understood the essentiality of mission to the vigor of the Gospels as a 
contemporary message, the import of missionary activities for the healthy 
development of the colonies, and the centrality of Christian mission to the fight 
against Islam.94 Knak represented one important faction of the German missionary 
community, eager to see the utility of mission justified to a wider audience. For him 
and others the prospect of finally addressing Germany’s shortage of Missionsgeist 
had the potential to put to rest a decades-long challenge for German Protestant 
mission.95 
                                                 
93 Siegfried Knak, “Die Nationalspende für Mission in den deutschen Kolonien,” Berliner 
Missionsberichte 81(1913): 125-126. 
94 Knak, “Die Nationalspende,” 126-127. 
95 By contrast to the Protestant response, the Catholic mission press eagerly welcomed the 
Nationalspende. See, for example, Bertram Kastert, “Die Missionsarbeit im Lichte des christlichen un 
nationalen Gedankens. Rede, gehalten auf der Generalversammlung des Vereins für das Missionshaus 
Knechtsteden von Pfarrer Bertram Kastert, Köln-Kalk,“ Echo aus den Missionen der Väter vom 
Heiligen Geist und unbefleckten Herzen Mariä 15(3, Mar. 1914): 65; and “Die Kaiserspende für die 




A New Source of Funds 
 
The initial sum collected by the Nationalspende was nearly 4 million Marks. 
The Catholic missions received 1.3 million Marks, while the Protestants received just 
over 2.5 million Marks.96 The impressive success of the Nationalspende led the 
newsletter of the campaign to gloat that the Nationalspende had given the question of 
Germany’s commitment to the evangelical project its “final rest.” Those who worked 
so hard over the months of fundraising had provided not only a service for the 
German missions, not only honored the Kaiser; they had also done an “extraordinary 
service” for Germany’s reputation in the world. Germans should not revert to their 
old complacency; the Central Committee called on their countrymen instead to 
continue the “joyfulness of giving” into the future. According to the newsletter, 
Germany had achieved a great national success, and the German people had learned 
that mission’s success was a matter of “great national importance.” 97 
The moneys gathered by the Nationalspende would need to be distributed 
between the Catholic and Protestant mission societies. It would then need to be 
divided amongst the various mission societies by the Catholic and Protestant 
subcommittees of the Central Committee. Just over a week after the Kaiser released 
the funds to the two subcommittees,98 Löwenstein reported to the Kultusminister that 
the Catholic committee had decided to proportionately distribute its funds among the 
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three Catholic mission orders99 in Germany’s colonies based on the number of 
mission stations, European personnel, and mission schools operated by a mission 
order in a colony, with an “adjustment” added to compensate the newest mission 
territories, which presumably had greater need.100 
The payments by the Protestant portion of the Nationalspende generally 
followed a similar pattern as the Catholic portion. The initial decision communicated 
to the Kultusminister by Wedel divided the sum, now grown to 3.2 million Marks in 
July 1913, into three portions. The first portion, 2.2 million Marks, was to be divided 
in a manner much like the Catholic plan. Mission societies were to receive a share 
proportionate to the number of European employees they had in the colonies, the 
number of mission schools, and the number of students in the schools. Of the 
Protestant societies active in German East Africa, the Berlin Mission received the 
largest sum, more than twice as much as the Moravian, Leipzig, and Bethel Mission, 
all of whom received about the same sum.101 The second portion, 800,000 Marks, but 
designated to increase to 1 million Marks if necessary, was dispersed to support 
operations which either “generally promote German Protestant mission in the 
colonies, or serve multiple missions communally.” This included, among other 
institutions, the Ausschuß, which received a relatively small sum as compensation for 
its “great service” in the past and for the future. Two key figures of the new 
generation of nationally-minded mission leaders also received windfalls from this 
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portion of the Protestant division. The missionary nationalists Julius Richter and 
August Wilhelm Schreiber both were able to have institutions near to their hearts 
remunerated. Richter had his youth mission studies organization 
(Missionsstudienkommissionen) funded, while Schreiber secured support for a 
training school for women missionaries in Hamburg (Schwesternheim Hamburg).  
Finally, the second portion provided partial debt relief to those mission societies who 
had ongoing deficits. This meant that the Berlin and Bethel Missions received an 
additional sum of money to help restore their bottom lines. Finally, the Protestant 
payment’s third portion was designated to serve two purposes. First, it would provide 
a reserve fund against unanticipated residual costs of the Nationalspende. Second, it 
would endow a new undertaking that would “in the spirit of the Nationalspende,” 
continue to promote the national interest of Germany in the evangelical project.102 
This new undertaking, which would eventually be named the Deutsche 
Evangelische Missions-Hilfe, gained the positive attention of the Kaiser, who placed 
it under royal protection and sponsorship in November 1913.103 The official 
constitutive meeting for the Missions-Hilfe was held on December 6 in the Prussian 
Herrenhaus.104 Its official purpose was “to awake, to nurture, and to advance” the 
cause of German Protestant mission in the German colonial empire.105 The Missions-
Hilfe consequently served a narrower purpose than any mission organization or 
mission society formed up to that point. It took a determined nationalist course and, 
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through its connection to the Kaiser and to the secular powers that had organized the 
Nationalspende, must have carried considerable influence in German religious and 
political circles.106 
For the directorship of the Missions-Hilfe the Protestant committee of the 
Nationalspende selected August Wilhelm Schreiber, former director of the North 
German Mission. His predecessor, Franz Michael Zahn, had been a vocal critic of the 
mixing of German colonialism with Protestant mission, but Schreiber lacked those 
convictions. Schreiber’s position at the Missions-Hilfe included editing the 
organization’s periodical, the Allgemeine Missions-Nachrichten (Global Mission 
News) and a series of pamphlets and short books of Missionswissenschaft called the 
Flugschriften der Deutschen Evangelischen Missions-Hilfe (Pamphlets of the German 
Protestant Mission Aid). In addition, Schreiber continued his own work as a scholar 
of mission studies. His support for the creation of a universal German reader in 1908 
for the missionaries in Germany’s colonies betrayed his preference for a nationalized 
mission culture in Germany.107 
Schreiber’s own description of the Missions-Hilfe carefully defined its role in 
German mission and political culture. He took the same line as the committee of the 
Nationalspende that the aim of his organization was “to awaken, to nourish and to 
advance the general interest of German Protestant mission.” The emphasis on German 
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mission, as exhibited by the Missions-Hilfe’s name but also by Schreiber’s words 
clarified a rising culture supporting a “German Protestant undertaking of German 
Protestants” operating from a “national standpoint” and devoted to bringing the entire 
German nation into the Protestant mission project. The new relationship envisioned 
by Schreiber and other “missionary nationalists” argued that missionaries were the 
best equipped to “shine, burnish, and polish” the “natives, the gems of our colonies” 
for German use. No contradiction existed between service to God and service to the 
Fatherland. Schreiber argued that “the kingdom of God [would] outlive this 
world…But whether or not our German Volk shall remain a Christian people or not” 
that is the fight which German Christians must fight.108 One part of the 
transformation of German missionary ideology during this period was a 
transformation of mission from a universal good, supported for the salvation of the 
individual and the entirety of Christianity, into a communal good focused on 
improving the German nation. 
From the start, the broad mandate given the Missions-Hilfe led to conflict with 
the other national missionary lobbying group, the Ausschuß. Furthermore, its 
foundational nationalism must have remained a concern to those in the mission 
establishment still clinging to the old division of mission and “politics.” A number of 
this old guard remained on the Ausschuß, including Theodor Öhler and Carl Paul. 
Inevitably the Ausschuß offered its opinion of the new organization in a circular sent 
to all its constituent members, which at this point included every Protestant mission 
based in Germany. In January it alerted its members to the formation of the Missions-
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Hilfe while noting that it had had no role in the decisions made about dividing the 
collection of the Nationalspende. The Ausschuß is unlikely to have wanted to be in 
the position of choosing winners and losers from among its members, and when this 
aversion is joined to the skepticism of the Nationalspende felt by many of the leaders 
of Germany’s missions (men who sat on the Ausschuß as well), it is not too surprising 
that the Ausschuß took no role. This suspicion took in the new Missions-Hilfe too. 
The members of the Ausschuß worried that the nationalist tone of the Missions-Hilfe 
might be mistaken as representative of all German mission societies.109 Though the 
leadership of Germany’s missions appeared to remain uncomfortable with the linkage 
of nation and mission, their difficult position did not allow nor did they choose to 
fully reject either the Nationalspende or the Missions-Hilfe. 
The conflicts between the Ausschuß and the Missions-Hilfe would continue 
into the First World War. One chair of the Ausschuß, Paul Otto Hennig, referenced 
these difficulties in a November 1915 letter. According to him, though the two 
organizations were statutorily separate, “their work areas touch[ed] on one another 
frequently.” Hennig sought to bring the two organizations together in their dealings 
with the government, hoping to dispel past difficulties.110 Hennig and Schreiber met 
in order to find a new “understanding” in 1915. The Missions-Hilfe, the Ausschuß 
told its members, had done much good for the German mission movement but it was 
the special responsibility of the Ausschuß to care for every aspect of German mission 
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life. The Ausschuß proposed that the Missions-Hilfe ought to be able to handle “minor 
questions and dealings” with the imperial government, but “larger questions of the 
Ausschuß” could not be left in the hands of a separate organization like the Missions-
Hilfe.111 In short, the Ausschuß argued that it was the superior organization with 
greater responsibilities to which the Missions-Hilfe ought to genuflect. 
Schreiber’s response, in January of 1916, was to put off any suggestion of a 
“firm regulation” of the relationship. The director of the Missions-Hilfe deployed the 
organization’s influential connections, mentioning to Hennig that he had “consulted” 
with Provincial Governor Hegel, the progenitor of the Nationalspende Faber, and 
Colonial Department mission liaison Berner.112 The issue was ultimately tabled, 
without resolution, at a meeting between the leaders of the two organizations in late 
January 1916. At this meeting both sides proclaimed their mutual admiration but 
resistance by the Missions-Hilfe’s supporters Hegel and Berner ultimately prevented 
any official reconciliation.113  The final end to this conflict came from the privations 
of the First World War, which rendered the German colonial and national missionary 
organizations so completely irrelevant that it did not matter what issues belonged in 
which organization’s bailiwick. The remarkable weight given to this matter when 
presumably Germany had far greater concerns can only be explained by the import 
that missionary leaders gave to the currency of official influence that had been built 
up over the last forty years. The Ausschuß had achieved much before 1913 and the 
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hardships of the war seem to have made it suspicious of the political capital wielded 
by the Missions-Hilfe. 
The Ausschuß’s concern for its proper place in the political hierarchy can be 
read as an indicator of its awareness that the new Missions-Hilfe may have 
superseded it on the national level. The President of the Herrenhaus, Wedel, and the 
Colonial Department’s main liaison with the mission movement, Berner, remained 
affiliated with the Missions-Hilfe after the end of the Nationalspende. So, even as the 
First World War raged and the campaigns of the Allies in Africa and on the Pacific 
Rim ended the German colonial empire, and even as German mission societies grew 
ever more cut off from their overseas stations and the societies’ financial resources 
dwindled, the Ausschuß continued to fight for political influence. The Missions-Hilfe 
would play a prominent role in the final death of internationalism in German mission 
ideology and the Ausschuß and other advocates of Germany’s missionary 
internationalism would become relics of an earlier time. The decade-and-a-half before 
World War I marked the emergence of German missionary nationalism, and the War 




 The alteration of German Protestant missionaries’ views on nationalism had 
causes within the intellectual field, as a younger generation of leaders rose to 
prominence and promoted a “missionary nationalism” organized to unite patriotic and 




missionaries held strong against pressure from secular nationalists who hoped to 
annex the evangelical project to the colonial project, missionary leaders in the 1860s, 
-70s, and -80s also sought to keep nationalism out of their activities in the Heimat. 
Unfortunately for those leaders, the German public did not provide enough financial 
support to sustain missionaries’ activities. Initially, German mission societies 
attempted to inspire greater Missionsgeist with educational and promotional efforts 
focused on the religious justifications for mission work. But the organizational logic 
of mission, near constant expansion, only aggravated the financial deficits of German 
Protestant missions. Advocates of missionary nationalism began to promote patriotic 
methods and arguments as a way to address missionaries’ money woes. This process 
began around 1908 and had its culminating event in the 1913 Nationalspende in 
honor of Kaiser Wilhelm II’s twenty-fifth jubilee. The Nationalspende raised enough 
Marks to breathe new life into the Protestant mission movement, erasing or nearly 
erasing the operating deficits of a number of societies and providing a valuable 
windfall to every mission. The financial success of the Nationalspende marked, in yet 
another way, the waning influence of internationalism in German missionary culture 
in the years before World War I. It represented a clear shift in Germany away from 






Chapter Five: Mission Conferences and the Persistence of 
Internationalism 
 
 Paul Otto Hennig of the Herrnhut Brotherhood thought the 1910 Edinburgh 
World Missionary Conference was the “most important gathering since the 
Reformation.”1 Gathered together in Edinburgh were the leaders of the national 
mission movements, “men from the missionary battlefront, and beside the sons of the 
Old World [were] members of a new Christianity: Indians, Japanese, 
Chinese…even…a Negro!”2 Hennig was not alone in drawing a straight line of 
inheritance from the Reformation to Edinburgh. Other German missionaries reveled 
in the unity of Protestants gathered in the Edinburgh Assembly Hall.3 To gleeful 
participants, the Edinburgh Conference belonged amongst the councils of the old 
church; councils where Christians had gathered in unity to guide the church. At 
Edinburgh the ancient tradition of unity had been resurrected by a “high church 
English bishop…, a Protestant monk,…a Baptist and a Quaker” seated together in 
communal prayer.4 News of the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference received 
attention in the general press of the German Empire. And the specialist presses of the 
mission movement tried to deliver the message of Protestant unity to their readers. 
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According to many attendees and the mission press, Christian mission spirit had 
dissolved national and denominational differences that summer in Edinburgh. 
This ebullient internationalism sprang from the same German Protestant 
missionary movement in the process of developing a more nationalist character. The 
optimism expressed by German Protestants, including the missionary nationalist 
Julius Richter, for a stronger internationalism in the wake of the Edinburgh 
Conference proves that the story of German missionary politics is not simply a tale of 
gradually accelerating nationalization. The persistence of internationalist sentiment 
demonstrated the deep roots of internationalism and the incomplete power of 
nationalism in Germany before 1914. In this instance the German mission movement 
exhibited the growing global interconnectivity spurred by the transportation and 
communication revolution of the late nineteenth century. The shortening of distances 
allowed for greater international missionary collaboration and stimulated a brief 
revival of German missionary internationalism. 
 German missionaries had long been a part of international and regional 
communities of missionaries. By 1900, missionary associations and supporters had 
been connected with organizations of common purpose outside what would become 
the German Empire for at least a century. These connections eventually created a 
layer of international mission conferences and conventions that settled neatly over the 
top of long-running local and regional conferences to bind German Protestants into a 
network of evangelical groups and organizations international in scope and 
cosmopolitan in outlook. This chapter will discuss the various types of regional, 




Germany participated and it will discuss the attitude toward these various assemblies 
and meetings espoused by the German missionary leadership. It will show that the 
outpouring of joy provoked by the Edinburgh conference was not a radical departure 
but rather the outcome of a long historical relationship between Germany’s 
missionary community and the international mission movement. Furthermore, it will 
show that German missionary intellectuals understood international conferences as an 
important tool for building Protestant evangelical feeling. 
 
The Sequence of Mission Conferences and the German Conferences 
  
Germany’s Protestant mission societies organized themselves into a system of 
conferences and associations. These organizations organically organized from the 
smallest geographical scope up to the largest. At the local level mission conferences 
and affiliations concerned themselves with the most local concerns, chiefly 
fundraising and promotion of local Missionsgeist. At the next highest level 
Germany’s Protestants organized themselves into national conferences. These 
included the Saxon Mission Conference, the Halle Mission Conference, and the 
Herrenhuters’ Missionswoche. These gatherings focused on promoting collaboration 
among Germany’s many Protestant societies. Attendees at the national mission 
conferences would gather to hear presentations on the tactics of mission work and 
practical problems of theology and methodology. For reasons that will be presented 
later, the Bremen Continental Mission Conferences also belonged to this category 




Liverpool Mission Conference and the 1878 General Conference on Missions in 
London. However, they did begin to pay closer attention with the 1888 London 
Conference and the subsequent 1900 New York Conference. By the 1910 Edinburgh 
World Missionary Conference, the German Protestant mission movement saw the 
international mission gatherings as excellent venues for the more abstract and 
strategic issues of global mission work. This neat system of missions with ascending 
geographical and topical scope wove German mission societies into the international 
mission movement and provided a justification for the traditional internationalist 
ideology by demonstrating exactly how German Protestant missionaries could 
participate in a global mission program.5 
At the most local level German missionaries and their supporters organized 
themselves into Mission Conferences (Missionskonferenzen). Some of these, like the 
Saxon Mission Conference (Missionskonferenz in der Provinz Sachsen), grew to take 
on national significance. Others remained only of regional importance. An 1899 
description of the various German mission conferences laid out an organized system 
of missionary collaboration. At the most local level, Germany had regular provincial 
mission conferences organized by regional communities of mission friends. These 
groups were generally organized to support a particular mission society. The author 
of the 1899 description, Pastor Richard Döhler, wrote, these provincial conferences 
were intended “to promote awareness and understanding of mission and to generally 
nurture… mission life” in the local sphere. On a larger scale, Warneck and his 
colleagues organized the Saxon Mission Conference in 1878 for the “awakening and 
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care of mission interests” among those men of the “first class,” in other words 
amongst the influential political and educated middle classes of the newly established 
Kaiserreich. Döhler grouped the Bremen Continental Conferences in the same 
category with the Saxon Conference at Halle. The Bremen and Saxon Conferences, 
along with the Missionswoche, promoted cooperation among the German Protestant 
mission societies by encouraging the exchange of missionary techniques.6 Still 
grander were the international mission conferences. According to Döhler, major 
gatherings like the 1888 London and 1900 New York Conferences dealt with issues 
of “mission praxis…important questions” that the whole of international mission 
needed to collectively consider. 
Döhler’s taxonomy of mission conferences clearly laid out the tiered system 
of mission affiliations and gatherings that helped organize the lives of missionaries, 
missionary leaders, and mission supporters. The tiered system of mission conferences 
rose from regional mission conferences focused on individual mission societies; 
through the layer of national conferences, like the Saxon Conference, interested in 
promoting the shared interests of all German mission societies; up to the international 
conferences whose ecumenical task was to address matters of grand strategy. 
The central conference of German Protestant mission life was the Continental 
Mission Conference, or the Bremen Conference. The Bremen Conference grew out of 
an idea proposed by Friedrich Fabri in 1860, for a gathering of missions. But it took 
several years for Fabri’s idea to catch on with Germany’s East African Protestant 
mission societies. The 1860 invitation was declined by the Berlin Mission and the 
Leipzig Mission as both had seen little worth in earlier efforts at such “universal” 
                                                 




conferences.7 However, the 1866 Bremen Conference received a more positive 
response from the Leipzig Mission because the invitation promised to “set aside all 
confessional and churchly questions” and only focus on “practical-technical mission 
questions.” The two representatives dispatched to Bremen by the Leipzig Mission 
reported on their impressions at the 1866 meeting to the gathered leadership of 
Leipzig. The positive experience of the Leipzig missionaries at Bremen helped foster 
a “friendly understanding” between Leipzig and the rival Hermannsburg Mission, 
with whom Leipzig had quarreled.8 From the start, the Bremen gatherings were 
designed to bring the German mission societies into contact so that they could find 
common ground from which to cooperate. In fact, when the Leipzig Mission could 
not send a representative to the 1868 Bremen Conference, the leader of the mission 
regretted missing an opportunity to meet with the Basel and Hermannsburg 
representatives as well as learn valuable practical lessons on “the relationship of 
mission to the universities, preservation of heathen customs, and caste issues” in 
India.9 By 1868, the idea of a conference for the cultivation of Protestant mission 
methods and collaboration in Germany had built a strong following.10 
The 1866 Bremen Conference served as the founding moment for the 
Continental Mission Conference. The quinquennial meetings of the Conference 
continued to adhere to 1866 ideals. And in 1909 the 12th Continental Mission 
Conference finally printed the “guiding principles” of the organization.11 The 
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Continental Mission Conference was a “free association of Protestant mission 
societies from the European continent.” It was not intended to interfere with or 
damage the full independence of its members nor the “confessional or national 
character” of its members. Instead, it was to “strengthen the unity of spirit and nurture 
personal relationships through the discussion of current theoretical and practical 
mission questions.” The associated mission societies would protect common interests 
and promote, whenever possible, a unified expression of continental mission 
“togetherness.”12 Overall, the Bremen Conference meetings would continue to be 
gatherings to share practical, tactical information for the success of Protestant 
missionaries and make some overtures toward unifying the various mission 
organizations on political issues. 
The Bremen Mission Conference loomed the largest in the minds of German 
mission associations for its significance. It was, in one report “inspiring” for the 
attending deputies of the German mission societies.13 The gatherings in Bremen were 
international affairs, though Germans made up the majority of attendees. Along with 
representatives from the German mission societies (considered by all to include the 
Basel Mission Society), delegates from Dutch, Scandinavian, and French Protestant 
missionary groups participated. The significance of the Bremen Conference for 
Germany’s Protestant mission associations is perhaps most strongly indicated by the 
foundation of the Ausschuß at the1884 meeting of the conference. In attendance at 
this seminal conference were representatives of every German foreign mission, along 
with leaders of the Danish, Dutch, Swedish, and Norwegian Protestant mission 
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societies.14 The Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift called the 1884 meeting the most 
“significant, vital, and practically important” meeting of mission societies. The 
October founding of the Ausschuß by nine German mission societies in Bremen, the 
Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift promised, would “clarify the position of mission” in 
Germany.15 The new Ausschuß promised to offer leadership for the Protestant 
missionaries of Germany and help stimulate greater cooperation. The significance of 
this meeting and the Bremen Conference in general prompted regular reports to the 
Prussian Kultusminister, Colonial Secretary, and Bismarck himself on the 
proceedings.16 
Though the Bremen Conference was identified as a “continental” gathering 
and representatives from mission societies outside of Germany made significant 
contributions to the gathering, nevertheless, the mission conferences served as an 
extension of the German missionary movement. For example, the 1893 Bremen 
Conference had thirty official attendees. Of those thirty attendees twenty-four were 
German (twenty-six if you count the two representatives of the Basel Mission, which 
most attendees would have).17 The attendance in Bremen of “a large number of clergy 
from Bremen and environs” in the audience would have added to the German 
character of the gathering.  This conference also gives a good sense of how Germans 
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expected the national mission conferences (Bremen and Saxon) to serve the German 
Protestant mission movement. These gatherings were expected to cover the tactical 
and practical needs of German missionaries. As such, the agenda for the 1893 
Conference was indicative of the typical conference. It included a report on the 
activities of the Ausschuß, statistical reports on mission activities, a discussion of “our 
conduct with regards to the Roman missions especially in the German colonies,” 
lectures on questions of organizing indigenous congregations and baptismal rules for 
Protestant mission, and diverse other matters of metropolitan and mission field 
practice.18 To further enhance the effectiveness of the meetings, participation in 
discussions was limited to a few score missionary authorities.19 
The Bremen Conference held an important place in German missionaries’ 
associational worldview. The tenth conference was described by the Evangelisch-
Lutherisches Missionblatt (Evangelical Lutheran Mission Gazette) with great 
reverence. Though the conferences’ attendees were usually small in number, in 1897 
the forty men from eighteen mission societies represented about 950 missionaries 
“caring for over 600,000 Protestants”.20 The union of missionaries from Germany, 
Switzerland, France, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland at the 1897 
Bremen Conference was reported as an important collaborative event bringing 
together Protestants regardless of nationality or specific Protestant creed. The Leipzig 
Mission, producers of the Evangelisch-Lutherisches Missionblatt, shared that the 
meeting ended with a “communal meal which brought together the attendees and 
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mission friends from Bremen…in pleasant hospitality” – a moment of true Christian 
unity.21  
On the national level, missionaries also participated in colonial congresses 
organized by the German Colonial Society in 1902, 1905, and 1910. Though 
Protestant mission societies joined these gatherings, mission periodicals and 
intellectuals clearly showed their view that the colonial congresses were only 
tangential to missionaries’ work. The antecedent of the Colonial Congresses was the 
Allgemeiner Deutscher Kongress zur Förderung überseeischer Interessen (General 
German Congress for the Promotion of Overseas Interests). This 1886 gathering was 
undeniably nationalist in its goals. Its agenda covered the new “‘national questions’: 
colonial policy, the emigration problem and the defense of German language and 
culture beyond the Reich’s borders.”22 As a consequence, only a small contingent 
from the German mission movement attended. Representatives of the newly 
established EMDOA attended, but this mission was an early incarnation of the 
nationalist Bethel Mission.23 Friedrich Fabri did send a letter of support to the 
gathering, part of his eventual movement out of the mission movement and into the 
colonial movement.24 In fact he had already left his post at the Rhenish Mission in 
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1884.25 No missionaries save these saw fit to travel to Berlin for the Congress. This 
set the precedent for future colonial congresses’ marginality to missionaries. 
Resolutions passed at the 1886 Congress on missionary activities, proffered 
by Matthias Ittameier of the EMDOA and approved by the overwhelmingly non-
mission attendees violated contemporary missionary principles of internationality. 
After thanking the mission societies for their work Christianizing overseas territories, 
the Congress resolved that it was a “necessary and urgent duty” for German missions 
to expand their work to the newly conquered German colonies. As a part of this duty, 
German missions would have to restrict their activities in foreign colonies and foreign 
missions would have to be restricted in German colonies. Finally, the Congress 
resolved that “it be expected of the German missions in the German overseas 
territories, that their activities be aimed at a national affiliation of their converts 
towards the German Fatherland, as much as [aimed at] the education of the natives to 
work…”26 Had more missionaries been interested in the 1886 Congress, such a 
resolution would have either been rejected or been made against the strenuous 
objections of the majority of missionary delegates as it clearly violated every 
principle of missionary ideology at that time. The resolution’s messages highlighted 
the early irrelevance of secular colonial gatherings to the mission movement. 
Little had changed sixteen years later when the Colonial Society organized its 
first Colonial Congress. The Basel Mission periodical, the Evangelisches Missions-
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Magazin, Neue Folge, reported on the 1902 Colonial Congress in Berlin. To the 
Evangelisches Missions-Magazin the 1902 Congress amounted to a simple piece of 
news that might interest readers. It observed that mission organizations of both 
confessions sent representatives in order to share information about their religious 
and cultural work.27 The periodical reported the text of speeches by Carl Paul and 
Alexander Merensky on possible roles for missions in Germany’s colonies. The 
article contained no reflections on the significance of the meetings for German 
mission, underscoring the relative unimportance of the 1902 Congress to the Basel 
missionaries. In fact, events at the Congress revealed that there was more risk than 
benefit possible for mission from the secular colonialists at the gathering. Paul and 
Merensky had to work quickly to prevent a resolution calling for greater colonial 
service from missionaries coming to a vote. A draft resolution had declared it was the 
“obligation of the German Empire” to “advance the physical and spiritual culture of 
the native population.” For that reason, and the necessity of fighting heathen 
“horrors” and heathen “superstition,” the Christian mission societies deserved the 
“energetic support of the government and widest sphere of our Volk.”28 This 
resolution would have contradicted the dominant missionary view of state service at 
the time but would have been completely in keeping with the spirit of the 1886 
Allgemeiner Deutscher Kongress, had it been passed.29 
Though missionaries remained skeptical of the Colonial Congresses and their 
organizer, the German Colonial Society, mission participation in the gatherings did 
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increase over time. The 1905 planning committee included Karl Axenfeld as a 
representative of the Berlin Mission.30 The program of the 1905 Colonial Congress 
included presentations from Carl Buchner, Theodor Öhler, Paul, Richter, Merensky, 
as well as delegates from the Catholic mission societies.31 In fact, the significant 
presence of mission topics on the program pleased the Ausschuß.32 The growing 
participation of the German Protestant mission movement in these conferences does 
provide yet another marker of the growing links between the mission movement, 
secular colonialists, and the colonial state. 
Nevertheless, missionaries continued to worry about the influence the 
Colonial Congresses could exert upon their work. The 1910 Congress filled Karl 
Axenfeld with trepidation. He worried that the assembled would enact resolutions that 
either violated missionaries’ principles or compelled missionaries to modify their 
activities. He wrote to the German Protestant mission societies in July of 1910 that it 
was crucial that a “considerable pro-mission majority” be present for the voting 
phases on resolutions at the Congress. There was too much danger that an “accidental 
majority” could take action that would alter the view of the German people about 
mission work.33 At the same time, Axenfeld’s nationalist sympathies also had him 
urging attendance so that the German people would recognize the important role that 
mission work played in developing Germany’s global expansion. In fact, the 1910 
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Colonial Congress would be the high point of missionary participation in the secular 
colonial propaganda effort. 
Paul Schwartz of the Leipzig Mission accepted a position on the planning 
committee for the 1910 Berlin Congress, joining Axenfeld, who was repeating his 
prior service on the 1905 planning committee. Schwartz was tasked by the Ausschuß 
with trying to use the Congress as a means to promote cooperation with the Catholic 
mission organizations – an interesting task considering the simultaneous conflict 
between the Berlin Mission and the Benedictines of St. Ottilien.34 The Protestants 
found their most eager collaboration from Amandus Acker of the Holy Ghost Fathers 
and the Zentrum politician Alois zu Löwenstein.35 Soon the Protestant mission 
societies were collaborating with Acker and the Benedictine Norbert Weber, sharing 
materials in preparation for lectures on indigenous peoples’ rights in the colonies.36 
After the Congress, Axenfeld told the various Protestant mission societies that the 
“relationship of both confessions in the colonies” were stronger than ever.37 For 
secular colonialists the behavior of the Catholic and Protestant missions must have 
validated their conviction that German colonialism could be a great nationalist project 
that would bring together Protestant and Catholic Germans. 
The Program of the 1910 Congress featured presentations from Axenfeld, 
Richter, Weber the Benedictine, the religious scholar Carl Mirbt, Joseph Froberger, 
who led Germany’s arm of the White Fathers, the linguist and religious scholar Carl 
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Meinhof, and Gottlieb Haussleiter of the Rhenish Mission Society. All spoke on 
issues of religious and “native” affairs.38 In addition, the mission societies organized 
a supplementary exposition for the Congress. Axenfeld described it to his colleague 
Mirbt: the gathering would begin with three hymns and a brass ensemble. Then three 
lectures: “The Movement of the Peoples or At the Change of Time,”39 “Mission as 
Colonial Duty,” and “Mission as Exercise of Belief.”40 This event, along with the 
missions’ participation in the Congress organized by Axenfeld, betrayed his 
nationalist touch, and tied German mission more tightly to the colonial state than 
missionaries would have at their own conferences. Axenfeld explained the usefulness 
of the Congress to Mirbt in a later letter as a chance to convince the German people 
of their “moral and religious” calling to improve the condition of Germany’s colonial 
subjects.41 On the eve of the Colonial Congress Axenfeld officially invited the 
Chancellor, Kultusminister, War Minister, Navy Secretary, and the Presidents of the 
Reichstag, Prussian Herrenhaus, and Prussian Lower House to the missions’ 
supplementary exhibition so they might see the service Germany’s Protestant 
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 As they did with the Bremen Conference, German Protestant missionaries 
took a short time to warm to international mission conferences. In this case the 
reservations grew out of a disagreement about the purpose of those conferences. 
German Missionswissenschaftler criticized the early international conferences in 
England for their practical focus; German mission societies could get practical advice 
and counsel from their own national mission conferences. German Protestants wanted 
the international gatherings to provide a broad, strategic forum for the development of 
a truly coordinated international mission movement. Gradually, the international 
conferences evolved into a form that satisfied German expectations. The Edinburgh 
Conference of 1910 met those hopes and satisfied German desires. Before the 1910 
Edinburgh Conference there were three international mission conferences of any 
significance, and Germans’ reactions to those conferences help illustrate the gradual 
evolution of the international conferences into a form that satisfied German 
missionaries’ expectations.43 
 The 1878 General Missionary Conference in London proved a disappointment 
for most missionaries in and out of Germany. Attendance from English mission 
supporters was “less than the combined attendance of the various mission societies’ 
annual celebrations” across England. The Conference received only passing notice in 
the press, and, consequently, the nameless reporter to the Basel Mission’s periodical 
wrote, “For the motivation of mission interest and the spread of mission knowledge in 
wider circles, this conference did not amount to much.” A quartet of German mission 
                                                 




leaders attended from the Berlin, Rhenish, and Basel Societies: Theodor Wangemann, 
Karl Plath, Elias Schrenk, and August Schreiber.44 In spite of the disappointment, the 
article maintained a hopeful internationalism in its report, declaring its solidarity with 
the hope that soon the Gospels would “win over all enemies” and “the Kingdom of 
God [would] triumphantly raise itself over the ruins of heathendom.” Though the 
London Conference had been a failure, the author concluded, it should not serve as a 
negative mark against the hopes of international cooperation and the “blessings of 
Christian community.”45 
 The Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift also published an account of the 1878 
London Conference. The majority of the article provided a simple report of the topics 
of discussion covered in the various sessions of the conference. However, Warneck, 
as editor of the journal, added his own epilogue to the article. He offered his 
judgment regarding the “arrangement” of such a universal conference with the hope 
that it would not be long before another such conference could be organized. 
Warneck’s suggestions showed the general feeling of German missionaries toward 
these international conferences. Satisfied with their own regional and continental 
mission conferences for matters of practical mission work, the German missionary 
intellectuals and leaders hoped for a gathering directed toward, as Warneck described 
it, “thoroughly talk[ing] through a single important topic,” rather than a diverse 
program of minor or specialized topics. He also wished for the future conference to 
be a “professional” conference so that the quality of discussions could be guaranteed 
for maximum effectiveness. Finally, Warneck suggested that, in order that the wider 
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public still received some benefit from the international conference, there should be 
co-located general assemblies of an educational nature for mission supporters.46 In 
short, Warneck proposed a plan whereby the international conferences would neatly 
fit into a system of missionary conferences and gatherings to provide valuable contact 
between missionaries of different countries, promote major questions of missionary 
interest, and provide a boost to “mission spirit” in the host location. Warneck’s 
suggestion for closed expert sessions was taken up in future gatherings and would be 
used for the Edinburgh Conference in 1910, though it is not clear if Warneck’s was 
the decisive voice on this matter.47 This neat accommodation may explain some part 
of the German mission societies’ and members’ pleased reaction to the Edinburgh 
Conference. 
 When missionaries gathered in London a decade later for another international 
conference the assessment of the conference offered by the Evangelisches Missions-
Magazin was more positive. The conference attracted more public attention in 
Britain, a pattern that would be repeated with each succeeding conference as well.48 
The 1888 Centenary Mission Conference was a “universal conference, called 
ecumenical with good reason.” Nonetheless, the Evangelisches Missions-Magazin 
asked, “And the outcome?” Had the conference been a “great enterprise”? On the one 
hand, the London gathering had indeed been successful. The participants in the 
conference were joined by the “knotting of personal acquaintance and…the 
broadening of horizons” in “brotherly intercourse.” On the other hand, the conference 
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had failed at one great goal. The program of the Conference declared its goal to be a 
new awakening of Christian mission spirit. In fact, the Basel journal wrote, outside 
England one could find “no trace” of that purpose. According to the report on the 
Conference in the Basel periodical, the problem was a difference of opinions on 
practical questions of mission work. The conference had failed to bring its attendees 
to the “principle tucked behind these practical problems” that all Protestant 
missionaries worked for the same purpose.49 Another published report suggested that 
the gathered mission representatives at the 1889 Bremen Conference found the 
London program of 1888 valuable but disappointing because it replicated what 
attendees expected of the Bremen Conferences.50 German missionaries did not expect 
the international conferences to deal with the tactical and practical concerns of 
missionaries: how to organize missionary schools, fundraising in the Heimat, et 
cetera; but rather to bring together missionaries to shape grand strategies for 
international mission effort. 
 Alexander Merensky, whose reputation from his work as a missionary in 
South Africa made him one of the best known German missionaries, described the 
1888 Centenary Conference as a missionary gathering whose “impressive size had 
never before been matched.” Merensky’s opinion of the 1888 Conference showed that 
Döhler’s 1899 mission conference taxonomy had been a common attitude more than a 
decade earlier. Merensky noted the London Conference (like the 1878 London 
General Missionary Conference) had been an authentic attempt to organize a “real 
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universal mission conference.” The 1878 Conference had marked the first time that 
delegates from both sides of the ocean gathered with delegates from the English 
mission societies. The 1888 Conference demonstrated the durability and value of the 
“decennial conference” for missionaries around the world and had expanded on the 
potential of the General Missionary Conference.51 
 The Conference, Merensky continued, provided an invaluable demonstration 
of the strength of American mission life, largely unknown on the continent and in 
Germany. Similarly it allowed for the propagation of Germany’s superior academic 
mission knowledge. Merensky’s article marked one of the first appearances of what 
became a common-place description of the three-legged stool of Protestant mission – 
an international project built on the British, American, and German mission 
movements. Merensky hoped that the London Conference of 1888 would also allow 
for the spread of missionary awareness in Germany amongst the general public and 
the awareness of mission’s internationalism amongst the German mission sphere.52 
As if to emphasize for his German readers the import of the gathering, Merensky 
spent time noting the size and grand furnishings of the conference. He noted that 
1477 people registered as attendees of the conference, representing 129 mission 
societies gathered at Exeter Hall, the “most beloved locale of many blessed Christian 
gatherings and celebrations, whose name, in the colonies, is linked with… great 
public influence” upon “native affairs.” The gathering hall was decorated with a great 
wall map ten meters by twelve meters with the declaration that “The Field is the 
World.,” a reference to Matthew 13:38 and its suggestion of missionaries’ purpose, 
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“the field is the world and the seeds are the children of the kingdom.” 53 The 
Conference was, for Merensky’s readers, painted as a grand gathering of international 
significance. 
In the final estimation, to Merensky, the London Conference could only be 
assessed after some time had passed. He judged that it had had a disappointing impact 
on the wider public of London. Though it had failed as a public relations operation, 
Merensky judged the conference had proven the efficacy of bringing together the 
international mission community to collaboratively consider the challenges of the 
evangelical project. The Conference had functioned across the Protestants’ various 
confessional differences and shown a common commitment to the “battle against the 
power of heathendom.” It had formed a “coalition for a grand global struggle.”54 
 Merensky’s hearty endorsement of international mission conferences as vital 
to Germany’s missionary future was echoed by Warneck’s afterword to Merensky’s 
description. Warneck expressed his joy that “this time [as opposed to the 1878 
Conference] special gatherings of experts” were organized for the discussion of 
theoretical and practical missionary questions, though those gatherings’ large size 
limited their effectiveness. The German mission leader hoped that the international 
conferences would continue to narrow the focus of their deliberations to “especially 
current questions” of mission interest. He offered examples: “the position of mission 
to contemporary colonial politics,…the international importance of mission, [or] the 
challenges of Protestant mission with regards to the growing Roman [Catholic] 
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aggression.”55 Warneck implored the organizing committee for the next international 
conference to include “fewer topics but a more exhaustive practical treatment [of 
those topics] and a wider space for discussion, and an exclusion of [superficial] 
rhetoric.”56 Warneck’s suggestions were designed to transform the international 
conferences so that they would become something more than the practical, 
methodological conferences of international attendees with which German mission 
leaders already felt themselves well-supplied. The Bremen, Saxon, and regional 
mission conferences gave German missionaries the tactical assistance they required; 
international conferences could provide the grand strategy of international 
evangelization and combine the strengths of every Protestant nation. In addition, they 
could function as concrete proof of international missionary identity for the 
missionaries and for their supporters in the villages, towns, and cities of the Heimat. 
 The 1900 Ecumenical Missionary Conference in New York eclipsed the 1888 
Centenary Conference in size. The cost and time required to cross the Atlantic limited 
German attendance but the extensive German-speaking diaspora in the United States 
helped keep the German mission movement supplied with reports of the Conference. 
The Evangelisches Missions-Magazin published a report from Paul Menzel, of the 
German Evangelical Synod of North America.57 He declared that the New York 
Conference was the “greatest ecumenical mission conference” ever organized. The 
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meeting was so significant that even secular public opinion recognized the 
importance of the mission conference, which would “mark the new century as a 
mission century.”58 In this case, as it would be for many at the Edinburgh 
Conference, the presence of powerful political figures marked the importance of the 
mission conference for Menzel and his readers. The Conference’s opening ceremony, 
he noted, was led by former President Benjamin Harrison and Governor Theodore 
Roosevelt of New York, who welcomed the delegates59 on behalf of his state, and 
delivered President William McKinley’s greetings as well. Declarations of the size of 
the gathering also emphasized the worth of the conference for Germany. On the first 
day Carnegie Hall, the conference’s venue, hosted 3500 people.60 
In addition to the import of the conference because of its size, for Menzel and 
the editors of the Evangelisches Missions-Magazin, the main message of the 
conference carried the most value. The reports made from every corner of Protestant 
mission work by attendees, de rigeur for these conferences, drove home the special 
requirement placed by God upon the German people. “America, Germany and 
England are the only Christian lands in possession of the Bible. Upon them rests the 
great, holy duty to bring God’s Word to the rest of the world.”61 A remarkable 
statement that captured the strong confessionalism of Protestant missionary 
internationalism – perhaps the Catholic and Orthodox Churches had the text of the 
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Bible but they did not truly “possess” it. Protestants, thanks to Luther and his 
successors, had a true understanding of the Gospels that required the Protestant 
nations to preach the gift of the Reformation to the world.62 The Conference attendees 
emphasized the international character of their work. The missionaries in New York 
had “filed an impressive certificate of authenticity for the unity of Protestantism.” 
Menzel wrote that “the now common phrases of national duty” calling on 
missionaries to bind their spiritual work to the colonial project were only 
“exceptions” at the New York Conference. Missionaries ignored pressure to 
instrumentalize their work for the colonial powers; instead the missionaries’ 
commitment was to “the Lord whose kingdom is not of this world.”63 
German missionaries learned of the New York Conference if they read the 
Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift as well. Warneck published the letter he sent to the 
Empire State for all to read. The letter, which Menzel reported was read into the 
record with “personal warmth” by Judson Smith, a prominent American missionary,64 
celebrated the cooperation among missionaries  of every Protestant country who 
worked together to spread the Kingdom of God to the non-Christian world. The New 
York Conference, Warneck continued, was a “meaningful” part of this project. The 
ecumenical conference in New York would help the new century see the “opening of 
the door of belief for the heathens.” It was in this letter that Warneck began his 
campaign against the slogan proposed by John Mott, that the world could and should 
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be evangelized in one generation. Warneck argued that deliberate, careful work 
would lead to missionary success. He wrote that the scripture read “Go forth in all the 
world,” not “fly forth.” Protestant missionaries could learn from the Catholic 
missionaries, especially their “organized concentration.”65 According to the German 
Missionswissenschaftler, Protestant missionaries needed to come together and share 
their practical wisdom and work together to systematically evangelize all the 
continents. Warneck’s urge to participate in the conference, even from afar, 
demonstrated the growing utility that Germans saw in these international gatherings. 
His message for the other participants also revealed Warneck’s determination to 
guide the international mission conferences so that they supported international 
missionary cooperation. 
Alexander Merensky, the seemingly peripatetic mission leader, had also 
attended the New York Conference, along with August Schreiber, as official 
emissaries from the Ausschuß.66 He wrote that the conference was a “wondrous, 
hope-awakening sign for the future of Protestant mission work.” The ecumenical 
gathering in New York’s Carnegie Hall promised to fertilize the field of missionary 
endeavor for the new century. According to him, the conference “had achieved 
expansiveness as no gathering” of missionaries before: “The number of lectures was 
greater than at earlier occasions, their content was more significant, the discussions 
more fruitful.” Merensky wrote, “This conference [was] a victory of mission 
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interests.”67 Merensky echoed Menzel’s reports of the size of the gathering and the 
esteem it received from influential American statesmen like Roosevelt, and Presidents 
McKinley and Harrison.68 Like international conferences before, this gathering of 
diverse Protestant communities in religious conviviality had healed wounds of 
doctrinarian difference with a balm of missionary commitment.69 One generality that 
Merensky stressed might have distressed Warneck; he noted for his readers that the 
topics of the various sessions at the conference dealt with the “practical work” and 
“practical needs” of the mission movement.70 Nonetheless, for Merensky and others, 
the New York Ecumenical Mission Conference of 1900 continued the growing 
enthusiasm shared in the missionary press in Germany for internationalism. German 
missionaries celebrated the size of the conferences as evidence of the size of 
international Protestantism, proof that the German mission movement was part of a 
grand, international community of Christians laboring for God. 
 
Anticipating the Edinburgh Conference 
 
 The final international missionary conference before the First World War, the 
Edinburgh World Missionary Conference, was the most anticipated, and, ultimately 
most significant of all the global meetings of Protestant missionaries. The conference 
left German attendees universally proud of their place in the international mission 
movement and filled with positive expectations of their work’s future. Though some 
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drew different lessons and assessments from the gathering in Scotland, all agreed that 
the conference had set an auspicious agenda for the future of Christianity. Even 
before the Conference met, German missionaries eagerly anticipated the effect the 
gathering would have upon world mission.71 
 In its report on the Edinburgh Conference, the periodical of the United North 
German Mission Conferences applauded the ecumenicalism of the gathering. In 
Edinburgh, “men and women from every major mission nation took part” in 
considering the “central questions” of Christian mission. To the nameless authors of 
the report the relationship between this important gathering and the Bremen 
Conferences was clear. In Bremen the members of the continental missions came 
together to consider “unique questions [Spezialfragen].” On the other hand, in 
Edinburgh the “Protestant Church” gathered to act on “world-historical concerns.” 
The Bremen Conferences were practical gatherings, perhaps even understood as 
tactical sessions, while the Edinburgh Conference represented a grand strategic 
gathering of global Christian importance.72 
 As has been discussed in other sections of this work, the German mission 
movement eagerly sought to have the 1920 World Mission Conference convened on 
German soil.73 Even before then, around 1906 and 1907, German missionaries 
considered pushing for the 1910 conference to be held in a German city. Paul Hennig 
of the Moravian Brüderunität proposed the Ausschuß nominate Germany as the host 
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nation for the 1910 World Missionary Conference in the winter of 1906.74 However, 
Theodor Öhler of Basel raised serious objections. First, he noted the language barrier 
that would be created by holding the gathering in Germany. He asked if it would be 
healthy for the goal of making mission international to hold either a German-language 
gathering, which many of the international participants would be unable to 
understand, or hold an English-language conference, which would prevent the wider 
public and a significant number of German missionaries and their supporters from 
joining the conference. Because fewer English-speakers spoke German than German-
speakers spoke English, it made more sense to hold the event in an Anglophone 
location.75 Other members of the Ausschuß agreed with Öhler’s objections.76 
Nonetheless, in January of 1907 Alexander Merensky informed Germany’s mission 
societies of the wish of the Ausschuß that Germany host the 1910 mission conference 
to the organizers of the 1910 conference.77 But then the Moravian Mission, after 
longer consideration of the matter, reversed its earlier support for a German host 
location. According to the Brüderunität, American mission circles were not open to a 
mission conference on German soil. For the Americans having the event in Great 
Britain was enough of a compromise. To the Moravians, the idea of a German world 
mission conference now seemed hardly worth the effort as it seemed unlikely to 
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occur.78 In any case, it would be better to have an international conference in Britain 
than to have no conference at all. Shortly thereafter the suggestion was dropped. 
However, the enthusiasm of a significant portion of the German mission movement 
for the World Missionary Conference proved the strong internationalism that 
remained among the German Protestant missionaries, even as nationalist mission 
ideology made inroads by other routes. 
 This episode demonstrated the esteem that the international gatherings of 
missionaries had built in Germany’s Protestant missionary culture. Eager to 
demonstrate the worth of their national movement to the rest of the world and keen to 
support the international evangelical program, German mission leaders set aside their 
own hopes and threw their organizational zeal into the planning of the Edinburgh 
Conference. The German missions were soon meeting to organize a statement of 
Germany’s possible contributions to and expectations of the Edinburgh Conference. 
In May of 1908 the German mission societies sent deputations to a German meeting 
to compile a shared proposition for the Edinburgh Conference. The German mission 
societies agreed to propose that the Edinburgh Conference take on major, 
international themes of Protestant mission work, specifically the “encroachment of 
Islam in Africa and the defense against the same,” and “alcohol in West Africa and a 
resolution against opium.”79 The assembled also made suggestions for greater 
international cooperation – the creation of an international mission library and the 
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standardization of a statistical rubric for recording mission work.80 The minutes of 
that meeting clearly revealed the intentions and expectations of German missionaries 
that the international conferences should be strategic and collaborative. At the 
Ausschuß’s October 1908 meeting, Julius Richter celebrated the interest that the 
English and Americans had shown in German assistance, “like never before.” This 
good will required a lively participation by Germany, he continued, and Warneck 
quickly seconded that notion.81 International mission conferences appeared, to many 
Germans, to be proving the acclaim for German mission work on the international 
stage. 
 Shortly after the Germans enthusiastically joined the planning for the 
Edinburgh Conference, the conference planners in Germany began distributing 
surveys to Germany’s mission societies in early 1909. Richter continued to take a 
leading role in the planning and his colleague, Johannes Warneck, joined the work. 
Johannes Warneck was the son of Gustav Warneck and a leader within the Rhenish 
Mission Society. He would also become one of the leading nationalists within the 
mission movement during the First World War. The surveys Richter and the younger 
Warneck worked to distribute were part of the preparation for the various commission 
reports planned for the Edinburgh Conference.82 Respondents provided the best 
information they could as it related to the “preaching of the Gospels around the 
world,” “the home base of mission,” and other topics. The various commissions then 
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combined the gathered data into a report for discussion in the general assembly 
meetings in 1910.83 Though these surveys did not always match the Germans’ 
“tastes,” they would provide a “sufficient basis” upon which to work, Richter and 
Warneck thought.84 This organizational scheme served the elder Warneck’s and other 
missionaries’ earlier hope that the international mission conferences would focus on 
major issues of broad concern. 
 The Berlin Mission proposed that the World Missionary Conference organize 
an international commission for addressing international mission issues. The Berlin 
Society openly admitted the impetus for their proposal was the losses the mission had 
suffered during the Boer War and the attendant difficulties the society had had 
securing redress from the British government. The German missionaries claimed that 
“if an international mission commission were at hand” a group like the Berlin 
Mission Society could expect a better response from the British government. Beyond 
this narrow interest, the authors of the proposal noted that if the Edinburgh 
Conference truly intended to transform Protestant mission into a “world power” then 
it needed some “central organ” to defend the rights of missions against state powers.85 
The Berliners proposed that the commission represent the international character of 
mission with representatives from Britain, the United States, the Continent, Canada, 
South Africa, and Australia.86 This commission would fit neatly atop the existing 
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collaborative organizations of mission like the Ausschuß.87 Full of the possibilities of 
international cooperation to serve the interests of the Berlin Mission, its leaders 
(including Richter) proposed a system of mission governance or association that 
mirrored the graduated sequence of conferences with a progression from local 
associations to national organizations, and with an international organization at the 
very top. 
 Before the Edinburgh Conference began its meetings, the son of Gustav 
Warneck, Johannes Warneck, shared his thoughts on the upcoming gathering in the 
Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift. His expectations for the World Missionary 
Conference showed he was, at the time, a strong standard bearer for his father’s 
internationalism. He told his readers that the ecumenical character of the conference 
would display paths for future missionary cooperation. Warneck, citing an article in 
the Christian Missionary Review, argued the process would benefit from Germany’s 
special contribution as the best informed of all mission movements because of the 
prominence of German missiology in Germany and abroad. Warneck expected the 
conference would bring together expert knowledge from all corners of the globe to 
address the most significant problems of the “modern mission era;” allowing 
discussions to be carried forward based on fact and causing “many illusions [to] fall 
away.” The presentations and discussions in Edinburgh would be a “treasure 
trove…for mission theorists…an exhilarating afterword for practical [mission] 
workers, a corrective for doctrinaires, a challenge to deliberate for the over-extended 
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[Vielgeschäftigen].”88 All the attendees would be provoked to rethink their methods 
and align themselves with the best in mission practice and belief. The mission 
conference gathering in Scotland filled Johannes Warneck with real optimism for the 
future of international cooperation. He told his German readers, “The German style 
[of mission work] is fully capable of complementing the English and American 
[styles of mission work]. But it would certainly not harm us [the Germans], if we 
allowed the dynamic industry and circumspect energy of our brothers across the 
Channel and the ocean to ignite our torch. We could learn much from them.”89 
Warneck’s pride in Germany’s Protestant mission work left plenty of room for 
authentic and significant collaboration with the nations increasingly represented in 
German political and popular culture as dangerous rivals 
 By the spring of 1910 Germany’s missionaries could barely contain their 
eagerness at the coming manifestation of missionary internationalism. The Moravians 
of Herrnhut in the spring of 1910, a few months before the Edinburgh Conference 
was to convene, echoed Johannes Warneck’s sentiments about the coming event. The 
Moravians hoped the gathering in Scotland would “call together Christians of every 
nation and church [and] gather them in supplication in order to join [their efforts] for 
the spread of the Kingdom of God in the heathen lands.” Every one of the 1200 
places for attendees had already been taken, proving the universal, global interest the 
efforts of the world’s missionaries had attracted. The reflection went on to recount the 
lengthy and extensive preparations put into the great meeting, including the 
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compilation of a 300-page report from the eight commissions. All the preparations 
gave one the hope that the result would be a “blessed success.” 90 
  
The 1910 World Missionary Conference 
 
One of the representatives of the Herrnhut Moravians, Paul Otto Hennig, 
experienced his ten days in Edinburgh as proof of the universal power of Christianity; 
the conference had brought together in its 1200 attendees the “entire Christian world” 
– at least the Protestant parts.91 Walther Trittelvitz of the Bethel Society wrote that 
for ten days Edinburgh was the “spiritual center of the Earth, the capital city of 
Christendom.”92 The Jahrbuch der vereinigten norddeutschen Missionskonferenzen 
(Yearbook of the United North German Mission Conferences) called the conference 
the “most important event” in recent mission history.93 Hennig evoked the globe-
spanning reach of the conference by noting that journalists sat in specially reserved 
seats with quick access to express telegraphs and postmen “in order to transmit the 
latest news of the Congress to every corner of the world.” Hennig’s account of the 
conference appeared in the Missionsblatt der Brüdergemeine (Mission Gazette of the 
Brethren), the society periodical of the Moravian missionaries in Germany. And with 
this and other anecdotes Hennig shared the message that the Edinburgh Conference 
was an event of world significance. He noted that the press of crowds during the 
lunch break was so great that it made it hard to find a friend for a lunch meeting. The 
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great mass and diversity of attendees at the mission conference made clear that 
Germany was but one piece of the international mission movement.94 The Jahrbuch 
agreed and took pride in the significant presence of German missionary leaders in 
Edinburgh.95 For all attendees, whatever their background, the Edinburgh Conference 
was an intoxicating religious experience which left most participants feeling they had 
participated in a profound spiritual event.96 
The gathering’s significance for Germany was verified to Hennig by the 
attention lavished on the assembled German delegates in Hamburg prior to their 
embarkation on a special steamer for Edinburgh.97 The German mission movement, 
Hennig made clear, matched intellectual achievements with the British and American 
mission communities, justifying German participation in the Edinburgh Conference.98 
Two-thirds of the representatives from the European continent were German, another 
source pointed out, and both Hennig and other reports of the conference made special 
note of the three German Missionswissenschaftler who received honorary doctorates 
from the University of Edinburgh as part of the conference celebrations.99 Scottish 
hospitality included significant subsidization of German attendance at the Edinburgh 
Conference, as well.100 
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 Hennig shared in the optimistic climate of the World Missionary Conference. 
He enthused, “We stand at the beginning of the mission era of the church, [and] we 
should expect greatness and will live through greatness!” This new era of greatness 
would be advanced by a new international consortium of mission associations, carried 
toward its culmination by the new Continuation Committee of the World Missionary 
Conference. This new body, itself an embodiment of the ecumenicalism of a wished-
for future, had been “seconded by a Presbyterian, supported by a Methodist and a 
German pastor, and spoken for by the Bishop of Durham, a Quaker, and many 
others.”101 The Continuation Committee would begin the planning for the next World 
Missionary Conference in 1920 and take the lead on other areas of potential 
international missionary cooperation. Hennig left his readers with an image of a 
world united by Protestant Christianity thanks to the Edinburgh Conference. He 
described a communion celebrated the final Sunday of the Conference. He told his 
readers how, 
I found myself beside…a cleric of the Scottish state church,...a Baptist missionary out of 
distant India,…one or another from the German delegates,…and in the pew opposite me an 
Indian cleric and his…wife, both in their national dress. Beside him a Japanese woman, in the 
background the black face of a Negro. We celebrated communion with one another, the repast 
that the Lord bequeathed to his Church…102 
 
For Hennig, the Edinburgh Mission Conference offered a true vision of 
Protestantism’s hopeful future, a gathering of all the peoples of the world, and the 
way towards that vision, a collective international evangelical effort. Trittelvitz, 
representative of the most nationalist of Germany’s mission societies, celebrated the 
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Edinburgh Conference as proof of Protestants’ “fighting camaraderie 
(Waffenbrüderschaft) against a shared enemy, against heathendom and Islam.”103 
 In 1910, Gustav Warneck was too elderly to travel to Scotland for the World 
Missionary Conference, but he was not too old to indulge in the same epistolary 
guidance he had given previous conferences. He sent a letter to John Mott, the key 
organizer of the Edinburgh Conference, and had that letter published in the 
Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift so that Germans might know his thoughts. Warneck 
shared in the general consensus that the Edinburgh Conference was of great merit. He 
wrote that he considered the conference “decisive for the future of mission” and for 
missionaries’ shared goal of seeing the Gospels spread to the entire non-Christian 
world. However, Warneck renewed his objection to Mott and others’ call for 
Christian missionaries to “occupy the entire world in the present generation.” 
Warneck thought this an unnecessary risk that would overextend the missions and 
leave them vulnerable to Islam.104 Benjamin La Trobe of the Herrnhut 
Missionsdirektion also cautioned Mott in private that the advocates of “rapid 
advance” ought not to defame the hard work of older mission societies.105 Even so, 
the international mission conference in Edinburgh had satisfied most German 
missionaries’ expectations. 
 The experiences of the German Protestant missionaries in Edinburgh were 
uniformly positive. They found themselves overjoyed to join together with other 
Protestants and discuss how they might expand the international community of 
evangelical Christendom, how they might continue their work to create a global 
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kingdom of God. The diversity of the gathering, the prominent place given German 
participants, and the overwhelmingly strategic character of the Edinburgh Missionary 
Conference helped confirm internationalists’ vision for international mission 
conferences. The World Missionary Conference had been a gathering of unlimited 
optimism and supreme certainty that Christian faith and power would change the 
world. Though there were instances of competitiveness, discord, and trepidation, the 
German missionaries who attended returned home only thinking of the glorious 
potential they had witnessed in Scotland.106 The gathering in Edinburgh in 1910 
fulfilled the aspirations of Germany’s old guard of internationalists and won, for a 
time, over many missionary nationalists as well. 
 
Reaction to Edinburgh in Germany 
 
 The earliest news of the Edinburgh Conference from German mission sources 
appeared in the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift in 1910, only shortly after attendees 
began reporting back to Germany.107 The missiological journal published a letter 
from the Edinburgh Conference delegates addressed to the “Christians of the world.” 
The delegates alerted their audience that the next ten years would “in all likelihood” 
witness a “turning point in human history.” The work of evangelization seemed to be, 
according to the message, teetering toward a final swing of all humanity over to 
Christianity. In preparation for this transformation, the World Missionary Conference 
members had begun organizing for the synchronization and strengthening of mission 
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activities around the world. However, every loyal Christian needed to contribute to 
raising other Christians’ awareness of their responsibilities with regards to this divine 
purpose. The Edinburgh delegates explained, while global mission advanced closer 
and closer to its divinely ordained success, there remained threats to internationalism. 
According to the Edinburgh leaders, the rising demands from the state for “patriotism 
and sacrifice” threatened to defeat the parallel rise of Christian (meant as 
international) missionary zeal.108 This, the first word out of Edinburgh, must have 
filled Germany’s remaining missionary internationalists with elation. 
 For Germany, the World Missionary Conference had received great attention 
in the public sphere and many important missionary leaders followed up their 
attendance in Edinburgh with speaking engagements for Germany’s middle classes. 
For example, Richter identified the echoes of the Edinburgh excitement in the 
Kaiser’s sponsorship of the Nationalspende. After his return from Edinburgh, Max 
Berner reported to the Colonial Secretary that he had shared to good effect the 
German colonial government’s “vital interest” in the concerns of global mission.109 
Many, according to Richter, saw that “through German mission German prestige 
[could be] promoted.” This too Richter hoped would be a sign of a new era, an era of 
recognition for German missionaries’ labors.110  
 To Richter, a man whose influence in German mission circles was growing 
daily, the Edinburgh Conference opened new possibilities for German and 
international mission. The cooperative structures formed and launched at Edinburgh 
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promised a renewal of the international program of evangelization. The establishment 
of the Continuation Committee had been the “high point” of the Edinburgh 
Conference.111 For Richter it might have been that the internationalism of the World 
Missionary Conference showed him that he and his fellow Germans did not have to 
choose between nationalism and internationalism. Perhaps Germany’s national 
interests could be served by a universal program of Christian mission. 
 The Continuation Committee formed to carry on the work of the Edinburgh 
Conference proffered the best hope for this new universal program. Shortly after its 
formation Richter began to tout the contributions Germany could make to the new 
international association. Germany’s model of national association amongst 
missionary organizations, the Ausschuß, needed a counterpart in England so that the 
“chains of union” could be forged. In addition, Germany’s well-developed system of 
academic and practical missionary training could be transmitted to the American and 
British mission societies for a general improvement of global evangelism. He also 
began proposing international ventures to improve cooperation; he proposed a unified 
statistical collection and a global effort to influence public opinion through the daily 
press, and the creation of an “international mission journal.” Finally, he hoped that 
this grand international system of evangelical governance could create an 
international commission that could help intercede between Protestant mission 
societies, whatever their ostensible nationality, and the various colonial and national 
governments.112 This idea was supported by the leaders of the Continental Mission 
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Conference; the key German mission leaders Theodor Öhler and August Wilhelm 
Schreiber, backed Richter’s proposal in a letter to the members of the Continental 
Mission Conference.113 Richter jumped with both feet into the nascent international 
movement, and considering how strong his nationalism had been, his apparent change 
of heart demonstrates the enthusiasm for internationalism that the Edinburgh 
Conference stimulated in German missionaries of every outlook. 
 The Ausschuß valued the hard work of Richter on the organization of the 
Edinburgh Conference in 1909 and 1910 and continued to honor his work on the 
Continuation Committee. At its February meeting in 1911 the Ausschuß delineated its 
expectations for the new international mission commission. The commission, the 
Ausschuß felt, should serve the general interests of the international mission 
movement by caring for individual missions’ needs. This could be done if the 
international commission concentrated on “societies whose rights [had] been 
interfered with by governmental procedures.” The general interest of mission in 
matters of the reduction of the spirit trade; abolition of the opium trade; promotion of 
international treaties on the  protection of indigenous peoples; opposition to slavery, 
the “coolie” trade, and the like; and the “elimination of infringements upon the rights 
of Christians and ensuring the interests of mission schools with regards to 
government policy in the mission territories.” In short, the international commission 
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should extend the areas of activity that the Ausschuß itself pursued in Germany into 
the global sphere.114 
Other important missionary leaders spread the joyful news from Edinburgh. 
Paul Otto Hennig of Herrnhut reported to an English colleague that he had toured 
Germany in the months following Edinburgh and “found everywhere the most hearty 
[sic] reception.” The Edinburgh Conference had invested a new “missionary thought 
and spirit…[into] many Christians…[and] a spirit of cooperation among the mission 
societies.”115 Hennig held these same views all the way into 1914 at the General 
Synod of the Herrnhut Brotherhood, the quinquenniel gathering of Moravian religious 
leaders from around the world. Hennig’s mission report included a note that the 
Edinburgh Conference had made it clear that “every society or church that wishes to 
pursue mission…[must] situate its work within the entirety of global mission.” He 
went on, “Edinburgh showed us duties like never seen by God’s Church. The Lord 
[had] opened the gates of the world wide.” He only hoped the world would take up 
God’s holy purpose. But, and here Hennig took solace in the other function of the 
Edinburgh Conference which he had perceived, the Moravians had also learned that 
they did not “stand alone.” Other mission societies faced exactly the same challenges 
as the Moravians and that could be a profound source of strength.116 The Edinburgh 
Conference had created in Hennig, and it is safe to assume others, a tangible sense of 
international purpose that would have served as a strong bulwark for many against the 
nationalizing pressures of the period. 
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 Hennig was not the only missionary leader to cling tightly to the memory of 
the Edinburgh Mission Conference. Julius Richter, of the Continuation Committee, 
presented a lecture to the gathered missionaries at the 1913 Bremen Conference on 
“The Impact of the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference upon Continental 
Mission Life.” Richter told his audience that the Edinburgh Conference was the 
“greatest, most unforgettable occasion in Protestant mission culture,” and every 
delegate at the conference would remember the “charm and magic” of that “holy day” 
as one of the most valuable memories of his or her life.117 Richter detailed for his 
audience a number of important advances in the wake of the World Missionary 
Conference. His affectionate memories revealed, again, that though he was 
increasingly espousing a nationalist mission ideology, Richter still held strong 
internationalist aspirations. 
 The continental missions, Richter told his audience, had, in Edinburgh, been 
drawn out of their isolation for the first time. At the same time, the American and 
British mission circles had been brought into greater acquaintance with the talents of 
their European counterparts. Perhaps now, he mused, the “principles and methods” of 
mission work studied and developed by German Missionswissenschaftler would 
receive the attention they deserved beyond the Continental Mission Conferences. The 
opportunity for international collaboration would also be fruitful for continental 
societies, Richter exulted. German, Dutch, and Scandinavian missions could learn 
from the “example of the Anglo-Saxons” the best methods for cultivating mission 
support in their home countries. Even more importantly, Richter hoped that the 
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brotherhood of missionaries that had arisen in Edinburgh would lead to a new “period 
of cooperation and missionary integration.”118 
 Many in the German Protestant mission movement felt that the next gathering 
place for international mission should be on the continent. Less than a year after the 
Edinburgh meeting, leading German missionaries sought to arrange for a German 
host city of the next international conference. The Continuation Committee undertook 
the planning for the 1920 World Mission Conference immediately after the 
Edinburgh Conference closed. The Canadians proffered Toronto as a host city but the 
Ausschuß felt a location on the European continent would be better suited. Öhler and 
the Ausschuß presented the case for a continental host city to the German mission 
societies. They argued with four major points. First, Protestant mission had three 
wings, American, British, and continental. The 1900 Conference had been in New 
York, 1910 in Edinburgh, so therefore the 1920 meeting should convene somewhere 
on the continent. Second, continental mission had a unique character with special 
“gifts and strengths”: a continental host city would allow these to come to their fullest 
potential. Third, were the mission conference held in Toronto, attendance from the 
continent would be very low, and as a result the conference would be a purely Anglo-
Saxon affair. The Edinburgh Conference had shown, by contrast, that a European 
location was no hindrance to American attendance. Finally, by placing the conference 
on the continent, Christian missionaries would place “scientific and practical work” at 
                                                 




the center of the goals of mission by recognizing the importance of the continental 
(i.e. German) traditions of mission work.119 
 The Protestant mission societies seemed amenable to Öhler’s proposition. At 
the next meeting of the Berlin Komitee in May of 1911 the gathered leaders resolved 
that they thought the continent the best location for the next global conference and 
agreed to help contribute to the costs of such a conference.120 The same week the 
Missionsdirektion of the Moravian Mission replied to Öhler that they wished to “join 
in inviting the World Congress to the continent.”121 The Ausschuß took its time 
drafting a proposal to the Continuation Committee, delaying into 1912. But then the 
Ausschuß leadership agreed to suggest Richter use his position on the Continuation 
Committee to request a continental host city for the 1920 conference.122 Then the 
1913 Bremen Conference voted in favor of a continental site and selected Germany as 
the host nation.123 
 Julius Richter was not the only missionary nationalist who caught the 
international bug with the hope that it would improve Germany’s mission culture. 
Karl Axenfeld produced another endorsement of Germany as host nation just a month 
before Germany’s declaration of war on France and Russia in 1914. This proposal 
met with such approval from the rest of the Ausschuß that parts of it were reproduced 
in whole in a memorandum that the Ausschuß submitted to the Continuation 
Committee on the very eve of World War I. He presented the case for Germany as the 
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best continental location for a world mission conference. According to him, only 
Germany among the continental mission nations possessed large mission fields in 
every region of Protestant mission work around the world. Axenfeld used arguments 
that he had used in 1910 with regards to the German Colonial Congress.124 He argued 
that Germany had fought for its political unity and had become a global power 
“overnight.” By holding the 1920 Conference in Germany, the victory of German 
unity and Christian development could be aided, helping bring the full strength of 
Germany into alliance with the international mission community.125 
 Axenfeld definitively described a future mission conference that fit neatly into 
the German system of mission conferences. He wrote, “The goal of the next world 
mission conference must be to secure the unity [of international mission] and through 
that make Christians more willing and more effective for their service to non-
Christian humanity.”126 A future German-hosted world mission conference should not 
be a carbon copy of the Edinburgh Conference; the “achievements of Edinburgh must 
constitute the premise for the next conference.” Axenfeld described how in just the 
four years since Edinburgh significant changes had transformed the mission sphere 
demanding that new strategies be developed in response.127 The international mission 
conference of 1920, like the previous conferences, provided an opportunity, in 
Axenfeld’s mind, for international missionary leaders to formulate strategic plans for 
the global evangelical project.128 
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 As already mentioned, Axenfeld’s ideas carried great weight among German 
missionaries by 1914 and the Ausschuß duplicated many of them in its “Expert 
Opinion of the German Mission Council on the Next World Mission Conference and 
its Meeting in Germany.” The Ausschuß directly reproduced Axenfeld’s language 
regarding the necessity of a world mission conference in Germany. Where Axenfeld 
had proposed Berlin, the Ausschuß added Hamburg as a possible site. The leaders of 
German mission also preserved Axenfeld’s argument that the next mission conference 
should be a strategic meeting. The topics covered at the Edinburgh Conference: 
developing indigenous churches, mission school policy, medical mission, and others 
were important but threatened to “schematize and flatten mission work.” The 
Ausschuß proposed concentration on broader themes, themes less likely to be 
distorted by local political and cultural conditions in mission fields. In other words, 
strategic and broadly theoretical issues of Christian mission.129 The guns of August 
would drown out German calls for a German host city for the 1920 World Missionary 
Conference; the hostilities of 1914-1918 also would put a final end to German 
missionaries’ internationalist ideology. Nonetheless, the excitement felt about the 
1910 Edinburgh Conference revived many German missionaries’ hopes for an 
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 At the same time that nationalist cultural norms encouraged German 
missionaries to adopt a more nationalist attitude in their fundraising and propaganda 
efforts, the same missionaries enjoyed a growing cordiality with their Anglophone co-
religionists. The structure of mission conferences that missionaries in Germany 
erected over the course of several decades and the ease with which they adapted the 
international mission conferences to that structure, made it easy for German 
Protestant missionaries to embrace the internationalism of mission cooperation. The 
gatherings in London in 1888, New York in 1900, and especially Edinburgh in 1910, 
carried forward German missionaries’ internationalist traditions. The meetings, 
especially the 1910 conference, provided tangible evidence of Germany’s 
membership in an international fraternity of evangelism. They did so with such 
effectiveness that even avowed nationalists like Julius Richter and Karl Axenfeld 
integrated internationalism into their nationalism at times. While the patterns of 
missiological discourse and metropolitan propagandization marked a definite slide by 
German Protestant missionaries towards nationalism, the support for international 






Chapter 6: From Edinburgh to Versailles 
 
It is more than just cliché to describe World War I’s effect on the German 
Protestant mission movement as the end of an era. The Protestant mission 
establishment viewed it as such from the very start. Missionaries experienced the war 
like every other German; many saw service at the front; German missionaries abroad 
in Entente territories had their activities restricted in ways ranging from mild to harsh, 
and mission houses gave over their space for use as hospitals and convalescence 
homes for the wounded. Missionaries, mission societies, and their national movement 
interpreted the wartime events a number of ways. For some the war was profound 
evidence of a new era; like the archetypical Freiwilliger, some missionary leaders 
charged headlong into the Great War hoping for a final forging of German 
Protestantism. To them the war promised to finally unify the people of the 
Reformation in one German nation devoted to its religious heritage and purpose. The 
Great War, for some, offered a chance to capitalize on the “re-founding” of the 
Kaiserreich. The furor of the war gave German mission leaders the chance to do more 
than just “roil the surface.” Axenfeld’s speech in September 1914 typified this idea, 
“Now the living, holy, all-powerful God speaks and reveals himself” as Germany’s 
only refuge. A Germany that joined together and called upon God for “assistance and 




God’s grace. Missionaries should pray for victory because such a nation, “ever more 
stalwart in the service of God” would show its gratitude in missionary deeds.1  
More complex was the reaction by some missionary leaders who interpreted 
the war as a certain sign of God’s will. Such commentators in the mission movement 
drew solace from the clarity they believed earthly events provided regarding divine 
providence. Still other missionaries (and sometimes the same ones who saw the war 
in a hopeful light) bore witness to the tragic effects of the war. In their literature they 
provided readers with narratives and descriptions of the practical impact of the war on 
German Protestant mission. Whatever the missionaries’ initial reaction to the war 
became, as it dragged into its second and third years, proof that missionary 
internationalism was dead. Some thought it had been murdered by the British and 
Americans, while others thought the war proved missionary internationalism had 
never been more than half-dead to begin with. 
The end of missionary internationalism in Germany was a two-fold process; 
first, German missionary leaders embraced the nationalist fervor of the war, forsaking 
in their own minds internationalism; second, over the course of the war, the British 
blockade and Entente conquest of German colonial territories indicated to German 
Protestant missionaries an Anglo-Saxon betrayal of the principles of internationalism. 
German missionaries simultaneously lost their interest in internationalism as the 
British and Americans seemed to militarily dismantle the international mission 
community. This chapter will discuss the German missionaries’ initial reaction to the 
outbreak of war in August 1914, and then their reaction to British activities during the 
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war. German missionaries’ interpretation of the war’s events led to a final rejection of 
mission internationalism. The chapter will also close with a discussion of the effect 
the war had upon German Protestant mission in concrete terms. 
 
Missionaries and the Spirit of 1914 
 
Jeffrey Verhey’s study of the “Spirit of 1914” offers some useful insights for 
understanding the behavior of Germany’s missionary leadership at the outset of the 
First World War. Verhey argues that the “myth of the Spirit of 1914” served the 
interests of every political faction within Germany.2 In their version of that myth, 
German conservatives and liberals read contemporary political and journalistic 
accounts of the German public’s emotional state in August 1914 as proof that 
Germans had finally recognized their common national identity.3 The leaders of 
Germany’s missionary leadership shared in this interpretation. As members of the 
intellectual elite, they, like other German intellectuals, dutifully sought to support this 
new unity.4 Between August and October of 1914, German missionaries offered their 
own addition to the language of unity, embracing the potential of a unified German 
Protestant nation poised to complete the unfinished work of the Reformation. 
On September 21, 1914, Karl Axenfeld delivered a remarkable speech in 
honor of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Brandenburg Aid Society for the Berlin 
Mission. The speech, hosted at the Stadtsmissionskirche in the Kreuzberg section of 
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Berlin and reprinted by the Berlin Mission as the pamphlet Mission und Vaterland, 
deutsch-christliche Reden in schwerer Zeit (Mission and the Fatherland, German 
Christian Orations in Dire Times), featured Axenfeld speaking along with the 
imperial family’s court chaplain, Ernst Dryander. Following a brief speech by 
Dryander, Axenfeld delivered his own discourse “Vaterland und Mission” 
(Fatherland and Mission). In his address Axenfeld celebrated the new unity that 
Germany had found in August 1914. The German people, Axenfeld told his listeners, 
had been called “to battle for life and death, to the fullest dedication of property and 
blood.”5 The war called upon all Germans to do their part for the nation’s survival. 
Germany’s mission movement, Axenfeld stated without any shadow of a 
doubt, was in this fight as well. The war had import not only for the German 
homeland but also for “[t]he symbiosis [Lebensgemeinschaft] of the Fatherland and 
mission…in this hour.” Axenfeld, ever mindful of the debate about internationalism 
and nationalism, defended his flank by acknowledging the universality of God’s 
message remained. However, Axenfeld argued that too strong a devotion to 
internationalism ignored the “natural” and “God-ordained” relationship between 
mission and nation. In fact, by this reasoning, internationalism defied God’s natural 
order. Axenfeld pointed out the significant assistance that Germany’s Protestant 
missionaries had received from the German nation and its colonial empire; the 
Nationalspende was just one example of the valuable assistance Axenfeld identified. 
More generally the “church and national life, colonial economy, trade and 
international standing of our Fatherland,” Axenfeld gushed, had been a “holy fount.” 
In the dire times of war, Axenfeld went on to catalog the effect the war had already 
                                                 




had upon his mission society; a fifth of the missionaries in training now bore arms for 
the state, mission fields had been cut off from the Heimat, and the mission stations in 
German Kiaochow had been destroyed. Axenfeld argued that Germany’s missionaries 
could not help but be part of Germany’s war. He proclaimed that German mission 
was ready, like the entire nation, to take up its share of the duties, sacrifices, and 
sorrows:6 “We believe and pray, we serve and sacrifice [ourselves] with our fighting, 
bleeding and dying brothers, with our beloved German Volk.”7 
In the first weeks of the war, German missionary officials encouraged the 
“spirit of 1914.” The meeting minutes of the executive of the Berlin Mission in early 
August 1914 record that in the “present situation” the majority of the mission’s 
leadership wished to know “[h]ow can we…best serve the Fatherland?”8 August 
Wilhelm Schreiber of the Evangelische Missions-Hilfe wrote to the leaders of 
Germany’s Protestant mission societies celebrating the “unforeseen unity and 
strength” of the German Volk. This unity needed to be cultivated. German missions 
had a “holy duty” to remind the German nation of the messages of the holy Gospels – 
messages like Jesus’ mission commision.9 Weeks before his speech at the 
Stadtsmissionskirche, Axenfeld wrote a colleague that the Berlin Mission Society had 
subordinated every other wish behind the desire to “serve the Fatherland.”10 He 
shared with the German members of the Continuation Committee on October 15, 
1914, his belief that “Our Volk, divided like no other [people] before the war, [was] 
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now joined in wondrous unity.”11 Germany’s missionary leadership eagerly embraced 
the struggle that Germany had entered because they hoped to see a unified Germany 
ready to reinforce the mission movement. 
Historical memory played an important role in missionaries’ efforts to express 
their enthusiasm for the war. Carl Paul reminded Leipzig Mission supporters that 
“100 years ago, when the German Volk struggled for its freedom, simultaneously [the 
Volk] underwent a religious awakening and deepening [of faith].” He hoped the 
coming battles of 1914 would “breed a similarly blessed fruit.” He, like many other 
missionary leaders thought the hardships of war might just complete the final 
transformation of Germany into a true mission nation.12 Paul’s comparison of 1914 to 
the Napoleonic era was not unique. Julius Richter claimed that even in the case of a 
defeat by the Entente, Germany would experience an even deeper awakening as it had 
after Napoleon’s defeat of Prussia at Jena in 1806. He continued, if Germany were to 
win the war, though there would be no need for a revival like that after Jena, the 
nation would have to accept the responsibility of world power, a responsibility for 
which he thought it should already begin preparing.13 Axenfeld identified this 
responsibility as the “responsibility for the elevation of the Gospels in the world and 
the direction of the mission injunction among the heathens and the Mohammedans.”14 
Germany’s final ascent to world power would also be a great victory for Christian 
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mission in Germany – it would force upon Germany the duty that the Protestant 
mission movement had been trying to cultivate for forty years. 
German mission leadership, especially Karl Axenfeld, but also more 
internationalist men like Carl Paul, joined in the nationalist outpouring at the 
beginning of World War I. This outpouring of nationalism had dire consequences for 
missionary ideas of international Christian fellowship. The voices of internationalism 
lost the initiative from the beginning and as the war continued the voices of 
nationalism grew stronger. The ups and downs of the war and the climate of 
uncompromising nationalism that prevailed in the German Empire muzzled any 
attempt to defend internationalism. After all, August Wilhelm Schreiber pointed out 
to the Moravian Mission leader Paul Otto Hennig, in August 1914, “the political 
outlook of mission [was] more difficult than ever before” and had mission stood 
against the war it would have only damaged the mission movement.15 
 
The Deconstruction of Internationalist Ideology 
 
The outbreak of the First World War further intensified the nationalism of 
men like Axenfeld and Richter. Nonetheless, others still clung to the forms of 
missionary internationalism. In 1915 Missionsinspektor Detlef Bracker of the 
Schleswig-Holstein Evangelical Lutheran Mission Society (Schleswig-Holsteinische 
Evangelisch-Lutherische Missionsgesellschaft), better known as the Breklum Society, 
wrote an objection to what he saw as “a great danger” to German mission. This 
danger was the growing and sustained pressure for German mission to have a 
                                                 




“national impact.” The chief target of Bracker’s criticism was Julius Richter. Bracker 
argued that Richter’s support for a mission with a national purpose was a grievous 
mistake and that a new clarification of the proper connection between the Christian 
and the national had become necessary. Bracker cited Galatians 3:28 as evidence that 
national difference was meaningless in the practice of Christian faith. As Bracker 
interpreted the passage, “All believers, whatever nation, whatever class and whatever 
sex they belong to…are all vines on one branch, not only ‘one’ but rather ‘One.’”16 
Bracker’s critique, Richter’s response, and Axenfeld’s intervention exemplify the 
impact of the political and military events of the First World War on the ideology of 
the Protestant mission movement. 
Bracker’s article did show some of the changes in mission internationalism 
over the years. He wrote that the unity of all believers should not transform all 
Christians into “a-national cosmopolitans” but instead into prosperous members of 
their Volk. As Bracker put it, “Christianity is supranational [hypernational] (not 
international, because spiritual life is not internal, but instead transcendental); it 
should directly activate in itself the national-ness of natural life, the universal in the 
particular.” Mission must hold in balance its correct relationship to the 
“supranational” and the national. Mission’s primary obligation was to encourage a 
recommitment to unity from all Christians. Devotion to Christianity’s universal 
message should remain superior to national loyalties. To Bracker, if the German 
people began to see themselves as superior to other Christians it would lead to 
                                                 




Germans perceiving themselves as the chosen people without any obligations to other 
nations of the earth.17 
Though German mission owed gratitude to the German people for their 
support of missionary work, mission, Bracker continued, could only pursue “religious 
goals, it must work religiously through and through, just as much at home [in der 
Heimat] as in the mission field, and must be completely selfless in national relations.” 
Deviation from this purpose, Bracker worried, would ruin the mission project. First, 
work in the mission field would be functionally destroyed. If missionaries could be 
accused of having national interests, Bracker argued, then missionary work would 
become tied up with national competition. And this, he concluded, would “fill the 
world with explosives” by combining national competition with religious fanaticism. 
Furthermore, the peoples to whom missionaries evangelized would become 
suspicious of missionary motives and turn away from salvation to superstition or, 
worse, Islam.18 At home as well, mission would suffer because, as Bracker reiterated, 
“the Kingdom of God is always injured if the national is mixed with the spiritual.” 
Mission societies’ special role as the carriers of Christian spiritual reawakening in 
Germany would be endangered in much the same way as with the “heathens” 
abroad.19 In short, to Bracker’s mind, while German missionaries retained certain 
obligations to their Fatherland, those obligations could not stand up to the higher duty 
of all Christians to the Gospels, and if national loyalty was wrongfully privileged over 
religious duty then the mission project would disintegrate. 
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Julius Richter acknowledged that the problem of the relationship between 
church and state was an issue of historical depth and consequence. He cast the matter 
as a question of whether or not a mission was authorized to extend its service to the 
political or economic interests of its home country. Richter acknowledged Bracker’s 
point that the location and political circumstances of every German mission society 
caused political difficulties. With nearly half of all German missionaries working in 
British colonies and many others working in other foreign empires, many German 
societies could not actively pursue any national program. Furthermore, he 
acknowledged that the first obligation of any existing German mission society ought 
to be to existing mission fields, wherever they may be. Only when a new mission 
society organized should the requirement be that German colonies be the first choice 
for destination.20 
All this was, to Richter’s mind, no concession to Bracker. What he truly took 
exception to was the matter of the importance of nation. For Richter, the “awakening 
and strengthening of the national mind” across Europe was the “strongest and 
healthiest factor” in the history of the nations of Europe during the nineteenth 
century. And on top of that, the “most difficult, greatest and healthiest creation [of 
this period] was the powerful strengthening of German national tradition,21 whose 
overwhelming manifestation in the current world war, particularly during the critical 
days of August 1914, would be count[ed] amongst the most magnificent episodes of 
world history.”22 How could German missionaries run away from these two 
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phenomena of world historical significance? Richter tied this moment to the medieval 
religious and military missions of the Germans under Charlemagne and Friedrich 
Barbarossa when both great German emperors fought for “Germandom” and for 
Christianity. 
Richter redoubled his claims with a passage from a speech he gave in January 
1915. In this remarkable speech, Richter outlined a new path for German mission. He 
declared that as German arms expanded Germany’s empire, “Germania should keep 
her good German Christian heart…she should be no violent conqueror…We wish to 
be proud of a pious, constant Germania, our hearts should cheer her, as her pennant 
travels to distant seas.” He continued and declared German mission’s place in this 
future. Mission could not confine itself to a narrow sphere; it must lead the German 
Volk as the foundation of a Christian worldview for Germany’s new global reality.23 
This impending global reality would be reliant upon German missionary participation 
to ensure that it serve the coming Kingdom of God. 
Richter returned to the terms of Bracker’s debate, and argued that mission 
must adapt to the new global and political reality. Bracker’s ideas were those of an 
earlier period, Richter countered, from a time when mission was not so deeply 
enmeshed with politics. The expansion of mission into national politics, colonial 
congresses, colonial mission conferences, mission professorships, and the 1913 
sponsorship by the Kaiser of the Evangelische Missions-Hilfe all signaled the mission 
movement’s changed political circumstances. Richter offered his own guidelines for a 
new mission ideology [Missionsmotiv]: German missionary groups should recognize 
no mission ideology outside or besides a biblical, Christian existence. Mission 
                                                 




remained a general Christian duty, and a part of mission work was the transformation 
of Christian peoples into missionary peoples. However, Richter maintained, this 
second point required a nationally-minded mission theory. Missionaries should not 
divorce themselves from their heritage. Missionized peoples should be encouraged to 
accept the particular cultural identity of the missionaries who evangelized to them.24 
Richter brought together older ideas about the importance of the mission project with 
newer ideas about the value of nationalism. 
Some months later, Karl Axenfeld observed that mission was in a “dual sense 
a citizen of two worlds.” Axenfeld discarded Warneck’s metaphor of mission as 
queen to a divine king ruling the entire globe for a metaphor casting Christianity as 
one identity over and above a global populace delineated into national communities. 
He noted that while mission served the “eternal” it also belonged to a particular 
nation. German mission could be regarded as “a part of the international texture of 
Christian mission, but also as a piece of German life.”25 Axenfeld went on in a 
lengthy essay to discuss the complex relationship of German mission and German 
national interests. 
 The First World War shook German missionary leaders’ confidence in the 
capabilities and possibilities of international mission. Axenfeld’s account of the 
impact of the war on German mission echoed the complaints of other German 
Protestant missionaries. He described how German missionaries had sought at home 
and abroad a “brotherly community” with foreign mission societies. Abandoned in 
the first months of the war, first by the British according to Axenfeld, this 
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international brotherhood proved nearly impossible to maintain. Axenfeld consoled 
his countrymen that the brotherhood had been “no illusion.” What had gone wrong 
was that the Germans had “overvalued that which united” the missions and 
“undervalued that which divided” them. That division lay in the national conditions 
of missionaries’ lives which gave every mission society its most fundamental 
character. Axenfeld argued that though Paul had written in Galatians that faith 
dissolved nationality, faith could not dissolve racial difference. Christianity could not 
remove the Christian from his or her family and, in the same way, membership in the 
Kingdom of God could not “dissolve or diminish the relationship between the 
individual and his national community [Volksgemeinschaft].”26 Having defined the 
inviolability of national belonging, Axenfeld went on to situate German mission in 
German national life. 
 According to Axenfeld German mission was undeniably German, and 
Axenfeld held that this was a good thing. Where there was a “German Christianity” 
there was also a “German mission,” Axenfeld wrote. Germany’s thousand-year 
history of Christianity had led to the formation of a particular German Christianity. 
Axenfeld explained that when a German missionary traveled to Africa, he brought, 
“German Christmas! German song! Johann Sebastian Bach and Albrecht Dürer!” 
Germany’s mission movement bore the mark of Germany’s history and German 
idealism. He exulted, “We hardly know how [much] richer we are than many, many 
other peoples!” And, Axenfeld continued, this strength honored God. Mission owed 
much to its morally and religiously exemplary Fatherland, because the Fatherland had 
bestowed upon its mission societies the honor “of [the German] name,…[Germany’s] 
                                                 




power, its science and technology [Technik],…its education,…culture of 
industriousness [Zucht und Fleiss], its urge for order and preparation,… [and the 
German] contemplative mind, internality and sobriety.” Furthermore, the special 
legacy of the Reformation had granted to Germany the grace to do for other peoples 
what God had done for Germans.27 German Christianity, because of Martin Luther’s 
legacy, possessed the clearest mark of God’s holy intention, Axenfeld reasoned. 
 Axenfeld concluded that if German missionaries’ “character and their spiritual 
occupation and goals” allowed it they should “seek and care for” the concerns of their 
Fatherland. Reprising a traditional Christian position on church and state, Axenfeld 
wrote that where German secular power reigned, German missionaries should support 
the goals of the administration whenever it did not conflict with their spiritual 
mission. By the same token, wherever another power reigned, Germans should seek 
to instill in their parishioners and supplicants positive feelings for Germany. In 
essence, German missionaries should perform “soft diplomacy” whenever possible. 
Axenfeld enjoined his fellow missionaries not to go too far, stating that “We are 
Christians [and] wish no other Lord” but must also follow the word, “all things 
belong to you (1 Corinthians 3:22), which speaks not only of our freedom but also of 
our duties.”28 German missionaries owed Germany their very essence and, as they 
could not abandon their national community, they must were duty-bound to serve the 
interests of the German nation as much as possible. 
 Bracker’s forceful defense of internationalism in Germany was an important 
indicator of the long-lasting durability of the imagined community of Christian 
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evangelicism within Germany. However, the view shared by Axenfeld and Richter 
continued a decade-long move to challenge the established strength of missionary 
internationalism. The course of the war and the impact of the war on missionaries’ 
values would bolster the younger generation’s nationalism. By the end of the war, 
though the loss of Germany’s colonies made the question largely irrelevant, most 
German Protestant missionaries had abandoned the old internationalism for a new 
missionary nationalism. 
Siegfried Knak of the Berlin Mission shared in this redefinition of the 
relationship between mission and the nation. Knak described God’s providential 
creation of the German nation as proof of God’s desire for a specific strand of 
Christianity to develop in Germany. According to the Berlin missionary, Germany 
was destined to be the source of a renewal of the Reformation around the globe. 
Mission had a duty to bring this special “German spirit” to the world.29 To Knak, the 
evidence from the war up to 1915 proved mission owed “more gratitude to the 
Fatherland” than to internationalism. Knak agreed with Axenfeld that in the past, 
community with Christians from other nations had been “overvalued,” and 
community with the Fatherland had been “undervalued.” Before colonialism, German 
missions had gone to the “heathens…only as children of Jesus,” but now, with the 
“non-European world divided into protectorates, colonies, and spheres of interest,” 
things must change. The missionary should remain a “child of Jesus,” but now his 
“belonging to the German Fatherland [was] a stronger factor in his work than before.” 
According to Knak, this change had significant effects. German missionaries had to 
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devote themselves to strengthening their homeland. The strength of the nation directly 
impacted the strength of its missionaries: “a weak Fatherland [made]…the 
ministrations of our emissaries amongst the heathens weaker and smaller, internally 
imperfect…”30 Not only was it impossible to separate the missionary from his 
homeland, Knak argued, it was imperative that the missionary work to strengthen his 
homeland so that his own work could prosper. 
For one leading missionary, the First World War had revealed the true state of 
German mission. Johannes Warneck wrote in the spring of 1915 that the war had 
“rolled back the particularistic and egoistic interests, and brought back selflessness, 
self-discipline, masculinity, valorousness, plainness,…faith in God, and self-
reflection” within German society.31 Like Germany, Warneck claimed, the nation’s 
mission societies were also undergoing a transformative experience. Perhaps in an 
effort to rationalize the losses to German mission of imprisoned missionaries, 
“orphaned” and “leaderless” indigenous congregations, destroyed mission property, 
and other losses of the war, the younger Warneck interpreted the war as an instrument 
of divine instruction. The war suggested a new path, one of greater unity. A unified 
German mission project could capitalize on the strengthening of German unity, and 
the crucible of the war would lead to a German society prepared to “work for the 
Kingdom of God.” A “hard, relentless war educates more than many years of 
untroubled prosperity,” Warneck wrote, and this education would focus the Germans 
on their mission duty.32 
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The growing commitment of German missionaries to nationalism, with 
Axenfeld driving his colleagues on, continued into 1916. A number of German 
missionaries, captured abroad by the Entente and repatriated to Germany in 1915, had 
pledged not to take up arms as members of the Central Powers’ militaries. However, 
the German War Ministry did not recognize the authority of those pledges. The 
Ausschuß sought a way to accommodate the needs of the state while avoiding an 
embarrassing violation that might later prevent missionaries who broke their oaths 
returning to mission fields in British territories after the war.33 Axenfeld, through his 
contacts with the German imperial government, worked to find a way for the 
missionaries to preserve their pledges and still serve the Fatherland.34 In November 
1916 Axenfeld informed missionaries that if called to serve they could be excused 
from armed service and take part in religious pastoral or labor service instead.35 This 
compromise, brokered by the nationalist Axenfeld, kept German missionaries in 
service to the German state but allowed them to preserve the conceit of independence. 
By 1916 new definitions of the relationship between religion and nation 
emerged. Christianity was not an “indigenous religion [Volksreligion];” 
Volksreligions were projections of their followers; Christianity was the “projection of 
God into the world.” That definition’s author, Albert Hauck, held a post as a 
professor of church history in Leipzig. He, like Axenfeld, made certain to protect his 
larger point from simple accusations of particularism. Mission must continue to be 
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ecumenical, his argument continued, and should the war end, Germany must be ready 
to renew its collaborative work with missionaries from other nations.36 However, like 
Axenfeld, Hauck argued for the religious sanctification of national difference. 
Hauck maintained that as men and women are not in one moment Christian 
and another moment German, religious work could only be taken up by missionaries 
“as Germans.” The necessity of this difference appeared in the particular ways that a 
Christian people might honor God. Albrecht Dürer could not have produced his 
devotional works in Rome, nor could the Sistine Madonna have been painted in 
Dresden (though, ironically, that was where it hung in 1916). Hauck pointed out that 
“art [was] only possible through national particularity.” Though there was no 
“German God” there was a “German Christendom.”37 Mission could, through these 
religious and national truths, lead the spread of German culture and prestige across 
the globe, as England and its mission societies had during the previous century.38 The 
First World War would act as a crucible that might burn away the “tensions of deep-
seated dogmatic” division in German Protestantism. Mission, because it did not 
concern itself with these denominational differences, would gain strength from a 
united German Protestantism purified by the trials of war. Germany, as land of the 
Reformation, would then have the opportunity to finally complete Luther’s 
Reformation. Every German would be reminded by the trials of the war that “mission 
work [was] a national duty.”39  
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, Walther Trittelvitz of the Bethel Mission understood 
the war as the final ordination of Germany as a mission nation. Bethel missionaries 
had consistently held the strongest devotion to the German nation and state. And on 
April 11, 1915, the leader of Bethel’s East African mission gave one of a series of 
lectures with a title that many would use between 1914 and 1918, “The War and 
German Mission.” Though the text of Trittelvitz’s lecture is lost, the publicity 
materials for the lecture series described its content. “After the war, the will to 
accentuate German character in the world,” the description read, “will be stronger 
than ever before.” The mission movement would become “a valuable aid” to the 
Germans’ “will” to spread their character around the world. Trittelvitz promised to 
answer in his lecture whether this meant that after the war “the emphasis on the 
particular [Nationalen] must hinder the Christian character of mission” and if mission 
could no longer be international.40 The new devotion of mission to the nation and of 
the nation to mission that the war was bound to create provided Trittelvitz with plenty 
of material for a long lecture. Even after the war Trittelvitz remembered World War I 
as “not only a struggle with physical weapons, but also a contest of spiritual 
strength;” a war in which the ministers and missionaries of the Bethel movement all 
took part.41 
The year 1917 brought about a new opportunity for German missionaries to 
reflect on the history of the Reformation and the First World War. Paul Otto Hennig 
found parallels between the current conditions of Protestant mission and the 
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Reformation. A beleaguered German nation found itself in the same position as 
Luther when he sheltered in Wartburg Castle from the Holy Roman Emperor. The 
connection between 1517 and 1917 had been best described by Carl Mirbt, according 
to Hennig. To make the link explicit in the minds of mission supporters Hennig 
advocated that the Ausschuß distribute Carl Mirbt’s “Protestant Mission: An 
Introduction to its History and Character” to the various mission support groups.42 
Hennig continued with this quest to advertise the link between mission and the 
Reformation through the summer of 1917, producing a form letter for distribution to 
possible buyers of Mirbt’s pamphlet.43 In that letter he closed with what would 
become a common theme among missionary leaders, “We may hope a happy 
outcome of this war will channel our Volk toward a still greater global mission.” The 
war could launch an evangelical project under the leadership of German Protestant 
missionaries, Hennig hoped.44 The Berlin Mission even offered to organize a slide 
show with lectures to “awake an appreciation and love for our colonies at the front” 
and presumably help show the German soldier just what he was fighting for.45 
As the First World War grimly moved into its second and third years, German 
missionaries’ patriotism only intensified. The intellectual debate over internationalist 
and nationalist approaches to mission work entered its final phase and ended with a 
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victory by the nationalists Richter and Axenfeld. The proof of their victory lay in the 
increasing nationalism of German Protestant missionaries’ communications and 
sentiments in 1916 and 1917. Missionaries adopted interpretations of their wartime 
circumstances as proof of the inherent truth of national difference. Nationalism 
became proof of God’s grand design and intentions for humanity. Still hungry for 
more explanations, some missionaries also argued that the war provided cosmological 
proof of God’s past, present, or future intentions. 
 
Global War as Divine Message 
 
Many missionaries sought a divine purpose in the destruction of the war. In 
general, the missionaries took solace in the certainty of God’s benevolence and 
comforted themselves that Germany and its mission movement would come out of the 
spiritual war stronger than they had been. At an October 1914 meeting of the German 
members of the Continuation Committee with the American missionary John R. Mott, 
Julius Richter described the opening of the war as awakening the feeling in Germany 
that “God had something grand to tell us.” At the same meeting, August Wilhelm 
Schreiber expressed his opinion that the war was proof that God had passed a 
judgment upon Germany, a judgment which would become clear in time.46 Later, in 
1915, the younger Warneck reflected that the war experience served notice to God’s 
missionaries that unlike the last century, in which everything had gone “flat and 
even” and made the missions and their congregations “soft,” the twentieth century 
                                                 





would require the mission movement to pass through “much adversity.” However, he 
wrote, “Adversity is the path to victory.”47  
To the veteran missionary Siegfried Knak the war signified God’s intent: “The 
war, this great friend of truth, which has destroyed so many illusions, which [has] 
fixed the true worth of men and objects, which [has] brought so many of the deepest 
connections to light, it now [has] compelled here like everywhere a recognition” of 
the truth of God’s plans.48 If mission could survive the trials of the Great War then a 
“new creation could emerge” on the other side of the “chaos.”49 To those missionaries 
who joined Germany’s fate with the fate of their own missions, the war became an 
important source of revelation. The events of the war could give Germany’s 
Protestants a tool with which to discern God’s will. Most concluded that the war 
would forge Germany and the German Protestant mission movement into a sanctified 
tool for the evangelization of the world. 
Paul Otto Hennig asked the same question as his colleagues had in a 1917 
article in the Basel mission journal. The suffering of the First World War, the 
“persecution of [God’s] messengers,” must provide evidence of God’s will. All that 
remained was to discern that will. Hennig pointed out that German missionaries 
suffered in the world because the missionaries were German. Everything that 
Germany’s missionaries, he wrote, “suffer[ed]…as members of the German Volk. The 
distress of the missionary is a piece of the opprobrium that [the enemy] wishe[d] to 
lay upon the German name, German work, German spirit, [and] German reputation 
everywhere in the world.” German missionary suffering as a consequence of their 
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German-ness proved to Hennig that the mission sphere and all of German 
Christendom stood under a judgment from God.50 
Hennig proceeded to lay out what he believed to be the causes of God’s 
punishment. One source was the spread of German faithlessness and frivolity to the 
educated of the “heathen” world. The spread of atheism and hedonism impugned the 
honor of the white man, and especially “tarnish[ed] German Protestants” before God. 
Germans had failed to observe the “holy responsibility” that accompanied the label 
“Christian.” The moral deterioration of the Heimat, so deleterious to the mission 
field, resulted, in part, from the neglect of the national by missionaries. The shared 
suffering of “German mission and the German Volk and even German mission and 
Auslandsdeutschtum [overseas Germandom]” during these years of war would have 
to bring German mission societies closer to the German nation, Hennig thought. In 
the future, mission would need (and want) to serve the German Volk at home and 
abroad loyally and unreservedly.51 In the aftermath of the Edinburgh Conference 
Hennig had been elated to discover that the German mission movement belonged to 
an international movement, though he did not belong to the ranks of Germany’s 
strongest missionary internationalists. His interpretation of the message of the First 
World War betrayed his complete transformation into a missionary nationalist by 
1917. 
Hennig’s second interpretation of God’s punishment of the German 
missionaries and their countrymen argued that German missionaries had lost some of 
their communion with the apostle Paul and the early church. Mission had, Hennig 
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agreed with Johannes Warneck, gotten too easy. Missionaries had reveled in the ways 
that God had “prepared the way and the path” for their work with modern 
transportation and communication. The war was a sign from God to remind 
missionaries of the necessity of trials of the body and the spirit; joy should come from 
living in a time of revelation.52 
The destruction of the resources of mission work in the colonies and at home 
by the advance of Germany’s enemies and the seemingly senseless destruction of 
modern war offered the third cause for judgment. Hennig argued that this was again a 
message from God that German missionaries had grown too committed to the 
financial side of their work. The dire straits of the war required a “reassessment.” 
Christian missionaries should recommit themselves to the spiritual side of their work 
and away from what Hennig saw as an inappropriate focus on gathering, distributing, 
and renewing capital within mission societies.53 In a similar vein, Hennig ultimately 
condemned the work of the Edinburgh Conference. The Conference had shown that 
the Protestant missionaries of the world had lost faith in the strength of God and 
sought to control the spread of mission. The mandate for mission, “Go forth in the 
entire world and make all the people my children,” had only the authority to sustain 
small-scale organizations. Attempts to guide the spread of Christianity on a grand 
scale defied God’s power.54 By implication, any expense of time or treasure upon 
activities not directly involving converting the unconverted was outside the scope of 
Christian activity.  
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Hennig saw the hardships of the war as divine proof of a conservative 
interpretation of the powers of Christian mission. He counseled missionary believers 
to use the trials of war to rededicate themselves to a simpler mission strategy, but one 
that also embraced the union of faith and nation. As he reminded his readers, the 
“shattered and consumed” strength of humanity required the faithful turn to the 
“strength of God.”55 By 1917 Hennig was not alone in this interpretation. Schreiber 
wrote the advisory committee of the Evangelische Missions-Hilfe that the world war 
had been “the hardest test in [German mission’s] history.” But God had visited this 
trial upon his believers to prepare them for the hard work “after the peace.”56 Even 
grimmer, Axenfeld wrote on November 3, 1918, as the German armies were 
collapsing on the Western Front, that “God [had] denied our Volk success and victory 
and directed us on the path of humiliation and hard work. [This path] must be more 
beneficial and more necessary for us than a triumph over all the peoples of the 
earth.”57 To many missionary leaders in Germany, the failures of the previous 
decades had required God scourge away the flawed doctrines of internationalism and 
the secularism of German nineteenth-century culture. 
Axenfeld’s dire pronouncement reflected a pessimistic bent that began to 
spread amongst the missionaries when they considered what the war might reveal 
about God’s intentions. Johannes Warneck reflected on the disappointing outcome of 
the war. Contrary to the spirit of 1914 and the hopes of the Protestant leadership, 
according to Warneck, the war had not fostered a religious revival as companion to a 
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national awakening.58 The hardships of war and the grim outcome had been a 
message from God, Warneck argued. “It is no accident…that the jubilee year of the 
Reformation coincided with [German mission’s] darkest hour.” The commemoration 
of the Reformation compelled German Protestants to remember the tribulations of 
that founding time, to treasure the truths, “unearthed from the word of God by 
Luther…the Gospel of mercy, of faith, of freedom.” The Reformation’s four-
hundred-year anniversary in 1917 provided, in Warneck’s opinion, yet another 
opportunity for Germany’s Protestants to receive God’s grace. 
Warneck wrote that in Germany’s “darkest hour” lay “hope for the future of 
German mission.” He reminded his readers that the Gospel of God’s grace was the 
“life-giving [lebenskräftig] root” of the mission enterprise. God had entrusted the 
Germans with a special duty to preserve and promote the Reformation and he 
interpreted the war as proof of this special destiny. German mission’s trials blessed 
God’s servants with the opportunity to renew their devotion to Jesus’ command to 
spread the Gospel around the world.59 This sentiment may have strengthened by the 
end of the war, but it was not an absent idea in September 1914. Court Chaplain, 
Ernst Dryander, declared, with the German advance halted in France and Russians 
occupying Eastern Prussia, “the destruction of these days are only a question of time 
for the Lord of Eternity…Above the ruins He himself stands with his steadfast 
promise: ‘Look! I am with you always, till the world ends!’ That is why we do not 
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despair!”60 Missionaries claimed that Germany’s hope for the future was to recognize 
God’s message and rededicate itself to the church. 
The growing certainty about God’s plans for Germany in particular rather than 
all of Christendom in general undermined support for internationalist interpretations. 
The hopes for internationalism took some time fully depart the Protestant mission 
movement in Germany. After all, many missionaries must have wondered, if God had 
meant for the cooperation of Edinburgh he would not have allowed a war between 
two of Protestant mission’s strongest powers. After detailing to a gathered audience 
in Berlin in September 1914 his sadness that Britain had joined with Russia and 
France in a war to destroy Germany, Axenfeld declared that while he knew 
Germany’s missionaries still loved their brethren in Britain, they still “wait[ed] with 
painful impatience for a clear testimonial from the English Christians, especially the 
men from Edinburgh,” that Britain’s “aggression” had caused the war. If none in 
Britain could acknowledge the injustice of the war then there could be no community 
between German and British missionaries, Axenfeld concluded.61 Soon Edinburgh 
was treated as a distant memory in Germany.  Knak told those gathered at the Halle 
Mission Conference in February of 1915, “the Edinburgh cooperation [now] lies 
smashed on the floor, the image of Protestantism become unified is gone like a dream 
in sobering daylight.”62 Two months after Knak’s speech, Johannes Warneck wrote 
how the war had brought the German Volk into unity and the “vague cosmopolitanism 
[from before the war] had suffered a deadly blow.” To him, the attempts at a global 
mission confederation before the war deserved to disappear. Warneck thought it 
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would have been “more beneficial to have more intensively cultivated the unity and 
cooperation of German missions” than work to foster friendship with the British 
mission societies.63 
Knak’s speech in Halle was the first explicit examination of the Edinburgh 
Conference during the First World War. He reminded his audience that the World 
Missionary Conference of 1910 had provided for many Germans the first inkling that 
they were part of an international community of Christians with a “communal project 
of overwhelming size” before them. And yet, the war showed that both England and 
Germany had turned away from internationalism. And since all things come from 
God, Knak reasoned, it must have been God’s design that Great Britain and Germany 
become enemies. After all, the dissolution of barriers between humans inherent in the 
Christian message, Knak explained, was God’s project, not humanity’s.64 And so, to 
remind Christendom of His power, God had brought the war. Others in Germany 
doubted whether the spirit of Edinburgh had ever really existed. The Leipzig 
professor Albert Hauck, wondered if the “mood [of cooperation] which the reports [of 
Edinburgh] described…was ever a true” reflection of the atmosphere. After all, how 
real could the unity of Edinburgh have been when now “England had, as much as it 
was capable, destroyed German Protestant mission.”65 
Perhaps one of the best pieces of evidence of how the First World War 
destroyed internationalism appears in the unpublished memoir of Walther Trittelvitz. 
Trittelvitz produced his memoir after the Second World War and his recollection of 
the Edinburgh Conference differed from the positive description he produced of the 
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conference in 1910. In his retelling, Trittelvitz claimed that while no one knew when 
the storm of World War I would break, “we heard its distant rumbling to be sure.”66 
The journey to Edinburgh had been a conscious effort on the part of the German 
mission circle to avoid a war. And yet, at the conference “racial and völkisch 
differences between the participants” diminished the basic unity of Protestant 
mission.67 Though Trittelvitz had reveled in the unity of the Edinburgh Conference in 
1910,68 the war experience altered the event in his memory. Apparently, to mission 
leaders after August 1914 Edinburgh and its internationalism had been only a figment 




Ernst Dryander, though not a formal member of the mission movement, 
delivered a momentous speech in the early days of the war that captured much of the 
mission leadership’s mood. He spoke of how many in Germany remembered the 
World Mission Conference in Edinburgh. “With uplifted hearts” the German mission 
men returned from Scotland, filled with certainty that they had witnessed a moment 
of portentous meaning unlike anything before. A new “community of the Redeeming 
Jesus Christ” had gathered and prepared to carry out holy work of mission. “And then 
the great Völkermord of this war came between” and destroyed the “fraternity 
[missionaries] had celebrated.”69 Dryander may have been the first, but soon others 
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would recognize that the Great War had destroyed missionary internationalism as an 
ideology within Germany. Once missionaries came to an interpretation that blamed 
Britain for entering the war it was a short step to then blame Britain for the 
destruction of international cooperation. 
In August 1914, Friedrich Würz of the Basel Mission, who considered himself 
German to the core70 but fortunate to be in a country “strictly neutral and 
independent,” wrote to the Continuation Committee members in Germany, Britain, 
the United States, and elsewhere to stress the “heavy blow” the war had and would 
deal to continental missions, especially German missions. He followed with a 
reminder and a call upon the missions to try and maintain the “deepening christian 
[sic] fellowship” that had arisen amongst them since Edinburgh. His August letter 
continued, the British members could help the most with this challenge by urging 
their government to treat the German missionaries in British colonies well. Würz 
reminded his readers, “There have been German critics for many years who demurred 
that German missions should spend their energy upon British colonies. It will be very 
difficult to silence them any longer, if German missionaries in British territories 
receive unfriendly treatment during this war.”71 In October he would repeat his 
message of unity at a meeting of the German members of the Continuation 
Committee, “What we experienced in and since Edinburgh, [was] a real community, 
which must persist.”72 The Basel missionary’s words would prove cassandran. 
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The Ausschuß included several members of the Continuation Committee: 
Gottlieb Haussleiter, Paul Otto Hennig, and Julius Richter. At an October 1915 
meeting of the Ausschuß all three defended their continued membership in the 
Continuation Committee against increasing criticism. Many in Germany had come to 
see the Continuation Committee as a tool of the British mission movement, and that 
the departure of Germany in protest against British “aggression” was meant to clearly 
communicate to the world German missionaries’ views. Richter argued that if the 
Germans left the Committee then it would hurt them with no tangible gain. 
Haussleiter and Hennig stressed the practical advantage for the future if the Germans 
maintained their affiliation with the organization. Other members of the Ausschuß did 
succeed with a proposal that the Ausschuß would not contribute any funds to support 
the Contination Committee’s work.73 The official report of the Ausschuß’s meeting 
described the group’s ultimate decision as designed to avoid closing future avenues of 
missionary activity.74 
Schreiber of the Evangelisches Missions-Hilfe wrote to the German members 
of the Continuation Committee on August 10, 1914, that he thought the support of 
“English Christianity” for British belligerence was completely understandable from a 
“national standpoint” but still neglected Britain’s religious obligation to international 
mission. He went on, “I believe, the leading men of mission cannot neglect the world 
mission of Christianity and must, on their part, assist that the damage not be too great 
and the bitterness amongst living Christians and mission friends not become too 
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great.”75 In early 1914, Schreiber sympathized with British missionaries’ nationalism. 
In fact, less than three weeks later he wrote Carl Paul of the Leipzig Mission on the 
value of good-hearted nationalism. He wrote, “If God, as it seems, intends something 
great for our beloved German nation” then the German missionary community must 
do all it could to maintain a just Christian spirit to preserve global evangelical 
mission.76 This sentiment remained salient into 1915, when the Ausschuß encouraged 
its member societies to include examples of friendly activities by the British and other 
Entente powers in their publications.77 
However, a residual commitment to internationalism in principle did not 
preclude many missionary leaders from abandoning Anglo-German friendship. An 
exchange between British and German theologians in a series of public letters 
illustrated the swift conclusion brought to British-German friendship by the First 
World War. Though a contest between theologians in the two countries in general, the 
rhetorical struggle in the fall of 1914 drew much from the German mission movement 
in particular.78 The “Appeal to Protestants Abroad,” penned by Axenfeld and signed 
by numerous German theologians, reminded Christians outside Germany of the hopes 
for cooperation developed at Edinburgh and called for the mission fields of the world 
to be left out of the fighting to prevent the “heathens” seeing Christians kill one 
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another.79 The British theological establishment answered with a rebuttal called “To 
the Christian Scholars of Europe and America: A Reply from Oxford to the German 
Address to Evangelical Christians,” which identified Germany’s violation of Belgian 
neutrality as the moral cause of the war.80 The British response seemed designed to 
excite a strong reaction from the Germans. It reminded its readers that the Germans 
had fought three aggressive wars since the 1860s, that the war reflected a historical 
plan on Germany’s part to expand with total disregard for other European peoples’ 
rights, and declared that “Until the saner elements of German public life can control 
the baser…will not the Christian scholars of other lands share our conviction that the 
contest in which our country has engaged is a contest on behalf of the supremest [sic] 
interests of Christian civilization?”81 Schreiber’s reaction to the “Rebuttal,” as the 
Germans thought of it, was indicative of the document’s effect in Germany. He 
doubted that words could solve the “sharply embittered” antagonism between 
England and Germany and noted that the English clergymen had ignored “England’s 
jealousy of Germany’s expansion.”82 Axenfeld viewed the response of the forty-two 
clergymen as proof that Germany could not expect a fair judgment from English 
Christians. He felt he and his colleagues could now only, “as Germans and 
                                                 
79 Charles E. Bailey, “The British Protestant Theologians in the First World War: Germanophobia 
Unleashed,” Harvard Theological Review 77(2, Apr. 1984) 201. For the opening efforts to solicit 
signatories see BMW/bmw1/2250 and AFSt/ALMW-DHM II.27.1.15.II. 
80 To the Christian Scholars of Europe and America: A Reply from Oxford to the German Address to 
Evangelical Christians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1914); and Bailey, “The British Protestant 
Theologians in the First World War,” 202. 
81 To the Christian Scholars of Europe and America, 4, 6, and 15. 
82 Schreiber to Axenfeld, Max Berner, Adolf von Harnack, Friedrich Lahusen, Julius Richter, and 




Christians,” hope that England would suffer a defeat and that experience would teach 
the British the error of their actions in August and the Fall of 1914.83 
For many German missionaries, Britain’s declaration of war in 1914 had felt 
like a betrayal. August Wilhelm Schreiber described Julius Richter as probably the 
most deeply wounded of all.84 Richter and his colleagues came to view Britain’s 
stated reason for entering the war – the defense of Belgian neutrality – as a lie. 
Richter said in October 1914 that “the war [was] a crime of official England against 
Christendom,” a war driven by “base motives of jealousy.” Schreiber agreed, calling 
the “formal question of the violation of neutrality” a “welcome pretense” for British 
aggression. He placed it alongside France’s “thirst for revenge” and Russian pan-
Slavism as causes of the First World War. To complete the triumvirate of key 
nationalist missionary leaders, Karl Axenfeld also blamed the war on the “growing 
jealousy of England.”85 Finally, the Leipzig Mission’s director, Carl Paul, who had 
dismissed the link between national interest and mission interest as flawed in 1904, 
gave a lecture in November 1914 that unequivocally cited British (and French) 
resentment of Germany’s colonies (“[symbols] of [Germany’s] developing world 
power status”) as the true cause of the war.86 This impression of the war’s causes 
helped German missionaries certify for themselves that Germany fought a just war.87 
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Some did try to prevent a total break between German and British mission. 
The unique position of the Basel Mission, based in neutral Switzerland but considered 
by Protestant missionaries around the world as a German mission, allowed its leader 
during the war, Friedrich Würz, to serve as something of an intermediary between the 
British and German mission movements. In late August 1914, Würz forwarded a call 
for prayer issued by J. H. Oldham, editor of the International Review of Missions88 
and secretary of the Continuation Committee, to Axenfeld.89 Axenfeld’s response was 
vociferous, “you in your acquired neutrality and Oldham on his island do not notice 
how audacious” such a call is when “murdering thugs [the French and Russian 
armies] break from left and right” into our house to rob and to murder. He went on, 
“every morning the casualty lists loudly cry of the blood of the sons of our nation” 
and drown out Oldham’s call to prayer. Axenfeld guaranteed that God heard the 
Germans’ prayers, “And what we have to say to [God], no Englishmen need teach 
us.”90 Axenfeld and Würz were old colleagues and friends, using the German 
informal “du” in their correspondence. Yet, Axenfeld did not hesitate to condemn his 
friend for suggesting any community of intentions with the British. 
Axenfeld shared his true feelings with Würz. His more considered position he 
sent to Oldham. To Oldham he wrote that “Christians in [Britain] should do 
something completely different for [Germans] than aim religious challenges.” He 
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informed Oldham, that though the Germans had once happily taken instruction from 
English Christianity, they would no longer. According to Axenfeld, England had 
taken the lead in the war conspiracy against Germany and had made the most 
important mission territories into battlefields in a civil war between Christians. 
Axenfeld condemned the British for turning African troops and “heathen” Japanese 
against Germany. For these reasons, Axenfeld went on, so long as British Christians 
failed to condemn the war, they “no longer possess[ed] the right to bear the same 
banner of Christ as other peoples.”91 Furthermore, Axenfeld declared that he would 
not distribute Oldham’s call for prayer. For the moment, he claimed, Germans felt no 
community with the British. He did hope, however, “that a day [would] come again 
on which Christians who are now fighting [each other] [could] again take one 
another’s hand” in friendship.92 
 Axenfeld quickly became Britain’s greatest enemy in German mission circles. 
His strong nationalist feeling had been evident in his attitudes towards 
internationalism before the war, but the outbreak of fighting between the United 
Kingdom and Germany had radicalized him further. A few days after he wrote 
Oldham, Axenfeld wrote Bishop Benjamin LaTrobe, the British representative on the 
five-member Missionsdirektion of the Moravian Church. Axenfeld wrote LaTrobe 
that he regretted that so many of LaTrobe’s countrymen had allied themselves with 
“Russian arsonists, Catholic Belgians and Frenchmen, blood-splattered Serbs and 
heathen Japanese.”93 Axenfeld’s words reveal how important the idea of religious 
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unity, in particular Protestant unity was to him. The British betrayal of Protestantism 
for Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and “heathen” Asian faiths deserved nearly as 
much opprobrium as going to war with Germany had. In this letter and his letter to 




From the first months of the war Germany’s Protestant missions began 
chronicling the toll the war was extracting from their organizations. The Leipzig 
Mission reported that their activities in the German colonies were especially 
aggravated by “enemy attacks” because many missionaries had been drawn into the 
military by local administrators for the defense of the colonies.94 Five days after the 
outbreak of the war Leipzig Mission Director Paul wrote to all of the Leipzig 
Mission’s supporters that the outbreak of war had put the mission in “distress.” 
Missionaries in training were called to the colors and finances were sure to be 
imperiled by the economic dislocation of war and the closed lines of communication 
for transferring funds to mission fields.95 By 1916 the Evangelisches Missions-Hilfe 
published a pamphlet that included a depressing conclusion for supporters of German 
missionaries. It declared that Germany’s mission work in the entire British Empire 
                                                                                                                                           
compelled to fight under christian [sic] nations against Christians, and in the mission fields they will 
point with their fingers even at christian [sic] missionaries who in their eyes have become enemies of 
each other. The harm done to the cause of christianity [sic] by this war seems quite unmeasurable.” 
Würz to members of the Continuation Committee (August 12, 1914), BMW/bmw1/2250. See also 
Minutes of the Deutschen Evangelischen Missionsausschuß (October 7-8, 1914), BMW/bmw1/8204; 
for a discussion of Britain and France’s use of Muslim and “heathen” troops. 
94 “Die bedrohten deutschen Kolonialmissionen,” Evangelisch-lutherisches Missionsblatt 31(1914): 
402. 





was “as good as destroyed, the German missionaries [were] displaced or taken into 
custody, the [indigenous] congregations orphaned and left to instruct themselves.”96 
In real numbers, Julius Richter reported in 1918 that after more than three years of 
war the number of mission stations had fallen by more than a quarter, from 744 
stations to about 550. Even worse, the number of missionaries stood at only about 550 
men and 150 women in the field, from a 1913 high of 1430.97 
Just after the armistice in 1918, Karl Axenfeld made a set of proposals 
designed to salvage what remained of the German mission movement. A testament to 
the desperate straits in which he and his colleagues found themselves was his first 
proposal: all Germans pray. This would help the mission supporters “humble 
[themselves] and patiently await His hour and His way.” The lost territories, seized 
by Entente forces, would serve as a focus for continued exertions in the mission cause 
in Germany so that when the mission fields returned to their rightful masters mission 
work could begin anew with fresh energy. The experience would instruct the German 
people and renew their spiritual commitment, as all suffering and privation does, 
Axenfeld concluded. God would favor the German nation; he would “preserve and 
bless German mission.”98 For Axenfeld the events of the war had not shaken his 
confidence in the ordained role of Germany in God’s plan for the world. In fact, if 
Germany stayed committed to Christian mission then Axenfeld believed God would 
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care for the German people. Axenfeld’s thoughts received a wide audience as they 
were published in a number of German missionary periodicals.99 
Mission leaders suffered more personal losses during the war. Julius Richter’s 
son was killed at Arras in 1917.100 Max Berner lost his step-son in the first month of 
the war,101 and Karl Axenfeld lost his son Wilhelm in 1916. In 1936, Martin Schlunk, 
Professor of Missionswissenschaft at the University of Tübingen, sought to create a 
“roll of honor” of German missionaries who died during the First World War. He 
distributed a list of those mission workers and their family members that he knew to 
have died during the war. Though Schlunk’s list was not authoritative (part of his 
purpose was to solicit additional names from the various mission societies); the list 
does give a picture of the losses by the mission societies. The Leipzig Mission lost 22 
missionaries and missionaries’ sons, including Gerhard and Siegfried Dachselt, who 
served in the same regiment and died in the same battle; the Bethel Mission had 13 
members killed in the war and the Moravians and Berlin Mission each lost 40 and 48 
workers and family members, respectively.102 
 
The Destruction of German Mission 
 
At the beginning of the war it was not uncommon to believe that the British 
would, in the end, repent their sins: “our errant brothers will yet regain their senses 
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and judgment and perform their penance.”103 Karl Axenfeld cautioned that the “bitter 
disappointments” of the war should not lead to the slogan, “Just or unjust, I only seek 
advantage for my country.” The glory of service to all in the Kingdom of Christ, 
Axenfeld said, would not allow that.104 Other leaders wondered at the evidence that 
the militaristic spirit ruled in England as much as Germany.105 Of course, these ideas 
did not last long past the opening months of the war. Soon German missionary 
leaders began to feel certain that the British were determined to use the war to destroy 
German mission wherever they could. 
By the end of 1914 many in the German mission movement had concluded 
that Britain was no longer a reliable partner in international mission. The Berlin 
Mission Society produced a report, “How has the War Affected the German Mission 
Fields?” In that report, Britain was accused of a “systematic incitement of the entire 
world against German culture [Gedanken] in every form.”106 The Allgemeine 
Missions-Nachrichten, organ of the Evangelisches Missions-Hilfe, complained 
bitterly in early 1915 that there had been “no public protest by English mission 
friends” against English “aggression.” The editors of the Allgemeine Missions-
Nachrichten wondered if some in Great Britain saw the “prostration of Germany and 
the destruction of its militarism” as a piece of the mission project “given to the 
English people by God” so that “His Kingdom of peace on Earth” might be 
established.107 This ironic suggestion carried with it all of the growing bitterness in 
Germany towards its former mission colleague Britain. The Allgemeine Missions-
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Nachrichten, unsurprisingly since its founding principles committed it to advocating a 
German national mission ethos, became a regular location for screeds against the 
supposed faithlessness and betrayals on the part of British missionaries. It also soon 
became a site for cursing the complicity of the neutral nations. The United Kingdom’s 
violations of the Congo Act by interring German missionaries, namely the Act’s 
guarantee of religious freedom; and desertion of “the solidarity of the white race” 
brought about no protest from the neutral mission nations, according to the 
Allgemeine Missions-Nachrichten.108 The Evangelisches Missions-Hilfe made its 
displeasure known in a 1916 pamphlet as well; the author Albert Hauck, a professor 
of church history in Leipzig, bemoaned that the “hate and irrationality” shown by 
England in two years of war left German missionaries “little good to expect from the 
future.”109 
By 1917 even one-time internationalist Paul Otto Hennig saw the war as a 
tragedy for Christianity. He opened “The Answer of the Mission Community to the 
Persecution of Its Messengers,” an article in the Basel Society’s journal, with a 
description of an attack upon the eighteenth-century Pennsylvania missions of his 
Moravian Brotherhood.110 The murder of eleven missionaries by “heathen Indians,” 
Hennig wrote, fell within the normal tribulations and risks of mission work. But in 
1917, Hennig continued, “it is not wild Indians; the mission does not suffer the 
obvious afflictions that a servant of Christ must be ready to bear.” Christian 
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missionaries suffer the “blows and hatred of Christians who…we had thought” served 
and valued the same holy project as the Moravian Mission. Though it was Germans 
suffering these privations, the “present war makes the Christian peoples into 
destroyers” and the sight of Christian missionaries in detention camps is “only the 
physical sign of the deep inner suffering of a critically ill Christianity.”111 Hennig’s 
description made it clear that he considered the British guilty of causing the illness in 
global Christianity. 
Along with condemnations of their activities, the British were also condemned 
for their associations during the war. They had set the “perfidious Japanese” upon 
Germany and dragged the “unsuspecting Naturvölker [primitive peoples] of Africa” 
into the war.112 The British had betrayed the union of Protestant Christians that had 
been sanctified in Edinburgh and joined Russia and France in a war to destroy 
Germany. England’s sins would allow the “Heimat of the Reformation and the most 
fertile soil of European culture [to be] ravaged by Russian hordes.”113 Carl Paul 
worried that the fraternity of the Edinburgh Conference had only been “a beautiful 
dream.” And he pleaded that God protect Germany’s missions from “evil whites” and 
those that the “evil whites” had prodded into aggression against Germany.114 
 In the summer of 1917, the German missionary societies continued to blame 
the British for the demise of the principles of Edinburgh and of German Protestant 
mission. In June the Ausschuß produced a Denkschrift, an extended memorandum, on 
German evangelical missions for the Colonial Secretary, Wilhelm Solf. In section 
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three of the Denkschrift the authors, Axenfeld, Richter, and Schreiber, wrote that 
England had attacked its natural racial and religious allies, the Germans. The British 
had encouraged Japanese aggression and violated the religious freedoms guaranteed 
in the Congo Act of 1885, which had divided the African continent. The resentments 
against, and alienation from, the British were now so deep, the authors of the 
Denkschrift continued, that the religious bonds between Germany and England had 
been more grievously damaged than any other element of German religious life.115 
In 1918 Julius Richter gave the final verdict on the First World War. The 
“World War led directly to a catastrophe of German mission,” and Britain and her 
allies had aggressively destroyed the mission. The Entente powers had abandoned 
international colonial mission for their own national interests.116 The British 
government had applied to conquered German territories a “nationality principle,” 
according to Richter. And yet, even this policy was abused in the interests of a total 
destruction of German mission activities; even the Basel and Herrnhut Missions, both 
of which had significant membership from either neutral nations (Switzerland) or 
Entente nations (the Herrnhut Brotherhood, as has already been discussed, included 
significant communities in Britain and the United States) had been expelled from 
their mission territories. The British government, filled with “hate for Germany,” did 
not recognize even these missions as international, but instead as German.117 
The entry of the United States into the war drew grave condemnation from the 
editors of the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift. What drew the greatest complaint was 
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the behavior of John R. Mott. The Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift reminded its 
readers that in the fall of 1916 Mott had declared himself committed to ecumenicism 
in the “struggle of the peoples.” However, after the entry of the United States, Mott 
telegrammed to the British YMCA that he was “no longer neutral” and was now 
ready to join the “battle for truth and justice” with the Entente against Germany.118 
Mott enthusiastically joined the American war effort and what, to German 
missionaries, appeared to be a movement of anti-German sentiment amongst British 
missionary leaders. As a consequence, the German members of the Continuation 
Committee petitioned that Mott be removed from his position as chairperson for 
damaging the “supra-nationality of Christian mission and the church of Christ.”119 
The official “Entwurf” (Proposal) produced by the German members of the 
Continuation Committee for the larger Committee opened with the accusation that 
Mott, “who we all had honored and whom we all had trusted,” had “consented to 
travel to Russia with the American political-military mission” with the intent to work 
against Germany. Therefore, Mott was now a “fellow combatant against the German 
Volk,” having abandoned his “supranational position.”120 
Mott’s apparently eager participation in the American war effort, like the 
behavior of British theologians in 1914, struck German Protestant missionary leaders 
as a betrayal of missionary neutrality and internationalism and, at the same time, a 
specifically anti-German act. Mott joined the British religious establishment as 
symbols amongst the Germans of Anglo-Saxon infidelity to internationalism. While 
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some in Germany continued to call for international cooperation with the reduced 
roster of possible partners (Scandinavia, mostly),121 they were left with little 
legitimacy against those who maligned the destruction of international Christian 
mission at the hands of the British and Americans. 
 
The Peace Settlement 
 
German missionaries were eager to consider the future of mission from the 
ruins of the German Empire in 1918. Germany, according to Axenfeld, had been 
“unlucky” because during the war its government was unable to “unify the will of the 
people.”122 The failure of the “spirit of 1914” left Germany broken and defeated in 
1918. Axenfeld, however, placed more of the blame for German missionaries’ 
position on Britain. According to him, “wherever [Britain] had the power” the British 
government had become increasingly “ruthless and brutal.” Britain’s policy was 
designed to destroy German mission and to keep German mission from recovering 
after the peace. In the occupied German colonies, German missionaries, “entirely 
uninvolved in the war,” were “imprisoned, deported, transported from place to place, 
brutally separated from their families” by British forces; their stations were 
plundered, their congregations “made orphans,” isolated from their home country and 
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mission leadership, “in short, everything done in order to …destroy German 
mission.”123 
The peace negotiations and the end of the war brought many of the indistinct 
fears that German Protestant missionary leaders had felt in 1917 and 1918 out of the 
realm of speculation and into real concern. Richter described German missionary 
friends’ “hearts trembl[ing]” with trepidation following the armistice and its terms.124 
The 1919 Jahresbericht of the Brüderunität reflected this worry and its confirmation 
by the Entente. According to the Moravian Church’s leadership, “From month to 
month we have hoped for the awakening of Christian feeling in the world…But now 
the once blossoming German mission realm lies desolate.” A destruction wrought by 
a “cool, abrasive ‘no’ [from] the victorious masters of the world” to German calls for 
mercy and justice.125 
In March of 1918 the Komitee of the Berlin Mission Society received the 
news via Würz in Basel, who remained in contact with Oldham, that the English 
government had made a fateful decision. German missionaries would no longer be 
suffered in British territories.126 This news coincided with an offer made by the 
Church Missionary Society, again via Würz, to both the Berlin and Leipzig Missions. 
The Church Missionary Society asked for assistance from the German missions as it 
was going to be taking over their mission fields.127 The Berlin Mission sent its 
response, authored by Axenfeld, back through Würz. Axenfeld asked that Würz 
inform the Church Missionary Society that the Berlin Mission Society could think of 
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no better society to take over its activities in East Africa. However, that did not mean 
the Berlin Mission would help the Church Missionary Society with the job. In fact, 
Axenfeld wrote, the Berlin Mission’s leadership was certain that “God would return 
the colony to [its] Fatherland and the mission field to [the Berlin Mission 
Society].”128 
The Versailles Peace Treaty made the informal British governmental 
reassignment of mission fields of 1918 official. Article 438 of the treaty guaranteed 
that those areas and properties that had been devoted to mission work under German 
mission societies would continue in that purpose. However, it gave over all those 
territories for the Entente governments to reapportion: “The Allied and Associated 
Governments, while continuing to maintain full control as to the individuals by whom 
the Missions are conducted, will safeguard the interests of such Missions.”129 In 
practice this meant a redistribution of the German mission fields to non-German 
mission organizations. According to the Komitee of the Berlin Mission, the “leaders 
of Anglo-Saxon mission life, at the top Dr. Mott and Oldham, [thought] the exclusion 
[of German mission societies] inevitable” and wished to see American and British 
missions take over the German fields.130 
The abuses of the British in the last years of the war, Richter declared, could 
only be corrected by world opinion. The destruction of German mission societies and 
mission fields by Britain’s “nationality principle” had decimated German activities in 
the former German colonies and in their old fields in the British colonies. Richter 
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doubted the mission circles of the other Protestant nations could be depended upon; 
perhaps better to pray to God for salvation.131 The decisions made by the British 
government, or at least the decisions that the German Protestant mission sphere 
thought the British government had made, both practically and theoretically put an 
end to German missionary internationalism. The nearly complete end of German 
foreign mission in Germany’s former colonies and Britain’s empire eviscerated the 
German Protestant mission movement. Furthermore, the manner of the mission 
movement’s end embittered Germany so completely against the other two “legs” of 





Karl Axenfeld did not shy away from the question of internationality versus 
nationality at the end of the First World War. According to him the debate over the 
“national or international character” of Christian mission had begun in Germany, 
moved to the neutral nations, and finally to England and America. While this 
dissertation has shown the debate was older, Axenfeld placed its provenance at the 
outbreak of the war. He also argued that the question would receive a lasting 
resolution with the decisions made in the Versailles Peace Treaty. According to 
Axenfeld, the German mission project had held to international forms from its 
inception; German missionaries had served the British Empire in South Africa and 
India, he wrote: “If any state owes thanks to the mission of a foreign people for 
                                                 




selfless, loyal service; it is England to the Germans.” This selfless, loyal service grew 
out of the principles of foreign mission, Axenfeld explained. Mission must be 
independent from national control to distance itself from “the brutality of colonial 
conquest” and to gain the “strongest influence upon the native population.” And yet, 
the Berlin Mission’s leader continued, Britain had ignored the obvious “supra-
nationality” of the German missions and aggressively destroyed the Germans’ 
operations.132 
Axenfeld and his colleagues in Germany faced the destruction of their mission 
work during the First World War with grim sorrow. For them, British missionaries 
and the British government had been the most active force dismembering Germany’s 
once vital mission movement. One effect of this process was a firm dismissal from 
German mission ideology of the internationalist principle. Coming hard on the heels 
of the successful national fundraising work of the Nationalspende, the First World 
War and the nationalist outpouring from the beginning of the war onward also made 
internationalism seem illusory. How could promises of international community be 
anything more than figments when laid alongside the Marks delivered to German 
mission societies by the patriotic program of the Nationalspende and the outpouring 
of national feeling that arose in August 1914? The First World War destroyed any 
real international community of Protestant missionaries, but even more importantly it 
destroyed the imagined internationalist Christian community that German 
missionaries had cherished for more than thirty years. 
 
                                                 






 German missionaries’ Protestant internationalism was an alternative 
adaptation to the dislocations and anxieties of globalization during the late nineteenth 
century. German missionaries, already skeptical of industrialization, urbanization, 
commercialization, and secularism before the establishment of the Kaiserreich in 
1871, let alone the creation of a German colonial empire in 1884, found in their 
internationalism a ready-made response to the difficulties presented by a shrinking 
world. If the First World War was an “escape forward” for the old regime in 
Wilhelmine Germany, then missionary internationalism might also be considered an 
“escape forward” for Germany’s missionaries. However, German missionaries did 
not construct a false ideal to justify their response to globalization. Their 
internationalism was sincere and consequential. It formed the core of an anti-
nationalist imperialism that had profound effects upon the shape that German 
colonialism took before 1914. Missionary intellectuals and leaders in Germany 
fashioned and adhered to a remarkably consistent ideology of missionary 
internationalism into the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century. 
The First World War concluded the long and rich history of German 
missionary internationalism. However, this is not to say that missionary 
internationalism was yet another illusion that the Great War dispelled. In fact, the 
commitment to a universal mission Christianity dissipated over the course of the 




that dispersed German Protestant missionaries’ imagined international community. In 
fact, the story of Germany’s mission movement during the late nineteenth century 
was not a simple tragedy – a tale of universalist internationalism slowly sliding 
toward a nationalist downfall concluding with a cataclysmic denouement. While the 
general trend of German missionary ideology did tend toward a growing nationalism, 
the events that shaped the shift to missionary nationalism were more complex, and 
missionaries did, at times, maintain their internationalism against nationalist pressure. 
In fact, as I have shown in this dissertation, missionary internationalism was 
more a victim of circumstance than of fate. Certainly the nationalism of missionary 
leaders like Karl Axenfeld, Julius Richter, and August Wilhelm Schreiber fostered 
during their youth under the black, red, and white German imperial banner played an 
important part in the shaping of missionary ideology during the years after 1900. But 
even they, the strongest missionary nationalists, could not have fully inspired 
Germany’s mission movement to abandon the internationalist community with which 
Gustav Warneck and Franz Michael Zahn had joined German Protestant missionaries 
during the 1870s, -80s, and -90s. As I have demonstrated, missionary internationalism 
remained a strong force even after 1900, in large part thanks to the strong precedents 
set by Warneck and Zahn that allowed their arguments to remain compelling into the 
twentieth century. German Protestant missionaries’ devotion to an internationalist and 
European Christian universalist ideal bolstered the defense of missionary educational 
and linguistic policies and bound the German Protestant mission societies with a 
community of Protestants through a hierarchy of mission conferences. The final 




came as a result of circumstances that encouraged missionaries to think of themselves 
as Germans first. The conflict between the Berlin Mission and the Benedictines of St. 
Ottilien and the fundraising success of the Nationalspende provided missionary 
leaders with tangible proof of the value of nationalism. 
Nationalism seemed, in the end, to win out over internationalism because it 
proved more useful to the political and financial needs of Germany’s Protestant 
missionaries. However, it is unclear how strongly Germany’s missionaries felt their 
nationalism. Certainly Axenfeld and Schreiber longed to transform the German 
mission movement into an auxiliary force for the German Empire. But other 
missionaries may not have been so eager to abandon the internationalist path. 
Missionaries may have favored the nationalist path simply because the imperial state 
had made efforts to utilize nationalism to help mobilize the German populace for its 
purposes. By taking on the nationalist mantle missionaries gained an important ally 
and discovered in the process that nationalism could be a useful tool for promoting 
the goals of their mission societies. Nonetheless, whether missionaries’ “converted” 
to nationalism out of real conviction or for more opportunistic reasons, German 
missionaries’ nationalism took a long time to develop, and their restrained approach 
must lead historians to reconsider the link between German Protestantism and the 
German state. 
Though the history of Germany’s Protestant missionaries has been a story of 
change, the crucial debates that shaped that change were largely localized to the first 
and second decades of the twentieth century. The long century of German mission 




movement. Missionary internationalism dominated the German Protestant mission 
movement for the entire nineteenth century and, as has been shown, did not disappear 
until after Archduke Franz Ferdinand died in Sarajevo. Missionaries in Germany 
articulated a clear, recognizable alternative communitarian ideal that did not ignore 
national concepts of identity and kinship, but rather claimed to transcend the nation 
and render ethnicity largely irrelevant. The broad reach of German mission culture 
made missionary leaders’ internationalist Christian universalism a foil to German 
nationalist movements; a role that has not been sufficiently recognized in historical 
scholarship. Furthermore, German Protestant missionaries followed an ideology of 
colonialism that was not only unique to the German colonial interest groups but also 
unusual when considered alongside British missionaries’ opinions of colonialism. 
Unlike their British counterparts, German Protestant missionaries (especially their 
intellectual leaders) questioned the value of commerce and trade to their evangelical 
project. On top of that, missionaries from the German mission societies rejected much 
of the “civilizing mission” as it had been defined by secular colonialists. To 
Germany’s missionaries, the work of creating Christians did not require the transferal 
of the artifacts and accessories of modern industrial life. German missionaries’ did 
not espouse a Christianity divested of its European antecedents, but they also did not, 
at least on paper, intend to Europeanize the globe. The longevity, forcefulness, and 
confidence of German Protestant missionaries’ religious universalism indicated 
contrary trends within German colonialism and in European missionary evangelism. 
The fundamental core of German missionaries’ different expectations of the 




movement, in particular the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift. The periodical provided 
the forum in which Protestant missionaries expressed their internationalist ideology. 
The Missionswissenschaftler who supplied the Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift with 
its material drew a stark line between the activities of missionaries and “political” 
activities. What emerged from the pages of the Protestant mission movement’s chief 
academic publication was an ideology of mission work which placed missionaries 
and their work converting indigenous peoples to Christianity above any economic or 
political program of colonization. Missionaries were cautioned against associating 
with the colonial state and counseled to focus on developing new Christian 
communities with no regard for “political” concerns. The Allgemeine Misisons-
Zeitschrift served as a key element in the creation of a German Protestant mission 
movement, copies of its issues reached every area of German Protestant mission 
culture and shaped the perceptions of mission leaders and mission supporters. Its 
strong internationalist position, especially before 1900, set the tone for German 
Protestant missionary culture. 
Internationalism was undeniably a strong ideology for Germany’s Protestant 
missionaries; however, the period after 1900 presented the German mission societies 
with difficulties that some in the movement could not answer with the principles laid 
down by Warneck and his associates. In German East Africa the events of the Maji-
Maji War and the changing character of German colonialism during the Dernburg 
Reforms disrupted Protestant missionaries’ sense of security. The expansion of the 
Catholic mission orders in the colony at the same time compounded the challenges 




Catholic Center Party and its natural sponsorship of Germany’s Catholic mission 
orders led the leaders of the Protestant mission movement, Karl Axenfeld foremost, to 
abandon many of the principles of missionary internationalism during the 
Benediktinerstreit. The Protestants of the Berlin Mission Society and their colleagues 
in the broader mission movement soon transformed the territorial conflict with the 
Benedictines into a debate over the national loyalties of Germany’s Catholics. The 
Protestants’ anti-Catholic strategy had inconclusive results but the use of nationally-
flavored rhetoric opened a breach in the internationalist redoubt. The nationalist 
strategy of the Beneditktinerstreit offered a template for missionary participation in 
the politics of the Kaiserreich. Apparently, allies could be found in parliament and in 
the public sphere if Germany’s Protestant missionaries connected themselves with 
supporters of a German Protestant national identity. 
On the other hand, missionary internationalism did not give up its supremacy 
easily. The nationalism of German colonialists outside the mission movement did not 
appeal to the Protestant mission societies. When secular colonialists tried to 
appropriate mission schools and mission activities for the purposes of colonial 
development and administration, not only did the missionaries defend themselves 
with familiar arguments about the sovereignty of the mission project; they also 
developed a theological and ethnological extension to nineteenth-century Christian 
universalism. Volkskirchen became the future of the mission church and the 
development of congregations for the Volkskirche required a commitment to 
preserving indigenous cultures. Consequently, German missionaries refused to make 




languages were the best languages for religious education and insisted that they 
would, whenever possible, instruct African schoolchildren in African tongues. 
Secular colonialists’ demands, missionaries insisted, amounted to denying 
missionaries the best tool for evangelizing non-Western peoples. Germany’s 
Protestant mission movement refused to adapt its educational and linguistic policies 
to economic colonialist demands for a “suitable” African workforce. Missionaries’ 
educational goals were to create independent, self-supporting African churches made 
up of independent, self-supporting African Christians. Furthermore, missionaries 
argued that the transformation of African culture was not their goal. As missionaries 
described it, if they could convert African societies to Christian societies without 
destroying “healthy” African cultural practices then they would do so. Missionaries 
rallied around the internationalist and Christian universalist ethos of mission 
education and successfully defended the independence of their schools. In German 
East Africa this defense did involve a compromise with the colonial state, but the 
result was the adoption by the colonial government of an indigenous African 
language, Swahili, for its activities and a shift by mission schools towards a regional 
African language over local indigenous languages. 
The conflicts over schools and with the Catholics in East Africa reached their 
crescendo in the decade before World War I. The years after 1900 had begun to 
demand more of missionaries, and missionaries faced increasingly tough financial 
challenges. Missionaries were no longer the only group interested in Africans; 
colonial administrations, colonial development schemes, and Catholic mission fields 




economic change worldwide caused missionaries to worry over the future of their 
non-European congregants; and the intensifying nationalism that came to color 
international relations and domestic politics within Germany challenged German 
missionaries’ self-conceptions. Missionaries’ inability to raise the money needed to 
sustain their operations in an increasingly challenging field exposed new 
vulnerabilities. After abortive attempts to improve the mission societies’ financial 
positions failed, some in the mission movement became open to alternative 
fundraising methods. The initiative proposed to celebrate Kaiser Wilhelm II’s twenty-
fifth jubilee disrupted missionaries’ internationalism and made 1913 the most 
significant year for missionary nationalism’s gradual triumph. The Nationalspende 
zum Kaisersjubiläum für die christlichen Missionen in den deutschen Kolonien und 
Schutzgebieten revealed in the most fundamental way the superior utility of 
nationalism for German Protestant missionaries’ needs. Its fundraising success 
resurrected the financial condition of the Protestant mission movement. And the 
thoroughly nationalist Nationalspende provided a powerful counterpoint to the 
internationalist excitement following the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference of 
1910. 
The Edinburgh Conference was the most tangible proof of Germany’s 
Protestant missionaries’ internationalism. The restrained attitude of Germany’s 
missionaries to the earliest international conferences of the 1860s, -70s, and -80s 
revealed that the German mission movement had very specific expectations for 
international conferences. The German mission movement had, by the 1890s, 




starting on the local level and ascending to a continent-wide conference held every 
five years in Bremen, the Continental Mission Conference. The most local 
conferences were expected to deal with the very local and very specific tasks of 
inspiring mission confidence and mission support within the cities, towns, and 
villages of Germany’s Protestant localities. The regional conferences served to 
provide the pastors and mission supporters who made up the local leadership of the 
mission movement with opportunities to share their ideas and learn new techniques 
for improving Germany’s “Missionsgeist.” At the top of the hierarchy, the national 
conferences in Germany gave mission society leaders, Missionswissenschaftler, and 
other experts the opportunity to discuss and debate the practical tools of mission work 
in the mission fields. Missionaries in Germany hoped for, and received in 1900 in 
New York and especially in 1910 in Edinburgh, an international missionary 
conference that could take a strategic view of the entire international evangelical 
project. The success of the Edinburgh World Missionary Conference validated 
German missionaries’ expectations and refilled the cup of internationalism that had 
nearly been emptied by 1910. In the years immediately after 1910 German Protestant 
missionaries exulted in a revitalized internationalism that they believed had the 
potential to develop into a fully mature and institutionalized international mission 
movement. 
In July 1914 the German mission movement was balanced delicately between 
a long-resisted nationalist mission ideology and the traditional internationalism of 
Christian universalism. On the one hand, the stresses of colonial development and the 




was nationalism. On the other hand, the old ideas of mission supremacy in the 
colonized world, the Volkskirche concept, and the unambiguous performance of 
missionary internationalism at Edinburgh appeared to prove the ongoing reliability 
and value of the internationalist path. The outbreak of war in 1914 and the ongoing 
hostilities thereafter helped tip the balance to nationalism. The real and imagined 
behavior of British missionary leaders during the war, the human and financial losses 
of the war, and the climate of fervent nationalism within the Kaiserreich all 
demolished the support for internationalism within the German mission community. 
By 1917 no one in Germany expected a renewal of mission internationalism, and the 
peace treaty signed at Versailles transformed the German mission movement so that it 
would have been unrecognizable to the internationalist stalwarts Warneck and Zahn. 
This account of the history of the Protestant mission movement in Germany 
during the nineteenth century has revealed a number of important questions that, if 
they could be answered, would clarify the social, political, and cultural influence of 
the German mission societies and their missionaries upon Germany during the period 
of high imperialism. The question of mission finances is an area which demands 
greater attention. It would be invaluable to know more about the size and sources of 
donations received by mission societies. In particular, the regional distribution of 
support needs closer analysis. Mission societies had deep roots in the provincial 
towns and small villages of Germany and a clear understanding of the financial 
involvement of the average resident of these towns and villages would shed important 
light upon the extent and reach of the German mission movement. Furthermore, such 




German communities and non-Western communities abroad forged by the German 
mission societies. By charting the connections between Germans’ daily lives and the 
lives of colonized peoples, historians could develop a better understanding of the 
penetration of ideas about race, about world commerce, and about colonialism into 
German society. 
A second area that needs greater explanation is the role of Islam in the history 
of the German mission movement. One of the declared goals of the Edinburgh 
Conference was to defeat Islam; the German missionaries in East Africa feared the 
growing strength of the faith in the colony; and a core component of Germany’s 
Weltpolitik after 1900 included closer ties with the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, 
Germany had a long history of orientalist study stretching back at least to the 
Enlightenment. German missionaries’ anxieties about Muslims played an important 
role in their conflict with the Benedictines of St. Ottilien. It would be beneficial to 
develop a better understanding of missionaries’ knowledge and preconceptions about 
Islam. Protestant missionaries’ suspicion that the twentieth century would be a 
century in which the great faiths of the world clashed might have had some impact on 
how missionaries interpreted their relationship with the German state, European 
imperialism, and the industrial capitalism of nineteenth-century globalization.  
Finally, this dissertation would materially benefit from more extensive 
research in the archives of the German colonial period held in Tanzanian archives. 
Such research would allow for a more substantial discussion of how missionaries’ 
experiences in Africa shaped their interpretation of the church-state relationship. 




similar pattern to missionaries’ dealings with the secular state. However, if the 
encounter with African leaders and societies had a different effect on Germany’s 
mission ideology then the answer is likely to lie in the records of missionaries and 
colonial administrators in local and regional archives in the former colony. 
Furthermore, many of the case studies, anecdotes, and personalities included in the 
analysis of this dissertation would benefit from additional material better able to 
provide the “on-the-ground” perspective than the records in missionary and 
administrative archival collections in Germany can. 
 
Germany’s Protestant missionary movement was a political and cultural 
phenomenon that redefined the relationship between the German state and the 
German Protestant church. For most of the nineteenth century German missionaries 
were more interested in the ties that bound them to other Christians and to “heathens” 
beyond Germany’s borders than they were interested in their membership in a 
German nation. Missionaries’ imagined internationalism created a different ideology 
of colonialism, and this explanation opens the history of German imperialism and 
German nationalism to a new analysis that questions the totalizing definitions 
frequently deployed to describe these two important elements of Germany’s 
nineteenth-century history. The experiences of Germans and Africans during the first 
period of globalization before the First World War were shaped by German 
missionaries’ ideology and, at the same time, by historical contingencies. African 
motivations played a role in the forms that German mission work and mission 




intents and experiences. Those intents and experiences have revealed that German 
Protestant missionaries preferred the work of founding an empire of Christians to the 
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